


# **REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA**



## **ARTICLE 7 REPORT FOR YEAR 2001**

**To the Secretary General of the United Nations**

**On the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,  
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of  
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction**


## FOREWORD

**By Mr Pavli ZERI, Deputy Minister of Defence**

The Minister of Defence in the Republic of Albania presents its compliments to the Secretary General of the United Nations and has the honour to Submit this Article 7 Report in respect of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, for the calendar year 2001.

I am pleased to report that Albania has made excellent progress with regard stockpile destruction. In 2001 a project was implemented under the auspices of a NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund to destroy the entire stockpile of 1,607,420 mines. The project, which has been designed and executed by NATO's Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), is at an advanced stage and over 1.2 million mines were destroyed by reverse engineering during 2001. Stockpile destruction is programmed for completion by mid April 2002 and is on schedule.

Conversely, progress in Mines Action has been disappointingly slow with little progress on the clearance of mine and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) contamination that occurred during the Kosovo crisis. Support from the international community for humanitarian demining has been very limited and there currently appears to be little prospect of progress in 2002. The Government of Albania is urgently considering ways in which we can increase activity in Mine Action that will significantly reduce or eliminate the current serious humanitarian threat.



## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1. Albania ratified the Ottawa Treaty on 29 February 2000 subsequent to the November 1999 introduction of a decree making law the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty. Prior to ratification, the Government of Albania ordered the clearing of anti-personnel mines that had been deployed in limited numbers to protect government property during the period of civil unrest in 1997.
2. During the Kosovo crisis the area of the Albania-Kosovo border became contaminated with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines as well as Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) of Serbian, UÇK and NATO origin. Since the end of the Kosovo crisis, 194 incidents have occurred which have killed 22 people and injured 210 within Albanian territory. This represents some 25% of the total number of the post Kosovo conflict casualties. It is also very likely that casualties that occurred in Albania were reported in Kosovo as victims sought medical attention there.
3. In response to the threat, the Government of Albania formed the political and executive bodies to formulate and execute plans to clear the contaminated areas. Unfortunately, progress in clearing the contaminated area is slow and at the current rate it will take approximately 57 years to complete. Albania does not possess the resources or expertise to carry out the Mine Action Plan (MAP) and international assistance has been very limited.
4. Progress has been made with regard to victim assistance and mine reduction education with support from international organisations. The physical marking of known mined areas presents a continuous challenge due to lack of resources and constant theft of minefield markers.
5. Stockpile destruction is at an advanced stage. Some 75% of the original stockpile of 1,607,420 APM has been destroyed by an ongoing project implemented under the auspices of a NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund. The mines are being transported from their storage locations by the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) and are being destroyed by reverse engineering at ULP Mjekës, a government explosives factory. Materials recovered from the disassembled mines are being recycled into useful products for infrastructure improvement projects in Albania and Kosovo.
6. Albania no longer possesses facilities or equipment specific to the manufacture of APM.
7. Stockpile destruction is being adequately addressed. In 2002 it is the intention of the Government of Albania to increase focus on mine action and to urgently seek additional support for humanitarian demining.

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## **SECTION 1 – NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES**

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9."

*Remark:* In accordance with Article 9, "Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control".

### **1.1 Legislation**

On 11 November 1999, law No. 8547 on the Ratification of the Convention "on the ban of APM, use storage, production, transfer and their destruction" came into force in the Republic of Albania. This law brought into legal force the obligations of the Ottawa Treaty.

### **1.2 Mine Action**

#### **Introduction**

As a result of the Kosovo crisis of 1998/1999 Serb forces laid large numbers of mines and fired artillery and other munitions on the border with Albania. The result of this is that some 120 kilometres of border up to 400 metres into Albania as well as some isolated munitions impact areas up to 20 kilometres beyond the border are contaminated; a total assessed area of some 1400 hectares. This affects Tropojë, Kukës and Has Districts in North Eastern Albania which are three of the most economically depressed areas in the country.

#### **1.2.1 Albanian Mine Action Committee**

In October 1999 the Albanian Mine Action Committee (AMAC) was formed as the overall executive and policy making body for mine action. This is chaired by the Deputy Minister of Defence with membership drawn from the Ministries of Local Government, Interior, Health and Foreign Affairs as well as the UNDP Resident Representative.

The terms of reference for the AMAC include the following:

- ☐ Act as the national focus for mine action.
- ☐ To seek donor funding and assistance to the de-mining programme.
- ☐ To prioritise de-mining efforts in Albania.
- ☐ To sensitise the international community to the mines threat in Albania.
- ☐ Ratify the Ottawa treaty through destruction of the AAF stockpile of anti-personnel mines.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Mine ban Treaty was ratified on 29 February 2000.

### 1.2.2 The Albanian Mine Action Executive

At the same time the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) was established to carry out the mine action programme under direction of the AMAC.

The AMAE is headed by a Director who is appointed by the AMAC. The current incumbent is an EOD trained officer of the AAF. The terms of reference for the AMAE included the following:

- ❑ Produce and maintain a Mine Action Programme.
- ❑ Coordination, oversight and monitoring of all Mine Action activities inline with AMAC priorities.
- ❑ Accreditation, Validation and Quality Assurance of Mine Action activity.
- ❑ Collection collation, maintenance and dissemination of mines and UXO related data and statistics.
- ❑ Monitor and report on de-mining progress.
- ❑ Survey and marking of mine contaminated areas.
- ❑ Produce and maintain Mine Action Procedures based on UN Standards.
- ❑ Investigate all mine-related incidents and accidents.
- ❑ Liaison with external Mine Action bodies.

### 1.2.3 Surveys

The General Mine Action Assessment (formerly incorporating Level 1 Surveys) is ongoing. This is the responsibility of the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) with assistance by CARE funded consultants in 1999. These surveys identified that the contaminated area covered some 120 kilometres of border running from Shishtavec, in the south, to an area north of Tropoje and to a depth of up to 400 metres into Albania; an area of some 1400 hectares. This area is shown on the schematic map and summarised in the tables in Section 3.

Technical Survey began on an ad-hoc basis in 2000 and on a more organised basis in 2001. To date approximately 15% of the area identified as contaminated during the General Mines Action Assessment process has been subjected to Technical Survey. This process has produced encouraging results both in identifying mine and UXO affected areas more accurately and also in the area reduction process. It is hoped to continue the process in 2002.

### 1.2.4 Mine Clearance

Three demining organisations have been active in Albania during 2000 and 2001.

These are:

- **HELP International.** A German Government funded operation. This has consisted of two 8 man de-mining teams operating alongside a road at Qaf-Morine in Tropojë District. These teams are made up of experienced Bosnian team leaders and locally recruited and trained de-miners. One team is made up of individuals from the Has area and the other from Tropojë. The operation has been methodical and is assessed as being of acceptable quality, however it has been extremely slow. The HELP Project Manager has been investigating the provision of both mechanical and Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) support for the future, subject to sufficient funding in an attempt to accelerate clearance rates.
- **Swiss Federation for Mine Action.** This operation has received funding from Swiss Government and Slovenian Trust Fund / US Government. This has consisted of four manual teams made up of locally recruited and trained de-miners each supervised by an expatriate supervisor. Operations have been carried out in 5 areas within Kukës and Has districts. The main emphasis has been on battle area clearance of KB-1 sub-munitions strike areas using search instruments. These areas were surface cleared by the AAF teams in 1999. Two large AP and AT mined areas have also been cleared. SFMA also introduced MDD support in October 2001 in attempt to accelerate clearance rates. This was apparently achieved but was compromised at the end of October when it was found that the dogs were failing to detect the TMM-1 anti-tank mine.
- **RONCO** Funded by Slovenian Trust Fund / US Government. This operation has utilised limited mechanical MDD in support of manual teams made up of seasoned de-miners from Bosnia. Operations have been carried out over two years on an area close to the border crossing at Quaf Prushit. In spite of the integrated nature of the operation progress has again been limited. This may be a function of the selection of mechanical equipment and its appropriateness for the operational area.

The clearance rates achieved have been disappointing as they have been both small-scale and relied on basic manual clearance methods which, though offering high levels of clearance confidence, are slow and not particularly cost effective. In summary these operations have cleared a total of less than 50 hectares in the past two years, which has made little impact on the global problem within Albania representing less than 3% of the total contaminated area. The clearance results, as at 31 October 2001 are summarised in the table below:

Table 1-1

2000		2001	
<b>RONCO</b>	10.8 hectares 1102 x AP mines 100 x UXO	<b>RONCO</b>	10.73 hectares 329 x AP mines
<b>HELP</b>	0.7 hectares 84 x AP mines 7 x UXO	<b>HELP</b>	1.84 hectares 146 x AP mines 3 x UXO
		<b>SFMA</b>	17.63 hectares 25 x AT mines 269 x AP mines 112 UXO (102 x KB1)

	2000	2001
<b>Totals</b>	41.7 hectares 1930 x AP mines 25 x AT mines 222 x UXO	


### 1.2.5 Summary

Overall the response to requests for assistance in Humanitarian Demining in Albania has been enormously disappointing. Some 25% of the post Kosovo conflict casualties have occurred on Albania territory. At the current rate of progress it will take 57 years to clear Albania-Kosovo border of mines and UXO during which time further casualties will occur.

**Section 1 Photographic supplement**  
**Mine Action**




A Serbian PMR-2 APM in the Has district, 1999.



The AAF conducts a survey operation during 1999 to scope the extent of APM and UXO contamination.



Mine victims from the Kukës area.



A deminer checks his instrument before starting clearance operations.



A deminer at work in the Tropojë area.



A Serbian KB-1 bomblet in the Kukës district.

## SECTION 2 – STOCKPILED ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

Article 7. 1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled."

### 2.1 Stockpiled APM pre-ratification.

Prior to the commencement of the destruction process during 2001, Albania possessed the following stockpiled APM:

Table 2-1

Ser	Mine Type <sup>2</sup>	Equivalent	Quantity
1	Mine AP Wood	RFAS PMD-6 (Wooden body)	234,980
2	Mine AP Bakelite	RFAS PMD-6 (Bakelite body)	310,290
3	Mine AP Fragmentation	Chinese Type 59	930,050
4	Mine AP Fibre	Chinese Type 58 (Blast)	132,100
<b>Total</b>			<b>1,607,420</b>

#### 2.1.1 Locations.

The APM were held at 57 different secure military storage depots locations throughout Albania.

### 2.2 Residual stockpile as at 31 Dec 01

Table 2-1

Ser	Mine Type	Quantity
1	Mine AP Wood	25,405
2	Mine AP Bakelite	65,211
3	Mine AP Fragmentation	247,584
4	Mine AP Fibre	94,510
<b>Total</b>		<b>432,710</b>

<sup>2</sup> Local Albanian Military Designation.


### SECTION 3 – LOCATION OF MINED AREAS

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced."

#### 3.1 Albania-Kosovo Border

APM contamination in Albania is limited to the Albania-Kosovo border:



During the Kosovo crisis in 1998/1999 Serb military and para-military forces laid large numbers of mines along the Kosovo border with Northern Albania. In addition to defensive minefields within Kosovo it was discovered that mines were also laid within Albanian territory as both defensive measures, where topographical and tactical conditions made this necessary, and also as an interdiction measure against assembly points and infiltration routes being used by the Kosova Liberation Army (UÇK).

### 3.2 Mine Types

The mines threat is a combination of anti-personnel mines: PMA-1, PMA-2 and PMA-3 blast mines and PROM and PMR-2A fragmentation mines and anti-tank mines: TMM-1, TMA-4 and TMA-5. Almost all mines encountered have been of Yugoslavian manufacture.

As the crisis escalated and an Allied invasion, (OPERATION ALLIED FORCE), seemed imminent Serb forces subjected possible military forming-up areas and the civilian population to fire from artillery, mortars and the Ababel 50 Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) containing KB-1 sub-munitions. NATO also fired a number of munitions onto the border area, some of which inadvertently landed in Albanian territory.

The result of this military activity is that some 120 kilometres of border up to 400 metres into Albania as well as some isolated munitions impact areas up to 20 kilometres beyond the border are contaminated; a total assessed area of some 1400 hectares.

The contaminated areas are summarised in the maps at paragraph 3.1. One shows the location of the three affected areas and the other delineates the actual areas contaminated along the border with Kosovo. A total of 85 separate contaminated areas have been identified. These are summarised in the table below.

#### Tables of Identified Mined Areas in Albania

Table 3-1 Tropojë district

Sar No	District	Comment	Location	Map Number	Map Sheet Reference	Area (hectares)	Area Dated
1	Tropoje	Qerem	Kerahi / Ujikut	K-34-53-A-c	21-13-c+d	1.3	
2					22-23-a+b+c	25	
3					22-14-d	12.5	
4					23-14-c	4.37	
5					23-13-a+d	37.5	
6					24-13-a	3.12	19.08.99
7			q. e Ali Qeles		25-12-d	12.5	
8					25-11-b	12.5	20.08.99
9			Stanet e Sulbices	K-34-53-A-d	29-09-a+d	17.5	21.08.99
10					30-09-c	5	
11		Tropoje	m. Brevines	K-34-53-C-b	31-07	8.75	23.08.99
12					31-06	8.75	
13					32-06	12.5	
14			m. Gilaves		35-00	37.5	25.08.99
15					35-99	28.1	
16					36-99	21.8	
17			Gegaj/Kamenice		35-98	13.2	07.09.99
18					36-98	31.2	
19			Kasaj/q. Morin	K-34-53-C-d	35-98	12.5	28.08.99
20					36-98	6.2	
21					34-97	3.1	
22					35-97	37.5	
23			q. Morin P. Nr.6		34-96	13.1	01.09.99
24					35-96	16.8	
25			Fagja e Uriantes		35-95	21.8	02.09.99
26					36-95	18.7	
27					36-94	12.5	
28					35-94	21.8	
29					35-93	28.1	
30			m. I Zymit		37-92-b+d	25	06.09.99
31			Lugu i zi/q. e Qobanit		37-91a+d	25	09.09.99
32			Lugu i zi/m. Pellumbit		37-90-a+c	19.6	15.09.99
33			q. e Gjonajve		37-89-b+d	25	15.09.99
34		Pac	Zherke / m. Padines	K-34-65-A-b	37-88	21.8	16.09.99



Ser No	District	Commune	Location	Map Number	Map Sheet Reference	Area (Hectares)	Area Marked
35					37-87	9.3	
36			Zogaj / Stobert	K-34-65-B-a	38-87	21.8	17.09.99
37					39-87	17.5	
38			m. Sulca e Lekes		40-87	25	18.09.99
39					41-87	37.5	
40			Zogaj /q. e Veres		42-87-a+c	21.8	19.09.99
41			Zogaj/ m. Gjata		43-87	21.8	20.09.99
42					42-86	6.2	
43					43-86	6.2	
44			Zogaj /q. Kacines		44-87	31.2	
45					45-88	32.8	06.08.99
46				K-34-65-B-a	45-87	17.5	
47					46-87	37.5	
48			Zogaj/ m. Kralices		46-86	37.5	09.08.99
49					47-86	12.5	
50					47-85	25	
51					48-85	12.5	
TOTAL			Has District			578.19	

Table 3-2 Has district

Ser No	District	Commune	Location	Map Number	Map Sheet Reference	Area (Hectares)	Area Marked
52	Has	Letaj	q. Prushit	K-34-65-B-b	48-85	15.6	09.08.99
53					(49-85) +(49-84)	25	
54			I.Kurpal		50-85	3.1	10.08.99
55					50-84	25	
56			I. Bardhosh		50-83-a-b	37.5	11.08.99
57		Golaj	Dobruna/ Zylfaj		51-83-c-d	25	12.08.99
58			m. Shkukzes		52-83	15.6	12.08.99
59					52-82	15.6	
60					53-82	25	
61			m. Shullanit		54-82-c-d	25	13.08.99
62		Golaj/Dobruna	Shpella e Pellumbave		(55-82) + (55-81)	34.3	13.08.99
63		Vlahena	m. Kunoresh		(56-81) +(56-80)	26.2	16.08.99
64					57-79	8.7	
65			q. e Mullareve	K-34-65-B-d	57-79	9.3	17.08.99
66					58-78	17.5	
67			m. Pishes/Pashtrik	K-34-66-A-c	58-59	17.5	18.08.99
68					(59-77) + (59-76)	13.1	
69		Kishaj	Pogaj		61-71	8.7	20.08.99
70					62-72	2.5	
71				k-34-66-C-a	62-70	1.2	
TOTAL			Has District			381.4	

Table 3-3 Kukës district

Ser No	District	Commune	Location	Map Number	Map Sheet Reference	Area (Hectares)	Area Marked
72		Bardhoc	Morini	K-34-66-C-a	62-69	2.5	26.08.99
73					62-68	1.2	
74					63-68	7.5	
75					63-67	7.5	
76			Livadhët e Camerise		63-66-b-d	5.6	27.08.99
77			Piramida Nr.12		64-66	2.8	30.08.99
78					64-65	17.5	
79			Padina e madhe		63-63-b	4.3	30.08.99
80			Padina e vogël p.13		64-62-a	1.8	31.08.99
81	Kukës	Zapod	Pakisht	K-34-66-C-c	65-57-a-c	3.7	01.09.99
82			Orgjost		66-56-c	3.7	03.09.99
83			Borje / m. Zeze		66-54	6.2	07.09.99
84					66-53	6.2	
85		Shishtavec	Livadhët mbi P.K	K-34-78-A-a	68-49-a-b	2	10.09.99
TOTAL			KUKËS District			71.4	
GRAND TOTAL						1400 ha	

### **3.3 Other mine affected areas.**

There are no other known mine affected areas in Albania. Property owned by the Ministry of Defense mined as protective defense measures in former times was cleared by the AAF prior to ratification of the Treaty in February 2000.

## **SECTION 4 – APM'S RETAINED OR TRANSFERRED**

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3"

### **4.1 Retention**

Albania has concluded there are no justifiable reasons for the retention of APM for training or any other purpose. Therefore, the entire stockpile will be destroyed.

### **4.2 Transfer**

Albania had not received any request for the transfer on APM by authorized institutions. The stockpile is being destroyed locally and therefore no transfer is necessary.

## **SECTION 5 – STATUS OF PROGRAMMES FOR CONVERSION**

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities."

### **5.1 Decommissioning of manufacturing facilities**

Albania originally possessed two facilities with the capability of manufacturing APM; ULP Mjekës in central Albania and KM Poliçan in the south of the country. Both facilities are elements of the Military Industry but have not manufactured explosives or ammunition in many years. Both facilities have transformed their activities to ammunition demilitarization under the auspices of Albanian Government and NATO projects.

#### **5.5.1 Manufacturing facility KM Poliçan.**

KM Poliçan no longer possesses equipment unique to the manufacture of APM.

#### **5.1.2 Manufacturing facility ULP Mjekës.**

The former facility at ULP Mjekës has been converted to demilitarize APM under the auspices of a NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) project. This facility too no longer possesses equipment unique to the manufacture of APM.

**Section 5 Photographic supplement**  
**Programme for conversion**




The former APM manufacturing facility at  
ULP Mjekës undergoing conversion.  
(July 2001)



The fully converted facility which is currently  
being used to demilitarize Albania's stockpiled  
APM. (September 2001)



The former APM manufacturing facility at KM  
Poliçan (1).



The former APM manufacturing facility at KM  
Poliçan (2).

Note:  
No equipment specific to the manufacture of APM exists at ULP Mjekës or KM  
Poliçan.

## **SECTION 6 – STATUS OF PROGRAMMES FOR DESTRUCTION**

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed."

### **6.1 APM stockpile destruction project**

A project to destroy the entire stockpile of APMs commenced in January 2001.

### **6.2 Outline Concept of the project**

NATO, under the auspices of a PfP Trust Fund, initiated a project to destroy the entire stockpile of APM in September 2000. Canada is the project sponsor and 7 other members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council have contributed financially.

The project established a demilitarization facility at the government owned explosives factory ULP Mjekës for the destruction of the entire APM stockpile by reverse engineering. Open burning and open detonation techniques are not used in this project. The explosives extracted from the mines are being recycled into a blasting explosive (Ammonite) for use in civil engineering projects to assist in the reconstruction of the Albanian and Kosovo economy. Metals recovered are also being recycled locally to the benefit of the Albanian citizens.

The process lines at ULP Mjekës will optimistically provide a foundation for the development of a munitions demilitarization industry for the urgently required destruction of other munitions stockpiles in Albania.

Albania's contribution to the project is the operation of the demilitarization facility and transportation of the mines to ULP Mjekës from the estimated 57 storage locations throughout Albania.

The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) is the executing agency. NAMSA has contracted AAF to provide logistical support (loading and transportation) of the mines to ULP Mjekës. NAMSA also concluded a negotiated contract with the demilitarization facility for the destruction of the APM stockpile. NAMSA also awarded a contract by competitive tender to a demilitarization company in Germany to design, production and installation of specialist machines required for the demilitarization of the APM stockpile.

The project is being coordinated locally by a small NAMSA sponsored team are coordinating the various agencies involved and providing technical support to the contractors and training where necessary. The team is responsible for monitoring technical, safety, environmental and accounting standards set down in the various contracts.

The estimated cost of the project is USD 790,000.


**Section 6 Photographic supplement**  
**Programme for destruction**




Preparing fibre mines for autoclaving.




Engineers commissioning mine body crushing equipment.



Engineers from EBV Germany train ULP Mjekës staff in the operation of a TNT block crushing machine.



NAMSA's Peter Courtney-Green evaluates the locally manufactured fibre mine autoclave.



Mine bodies are being recycled to manhole covers and other non-military items.



TNT explosive is recycled to ammonite which is used in construction projects in Albania and Kosovo.

## SECTION 7 – APMs DESTROYED AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4"

### 7.1 Mines destroyed


Table 7-1 below describes progress in stockpile destruction during 2001.

Table 7-1

Ser	Mine Type <sup>3</sup>	Original	Destroyed	Remaining
1	Mine AP Wood	234,980	209,575	25,405
2	Mine AP Bakelite	310,290	245,079	65,211
3	Mine AP Fragmentation	930,050	682,466	247,584
4	Mine AP Fibre	132,100	37,590	94,510
<b>Totals</b>		<b>1,607,420</b>	<b>1,174,710</b>	<b>432,710</b>

Graph 7-1 below graphically depicts Albania's reducing APM stockpile.

Graph 7-1 Mines destroyed during 2001.



<sup>3</sup> Local Albanian Military Designation.



## SECTION 8 – TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance"

### 8.1 Mine AP Wood / Bakelite

#### 8.1.1 Introduction

The Mine Anti-Personnel Wood / Bakelite is an approximate copy of the RFAS PMD-6 and was manufactured in large quantities in Albania and there exists an identical counterpart which has a body made of bakelite. The majority of these mines were manufactured in Albania but a quantity of 150,000 were imported from the former Soviet Union between 1953 and 1959.

Mine Anti-Personnel Wood is a simple box design the origins of which can be traced back to the second world war.


#### 8.1.2 Manufacturer

Mines were manufactured the ULP Mjekës and KM Poliçan facilities.

#### 8.1.3 Components

Components of the mine<sup>4</sup>


1. Arming rod.
2. Mine body
3. Fuze SHT
4. TNT charge



<sup>4</sup> AAF Publication "Manual per Perdorimin E Minave Dhe Te Explosivava Ne luften Populorre" January 2002

### Components of the Fuze SHT

1. Striker body
2. Striker
3. Striker spring
4. Safety pin
5. Detonator



#### 8.1.4 Method of operation

Mine Anti-Personnel Wood may be operated by pressure or tripwire. The fuze assembly is inserted into mine and the detonator is pressed home into the TNT explosive charge. In the pressure the winged striker-retaining pin is turned through 90 degrees to align the flattened end of the pin with the elliptical striker retaining pin hole. The lid of the mine then rests on the wings. Once armed, pressure applied on the lid simply pushes the pin out of the fuze assembly allowing the striker to impinge on the detonator.

#### 8.1.5 Safety arrangements

The striker mechanisms and detonators are store unassembled but in the same package.

#### 8.1.6 Containers


The mines, both Bakelite and wood variants are packed in various configurations in wooden packaging.

Table 8.1.1 - Technical Specifications


<b>Local designations</b>	Mina KK- Druri
<b>Local catalogue numbers(s)</b>	2505 (Wooden body) 2510 (Bakelite body)
<b>Operating pressure</b>	1 to 12 kg
<b>Dimensions</b>	200mm x 90mm x 45
<b>Colour</b>	Unfinished softwoods, green, black and grey.
<b>Body material</b>	Softwoods or Bakelite
<b>Weight of mine</b>	460 g
<b>Explosive type</b>	TNT, wax paper wrapped, unmarked.
<b>Explosive weight</b>	200 g

Table 8.1.2 – General Information

<b>Emplacement</b>	By hand only
<b>Depth laid<sup>5</sup></b>	1-2 cm below the ground, covered.
<b>Detectability</b>	Easily detectable
<b>Anti-handling</b>	None
<b>Blast resistance<sup>6</sup></b>	Very susceptible to counter-charging.
<b>Cross reference</b>	Chinese type 59, FRY PMD-1, Czech PP Mi-D




Mine AP Bakelite boxed



Mine AP Bakelite, open.



Mine AP Wood boxed



Mine AP Wood, open.

## 8.2 Mine AP Fragmentation

### 8.2.1 Introduction

The Mine Anti-Personnel Fragmentation is a simple design that has been copied by many countries. The mine an approximate copy of the Chinese type 59 and was manufactured in large quantities in Albania as well as being imported from both China and the RFAS.

There are two variations of the mine; one has a screw-fit striker and the other a push-fit.

<sup>5</sup> As taught by the Albanian Armed Forces

<sup>6</sup> Blast resistance to counter-charging.


### 8.2.2 Manufacturer.

Manufactured at ULP Mjekës and KM Poliçan facilities.

### 8.2.3 Components

Components of the mine<sup>7</sup>

1. Mine body
2. Explosive charge
3. Striker mechanism
4. Release pin
5. Tensioner
6. Trip wire
7. Anchor stake
8. Mine stake



### 8.2.4 Method of operation

The fuze is fitted with either a push-fit or screwed detonator as appropriate and fitted in the fuze-well. The anchored trip-wire is attached to the release pin and the safety pin can then be removed from the mine. When the trip-wire is pulled, the pin is extracted allowing the pre-cocked striker to impinge on the detonator.

### 8.2.5 Safety arrangements

The striker mechanisms and detonators are both stored unassembled, but within the same package.

### 8.2.6 Containers

The mines are invariably packed 10 to a wooden package, with all necessary components.


Table 8.2.1 - Technical Specifications

<b>Local designations</b>	Mina MKK-TH
<b>Local catalogue numbers(s)</b>	2508 Mine AP Frag w/screw thread 2509 Mine AP Frag w/o screw thread
<b>Operating pressure</b>	1 to 3 kg
<b>Dimensions</b>	130mm x 60mm
<b>Colour</b>	Green, grey, brown, kaki and sand. (Applicable to mine body and stake)
<b>Body material</b>	Cast iron
<b>Weight of mine</b>	2.3Kg all up with components.
<b>Explosive type</b>	TNT, wax paper wrapped, usually unmarked.
<b>Explosive weight</b>	75 g


<sup>7</sup> AAF Publication "Manual per Perdorimin E Minave Dhe Te Explozivava Ne luften Populorre"

Table 8.2.2 – General Information


<b>Emplacement</b>	By hand only
<b>Depth laid<sup>8</sup></b>	Laid above surface, on stake.
<b>Detectability</b>	Easily visibly detectable.
<b>Anti-handling</b>	None
<b>Blast resistance<sup>9</sup></b>	Difficult to counter-charge because of thickness of mine wall.
<b>Cross reference</b>	Chinese type 58, Czech PP-Mi-Sk, FRY MPR-1.




Boxed mines



Mine body and charge



Detonator



Striker mechanism

### 8.3 Mine AP Fibre

#### 8.3.1 Introduction

The Mine AP Fibre is a pressure operated AP mine that was introduced into service in the early 1960s. The Mine Anti-Personnel Fibre are in fact the RFAS PMN and Chinese type 58 (Blast mine). Imports from China and the RFAS over the period 1969-70.

#### 8.3.2 Manufactures

China and the RFAS.


#### 8.3.3 Components

Components of the mine and fuze

<sup>8</sup> As taught by the Albanian Armed Forces

<sup>9</sup> Blast resistance to counter-charging.

1. Fibre mine body
2. Rubber lid
3. Fuze assembly
4. Detonator
5. Explosive charge.
6. Safety pin
7. Lid securing ring.



#### 8.3.4 Method of operation

The Mine Anti-Personnel Fibre is operated by pressure. The fuze assembly is inserted into the mine transversely and the detonator and striker are kept out of line by the plunger. When the safety pin is removed it starts a lead shear-wire decay mechanism, which provides a safe-to-arm period of up to 20 minutes. When armed and sufficient pressure is exerted on the mine the plunger moves down allowing the striker to impinge on the detonator.

#### 8.3.5 Safety arrangements

Fuzes are not stored in the mines. Packages of fuzes are stored in the same outer container for operational convenience.

#### 8.3.6 Containers

All containers are wooden in construction and contain 15 mines.

Table 8.3.1 - Technical Specifications

<b>Local designations</b>	Mina KK- Fibre
<b>Local catalogue numbers(s)</b>	2507
<b>Operating pressure</b>	6 to 20 kg
<b>Dimensions</b>	110 mm diameter, 53 mm deep.
<b>Colour</b>	Black
<b>Body material</b>	Bakelite
<b>Weight of mine</b>	550 g
<b>Explosive type</b>	TNT cast.
<b>Explosive weight</b>	240 g

Table 8.3.2 – General Information


<b>Emplacement</b>	By hand only.
<b>Depth laid<sup>10</sup></b>	Cover with soil or camouflage or 5 cm snow.
<b>Detectability</b>	Fairly easily detectable
<b>Anti-handling</b>	None known
<b>Blast resistance<sup>11</sup></b>	None. The mine is very susceptible to counter-charging.
<b>Cross reference</b>	CIS: PMN, Hungarian GYATA-64, Chinese Type 58, FRY PMA-3.

<sup>10</sup> As taught by the Albanian Armed Forces


<sup>11</sup> Blast resistance to counter-charging.




Mines Boxed



Mine Opened



Side view



Bottom view



## **SECTION 9 – MEASURES TO PROVIDE WARNING**

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5."

*Remark:* In accordance with Article 5, para.2: "Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

### **9.1 Mine Risk Education**

UNICEF is now the lead UN agency for mine risk education. Interestingly, however, UNICEF declined to be a member of AMAC when it was formed in 1999.

A Mine Risk Education post within AMAE was established, manned by the donation of a person 'in kind' from 1999 to 2000 and granted short term funding for six months by UNICEF in 2001 to enable AMAE to recruit its own officer. The incumbent has yet to be fully trained but is an energetic and intelligent individual with interesting ideas as to how to improve this area of activity. A number of NGOs and other agencies have carried out mine risk education activity in Albania including CARE, Handicap International, ICRC and Albanian Red Cross.

These activities include poster campaigns, visits to schools and community facilities, TV, press and radio campaigns.

### **9.2 Physical delineation.**

9.2.1 The physical delineation of known mine and UXO contaminated territory along the Albania-Kosovo border has been problematic due to:

- ☐ Constant theft of minefield marking post. (This is due to a shortage of fencing materials and fuel in the mine affected areas).
- ☐ Inclement weather during winter months preventing access.
- ☐ Lack of resources.



## **SECTION 10 – OTHER RELEVANT MATTERS**

**Remark:** States Parties may use this form to report voluntarily on other relevant matters, including matters pertaining to compliance and implementation not covered by the formal reporting requirements contained in Article 7. States Parties are encouraged to use this form to report on activities undertaken with respect to Article 6, and in particular to report on assistance provided for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims.

### **10.1 Victim Assistance**

There has been some limited success in the area of Victim Assistance although this has largely centred on the provision of prosthesis to mines victims. Thus far a total of 27 victims have passed through the Slovenian Institute for the Rehabilitation of Mine Victims in Ljubljana and have been fitted with prosthetics. In addition 7 technicians are undergoing training in the measuring for, fitting and adjustment of prosthesis. There is currently a very limited capability for support to families of victims, counselling or retraining of victims. There has recently been a small-scale programme to offer some training to victims in Kukës District. However, the focus and applicability of this to the skills and educational levels of these victims has not yet been fully assessed.

### **10.2 Stockpile destruction verification measures**

There are two principle areas where transparency measures have been implemented:

#### **10.2.1 Stockpile status and consolidation**

Verification that the mines stockpile, as declared and agreed ant the commencement of the project<sup>12</sup> are accurate and that all mines are identified, collected and delivered to the destruction facility.

#### **10.2.2 Demilitarization**

Ensuring that the entire stockpile delivered to the destruction facility is demilitarized, including all components, to a degree that precludes reuse.

#### **10.2.3 Transparency measures.**

The projects executing agency, NAMSA, has designed and implemented the following verification measures for this project:

- ❑ The establishment of a permanent “verification auditor” at the demilitarization facility, ULP Mjekës.
- ❑ The development of an auditing system – the Integrated Ammunition Accounting and Monitoring System (IAAMS).
- ❑ A system of other, random checks by NAMSA's Project Supervisor and the Canadian Ammunition Technical Officer attached to the NATO PfP AMODATT.

The verification auditor has two principle functions – he ensures that the transfer of APMs from the AAF to ULP Mjekës is transparent and also provides a continuous audit of demilitarization activities.

<sup>12</sup> And figures declared with the Instrument of Ratification.

The IAAMS integrates the existing military accounting procedures (which are very stringent) and those of ULP Mjekës. It provides the foundation of a robust and effective system that provides a very high degree of confidence in compliance.

NAMSA have reported accounting standards for both primary agencies have to date, been in excess of 99%, far higher than the 90% anticipated in the project proposal.

#### **10.2.4 Additional transparency measures**

The Ministry of Defence has formally ordered the physical auditing of storage facilities that are now supposedly free from APM. As at the end of December 2001, this internal audit process has located over 3,500 additional APM.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Public Order has handed back 14 APM to the military which were obtained from the public during organised collection of illicit weapons and ammunition. It is assumed these were originally looted from military establishments during the crisis of 1997.

These additional APM have subsequently been brought to account and transported to ULP Mjekës for destruction.


**Section 10 Photographic supplement**  
**Stockpile destruction verification measures**



NAMSA's Verification Auditor verifies a delivery of mines from the Kukës Brigade area. (May 2001)




The Canadian Ammunition Technical Officer performs a 100% stock check at ULP Mjekës. (April 2001)



NAMSA's Project Supervisor checks safety aspects of demilitarization procedures with ULP Mjekës Management (November 2002)



NAMSA's Administration Officer validates transportation quantities at the Ministry of Defence. (December 2001)



NAMSA's Verification Auditor reviews stocks of mine components at C Zone ULP Mjekës. (June 2001)



The NAMSA Project Supervisor and Canadian Ammunition Technical Officer observe outloading of APM from an AAF storage depot. (June 2001)