Distinguished Co-Chairs,

Implementation of the Ottawa Convention requires a clear understanding of its provisions, the obligations it imposes and the possibilities it affords. A number of questions have been consistently raised about how States Parties interpret and implement certain aspects of Articles 1 and 2, in particular in relation to the issues of joint military operations with non-States Parties, the prohibition on “assist,” foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices.

Since Moldova has not been engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties have had on these matters, my delegation requested the floor under this agenda item to briefly outline our positions.

Concerning the Article 1 of the Ottawa Convention. It is our firm belief that States Parties engaging in military operations with other states or groups of states should not:

- participate in planning for use of anti-personnel mines;
- train others to use anti-personnel mines;
- participate in operations wherein direct military benefit is known by the State Party to be derived from the use of anti-personnel mines;
- agree to rules of engagement permitting the use of anti-personnel mines;
- or request others to use anti-personnel mines.

We are strongly behind the view that Article 1 prohibits transit of antipersonnel mines across, or the foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines on, territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party.
The Republic of Moldova is a neutral State. Consequently, Moldovan troops are not allowed to participate in any *joint military operations*. Also, the Article 11 of the Moldovan Constitution prohibits the dispersal of foreign military troops and, implicitly, their ammunitions on the Moldovan territory.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity and to call, once more, on non-states parties, including those of the Commonwealth of Independent States, that have troops and ammunitions deployed on the territory of other sovereign states, in particular those affected by internal conflicts, to immediately withdraw or destroy the existing stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, in conditions of full transparency.

It is in this context that we also call on the Russian Federation, a non-State Party, to provide officially to Moldovan authorities and to relevant international structures the available information in regard to any type of anti-personnel mines which might be held by its military forces deployed illegally on the territory of the Republic of Moldova or about the landmines transfers to separatist transnistrean armed structures in 1992 or latter, if this was the case.

Distinguished delegates,

It is our firm belief that all mines, including *anti-vehicle* ones, designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons, do fall within the scope of the Ottawa Convention and are thus prohibited by the Convention.

We fully share the view that a mine equipped with a sensitive fuze or sensitive antihandling device, capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person, should be considered an anti-personnel mine and banned under the Convention, regardless of an attached label possibly calling it an anti-vehicle mine, and of the respective amount of explosives going with it.

In conclusion I wish to inform the distinguished audience, for the record, that Moldova does not produce nor does it hold in its stockpiles antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes.

Thank you for your attention.