CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Reporting Formats for Article 7 ¹

STATE PARTY: Republic of Slovenia

DATE OF SUBMISSION APRIL 2021

POINT OF CONTACT

Mr. Tadej Furlan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia

Tel.: +386 1 478 67 24 E-mail: tadej.furlan@gov.si

(Organization, telephones, fax, email)

(ONLY FOR THE PURPOSES OF CLARIFICATION)

¹ These reporting formats <u>informally provided by Austria</u> on disk are based on document APLC/MSP.1/1999/L.4 of 31 March 1999, as amended and decided upon by the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, held in Maputo from 3 to 7 May 1999. Tables of formats may be expanded as desired.

Form A National implementation measures

- Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:
 - a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9."

Remark: In accordance with Article 9, "Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control".

State [Party]: Republic of Slovenia reporting for time period from 1.1.2020 to 31.12.2020

Measures	Supplementary information (e.g., effective date of implementation & text of legislation attached).
- Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction by the Slovenian Parliament (24 September 1998, No. 231-05/98-5/1)	By April 30 th , 2003, Slovenia destroyed all APMs. It has retained 3.000 APMs for
- Criminal Code, Article 307: Illegal Manufacture of and Trade in Weapons or Explosive Materials (adopted 2012, last amended in 2020);	training in mine detection and for educational purposes.
- An execution plan confirmed by the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia on the destruction of APMs in Slovenia (1 December 1998; No. 016-05-01/191) and the decision by the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia on the quantity of all anti-personnel mines retained for the development and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques in accordance with Article 3 (15 January 2002, No. 5/2002-9)	
- An order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Slovenian Army about the destruction of APMs in the Slovenian Army (14 April 1999; No. Z-871-00-6/99-9)	

Form B Stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Article 7. 1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled."

State [Party]: Republic of Slovenia reporting for time period from 1.1.2020 to 31.12.2020

Type	Quantity	Lot # (if possible)	Supplementary information
PMA-1	73	8-59	SAF ID No 000796
PMA-2	75	SRB 6740	SAF ID No 000797
PMA-3	25	SRB 7530	SAF ID No 000798
PMR-2A	38	R1973	SAF ID No 000800
PROM-1	45	KV04-68	SAF ID No 000803
TOTAL	256		

Form C Location of mined areas

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced."

State [Party]:	Republic of Slovenia	reporting for time period from	1.1.2020	to	31.12.2020
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1. Areas that contain mines*

Location	Туре	Quantity	Date of emplacement	Supplementary information
/	/	1	/	There are no areas containing anti-personnel mines.

2. Areas suspected to contain mines*

Location	Туре	Quantity	Date of emplacement	Supplementary information
/	/	/	/	There are no areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines.

^{*} If necessary, a separate table for each mined area may be provided

Form D APMs retained or transferred

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3"

State [Party]: Republic of Slovenia reporting for time period from 1.1.2020 to 31.12.2020

1. Retained for development of and training in (Article 3, para.1)

Institution authorized by State Party	Туре	Quantity	Lot # (if possible)	Supplementary information
Ministry of Defence - SAF	PMA-1	72	8-59	Stockpiled at the military warehouse in Mačkovec near Postojna.
Ministry of Defence - SAF	PMA-2	74	SRB 6740	Stockpiled at the military warehouse in Mačkovec near Postojna.
Ministry of Defence - SAF	PMA-3	24	SRB 7530	Stockpiled at the military warehouse in Mačkovec near Postojna.
Ministry of Defence - SAF	PMR-2A	37	R1973	Stockpiled at the military warehouse in Mačkovec near Postojna.
Ministry of Defence - SAF	PROM-1	42	KV04-68	Stockpiled at the military warehouse in Mačkovec near Postojna.
TOTAL		249		

Form D (continued)

2. Transferred for development of and training in (Article 3, para.1)

Institution authorized by State Party	Туре	Quantity	Lot # (if possible)	Supplementary information: e.g. transferred from, transferred to
/	1	/	/	/
TOTAL		/		

3. Transferred for the purpose of destruction (Article 3, para.2)

Institution authorized by State Party	Type Quantity		Quantity Lot # (if possible) Supplementa e.g. transferre	
1	/	/	/	/
TOTAL		/		

Form E Status of programs for conversion or de-commissioning of APM production facilities

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities."

State [Party]: Republic of Slovenia reporting for time period from 1.1.2020 to 31.12.2020

Indicate if to "convert" or "decommission"	Status (indicate if "in process" or "completed")	Supplementary information
1	1	There are no anti-personnel mine production facilities in Slovenia.

Form F Status of programs for destruction of APMs

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed."

State [Party]: Republic of Slovenia reporting for time period from 1.1.2020 to 31.12.2020

1. Status of programs for destruction of stockpiled APMs (Article 4)

Description of the status of programs including:	
Location of destruction sites:	Methods
- Decomposition of APMs and mechanical destruction of inert components in a facility-workshop for the dismantling and destruction in Borovnica near Ljubljana;	
- Destruction of primer caps and explosive charges in central exercise and training area Poček near Postojna.	
- Decomposition of APMs on components;	Applicable safety standards
- Mechanical destruction of inert components;	
- Destruction of primer caps by burning in a special kettle;	
- Destruction of APMs bodies with explosive charges by explosives.	
- Valid military manuals on the decomposition of ammunition (original "Delaboracija	Applicable environmental standards
municije", SSNO, 1976) and the destruction of ammunition, mines and other explosive materials (original "Uništavanje municije, minsko-eksplozivnih sredstava in drugih eksplozivnih materiala", SSNO, 1980)	-United Nations Manual on Ammunition Management (IATG) and NATO standards
- Slovenian national Environmental Protection Act	Applicable environmental standards
- SAF rules SV-TZ-127 on the protection of health at work with explosives	

Form F (continued)

2. Status of programs for destruction of APMs in mined areas (Article 5)

Discription of the status of programs including:	
	Details of: /
Location of destruction sites	/
/	Methods
1	Applicable safety standards
/	Applicable environmental standards

Form G APMs destroyed after entry into force

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4"

State [Party]: Republic of Slovenia reporting for time period from 1.1.2020 to 31.12.2020

1. Destruction of stockpiled APMs (Article 4)

Туре	Quantity	Lot # (if possible)	Supplementary information
PMA-1	1	8-59	The SAF units destroyed 7 APM's for educational
PMA-2	1	SRB 6740	purposes.
PMA-3	1	SRB 7530	
PMR-2A	1	R1973	
PROM-1	3	KV04-68	
TOTAL	7		

2. Destruction of APMs in mined areas (Article 5)

Туре	Quantity	Supplementary information		
1	/	see Form C		
/	/			
TOTAL	/			

Form H Technical characteristics of each type produced/owned or possessed

Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:

h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance"

State [Party]:	Republic of Slovenia	reporting for time period from	1.1.2020	to	31.12.2020

1. Technical characteristics of each APM-type produced

Туре	Dimensions	Fusing	Explosive content		Metallic content	Colour photo attached	Supplementary information to facilitate mine clearance.
			type	grams			
/	/	/	/	/	/	/	see Form E

2. Technical characteristics of each APM-type currently owned or possessed

Type	Dimensions	Fusing	Explosive content		Metallic content	Colour photo attached	Supplementary information to facilitate mine clearance.
			type	grams			
PMA-1	140mm x 70mm x 30mm	UPMAH-1 (chemical)	TNT	200	/	Yes	The mine is plastic, without metal elements.
PMA-2	ø68mm x 32mm	UPMAH-2 (chemical)	TNT	70	/	Yes	The mine is plastic, without metal elements and waterproof closed.
PMA-3	ø103mm x 36mm	UPMAH-3 (chemical)	tetryl	35	/	Yes	The mine is plastic, without metal elements and waterproof closed.

Form H (continued)

PMR-2A	ø66mm x 132mm (APM without post)	UPMR-2, UPMR-2S (mechanical)	TNT	100	1700 g	Yes	Its fragments are dangerous in range at 50m. Detection with mine detectors is possible.
PROM-1	ø80m x 150mm	UPROM-1 (mechanical)	TNT	420	2580 g	Yes	Its fragments are dangerous in range at 50m. Detection with mine detectors is possible.

Form I Measures to provide warning to the population

see Form C

- Article 7.1 "Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General ... on:
 - i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5."

Remark: In accordance with Article 5, para.2: "Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

State [Party]:	Republic of Slovenia	reporting for time period from	1.1.2020	to	31.12.2020
[Narrative:]					

Reporting

At the Fourth Review Conference in 2019, all States Parties, in adopting the Oslo Action Plan committed to take a number of actions to contribute to the effective implementation of the Convention.

In accordance with your State's outstanding obligations and commitments under the Convention and the Oslo Action Plan, your State is encouraged to ensure that the following information is provided within your Article 7 Report due on **30 April 2021**. Your State is also encouraged to employ the <u>Guide to Reporting and annexed sample report</u> to support your reporting efforts.

Universalization (Actions #11 - #12)

In order to promote continued universalisation of the Convention and the strengthening of its norms must continue, <u>all States Parties</u> will take the following actions:

Oslo Action Plan	Areas for which information would be welcome in your State's Article 7 report
Action 11: Use all available avenues to promote ratification of/accession to the Convention by States not party including by encouraging their participation in the work of the Convention.	In 2020, has your State undertaken actions to promote ratification of / accession to the Convention by States not party? If yes, can you provide details on these actions? Slovenia has nationally and as a Member of the European Union encouraged States not party to the Convention in its bilateral contacts as well as at different multilateral meetings and events, when appropriate, to sign and ratify this important agreement in the disarmament area.
Action 12: Continue to promote universal observance of the Convention's norms and objectives, condemn violations of these norms, and take appropriate steps to end the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines by any actor, including by armed non-State actors.	In 2020, has your State taken actions to promote universal observance of the Convention's norms and objectives? Or to condemn violations of these norms and take appropriate steps to end the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines by any actor, including by armed non-State actors? If yes, can you provide details on these actions? Slovenia has nationally and as a Member of the European Union promoted the universalisation of the Convention and its norms and objectives at different multilateral meetings and events, when appropriate.

Stockpile destruction and retention of anti-personnel mines (Actions# 13 - #17)

To ensure that all stockpiled anti-personnel mines are expeditiously destroyed in line with Article 4 of the Convention and that anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes, <u>States Parties with obligations under Article 4 and/or who retain anti-personnel mines in line with Article 3 will take the following actions:</u>

Oslo Action Plan actions	Areas for which information would be welcome in your State's Article 7 report
Action 13: Develop a time-bound plan with clear milestones for the fulfilment of Article 4 within their deadline as soon as possible following the entry into force of the Convention, and regularly inform States Parties on progress made and remaining challenges in implementation.	 Has your State developed a time-bound plan for the destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines within your Article 4 deadline? If yes, could you share this plan, including clear milestones for the destruction of remaining stockpiled mines? In 2020, How many stockpiled anti-personnel mines has your State destroyed? In 2020, was your State still facing challenges in relation to stockpile destruction? If yes, could you provide information on these challenges? This set of questions is not applicable to Slovenia, since it destroyed its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in 2003.
Action 14: States Parties that have failed to meet their stockpile destruction deadline and therefore are in noncompliance with Article 4, will present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner, regularly informing States Parties on progress made and remaining challenges.	 If your State has failed to meet its stockpile destruction deadline, could your State present a of time-bound plans for completion? In 2020, what progress has your State made in the implementation of Article 4? How many stockpiled anti-personnel mines has your State destroyed? In 2020, was your State still facing challenges in relation to stockpile destruction? If yes, could you provide information on these challenges? This set of questions is not applicable to Slovenia, since it destroyed its stockpile of anti-personnel mines in 2003.

Action 15: Any State Party that discovers previously
unknown stockpiles after stockpile destruction deadlines
have passed will inform States Parties as soon as possible
and destroy these anti-personnel mines as a matter of
urgent priority and no later than six months after their
discovery.

In 2020, has your State discovered previously unknown stockpiles after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed? If yes, how many? And how many of these mines were destroyed in 2020?

This question is not applicable to Slovenia, since it destroyed its stockpile of anti-personnel mines in 2003.

Action 16: Any State Party that retains anti-personnel mines for reasons permitted under Article 3 of the Convention will annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes and will destroy all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number. The States Parties will report annually by 30 April on the use of retained mines and on their destruction.

- 1. In 2020, did your State carry out a review of the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes?
- 2. Could your State indicate how the anti-personnel mines retained for reasons permitted under Article 3 were used in 2020?
- 3. Could your State indicate what is the planned use for anti-personnel mines retained for reasons permitted under Article 3?

Please see our Annual Report for 2020, which also includes information on the use of retained mines permitted under Article 3 of the Convention and on their destruction.

Action 17: Explore available alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes where possible.

Has your State explored alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines with alternative measures for training and research purposes? If yes, could you provide information on the alternative measures you have taken?

So far, Slovenia has not explored alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines with alternative measures for training and research purposes. This option might be explored in the future.

International Cooperation and Assistance (Actions #42 to #47)

With a view to enhancing cooperation in order to meet the Convention's obligations and aspirations as soon as possible, States Parties will take the following actions:

Oslo Action Plan actions	Areas for which information would be welcome in your State's Article 7 report
Action 42: Do their utmost to commit the resources needed to meet Convention obligations as soon as possible and explore all possible alternative and/or innovative sources of funding.	If you are a mine-affected State Party, what national financial commitments did you make in 2020 to the implementation of your obligations under the Convention? Slovenia is not a mine-affected State Party.
	2. In 2020, did your State provide financial or other support to affected States Parties? Can you provide details of this support?
	 In 2020 Slovenia provided the following support to mine-affected State Parties: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Slovenia continuously supports the operations of the ITF Enhancing Human Security Representative Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This facilitates smooth implementation of the projects implementation procedures such as calls for offers for mine action projects, capacity support as well as monitoring of implementation of demining projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, assessments of humanitarian and socio-economic aspects of projects, preparing reports for donors, oversight of the implementation of demining and its quality assurance and control. EUR 70.000 per annum.
	- Jordan : Education on risks from mines and ERW for Syrian Refugees. The project involves conducting awareness-raising workshops on the dangers of mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) for Syrian refugees in Irbid province in north-west Jordan. It is a border area that is among the most populated with refugees from Syria. The target group is both children and adults. The project lasted from January 2019 to May 2020 In the project period, risk education and health education was implemented in 105 primary and secondary schools in Irbid and in close cooperation with 22 NGOs and charities. Additionally, 28,802 pieces of RE leaflets and other materials were distributed

in order to raise awareness about the dangers of landmines/ERW and the COVID-19. In total, 21,114 Syrian refugees in Jordan received RE and health education (out of which 6,713 Syrian refugees participated remotely) and 35 units of audio-visual material was distributed/presented to Syrian refugees regarding mine/ERW risk education and health protection/COVID-19 awareness. Value of the project: EUR 170.000.

- **Syria**: In 2019, Slovenia started to support the implementation of a project addressing humanitarian needs of internally displaced people and communities, endangered by explosive hazards in northeast Syria (with contribution of EUR 300.000 for a total value of the project over EUR 2 million, majority financed by Austrian ADA). The activities will continue with a new project, signed early 2021 aimed at mine clearance and reviving agriculture in cleared areas in northeast Syria (Ar Raka, Al Hasakah and Deir ez Zor) a two-year project worth EUR 200.000. The aim of this project is to contribute to improving the safety of the local population and help farmers in contaminated areas to restore their livelihoods and food security. In this phase, the clearance of explosive hazards on about 750,000 m2 of contaminated areas will continue, in close cooperation with the local community. The preparation phase includes at least 6 non-technical surveys of the territory, which will provide an assessment of the state of contamination with explosive hazards and will enable full-scale clearance at a later stage.
- Additionally, Slovenia continuously provides core support to the operations of ITF Enhancing Human security (230.000 EUR in 2020) in affected States Parties (unallocated/unearmarked). ITF started-off in 1998 by assisting in mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later expanded its activities to become a global player in the field. Its mission is to improve security by removing the immediate and long-term effects of mines or explosive remnants of war (ERW), facilitate safe and sustainable development, and build resilience in communities which have been affected by conflict. ITF engages in clearance of landmines and ERW, risk education, victim assistance, capacity building, physical security and stockpile management, destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition and in advocacy.
 - 3. In 2020, did your State explore alternative and/or innovative sources of financing?

In 2020, Slovenia has not directly explored alternative and/or innovative sources of financing to meet the Convention's obligations.

4. In 2020 did your State obtain resources from alternative and /or innovative sources? In 2020, Slovenia has not obtained resources from alternative and/or innovative sources to meet the Convention's obligations. However, the ITF Enhancing Human Security, supported by Slovenia, does engage a variety of partners – international and local public and private companies, non-governmental organisations and individuals to donate funds for its operations in developing countries. If your State requires support, can you provide information on the challenges you face and Action 43: States Parties seeking assistance will develop resource mobilisation plans and use all mechanisms your requirements for assistance? Have you developed a resource mobilisation plan? Can you within the Convention to disseminate information on provide information on this plan? challenges and requirements for assistance, including through their annual Article 7 transparency reports and by Slovenia does not require support or assistance for the implementation of the Convention's taking advantage of the individualised approach. States obligations. Parties will share the outcomes of the individualised approach with the wider mine action community in order to maximise its impact. 1. Does your State have an in-country platform for dialogue among all stakeholders Action 44: States Parties will strengthen national that meets on a regular basis? If yes, could you provide details about this coordination including by ensuring regular dialogue with mechanism? national and international stakeholders on progress, challenges and support for implementation of their Slovenia does not have a special national platform for regular dialogue among stakeholders obligations under the Convention. They will consider, on the implementation of our obligations under the Convention. Demining activities as a where relevant, establishing an appropriate national special priority area under the Slovenian humanitarian aid (as set by the Resolution on platform for regular dialogue among all stakeholders. development cooperation and humanitarian assistance of the Republic of Slovenia, 2017) might be deliberated both by the Permanent Coordination Group for International Cooperation, consisting of States Secretaries of different ministries, as well as by the Expert Council, composed of different development cooperation and humanitarian aid stakeholders, including the Director of ITF Enhancing Human Security.

Slovenian Government that established the ITF Enhancing Human Security also has members from different institutions, engaged in the issues, relevant for the Convention's implementation, in the ITF Managing board as well as a member in the ITF Board of Advisors, which consists of international donors and stakeholders.

2. If your State does not have an in-country platform for dialogue among all stakeholders, has is ever considered establishing one?

We have not considered establishing a special in-country platform for dialogue among all stakeholders, specifically for dialogue on the implementation of our obligations under the Convention.

Action 45: States Parties in a position to do so will provide assistance to other States Parties in the implementation of their obligations under the Convention, in line with their development policies. In doing so, they will support the implementation of clear, evidencebased national strategies and work plans that respond to the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities and are built on sound gender, age and disability analysis. Support to victim assistance can be provided through the mine action budget, and/or through integrating victim assistance into broader development and humanitarian efforts.

1. 2020, did your State provide financial or other support to affected States Parties for the implementation of their obligations under the Convention? If yes, could you provide details of this support?

Yes, same as under 42.2.

2. In 2020, did your State provide support to victim assistance? If yes, did this support come from the mine action budget or is it part of broader development and humanitarian efforts? Could you provide details of this support?

Yes, Slovenia provides also support to victims (specifically of mines, but also more generally of armed conflicts) in Ukraine and Palestine, but in 2020, two activities (Ukraine) had to be cancelled due to travel restrictions and one activity (Palestine) has (partly) been reprogrammed to help satisfy the COVID-19-related needs. The activities have been financed from the ODA budget and cost around 55.000 EUR per annum (Ukraine) and 70.000 EUR per annum (Palestine) respectively.

3. In 2020, did your State provide support to mine clearance activities? If yes, could you provide details of this support?

Yes. Support to the operations the ITF Enhancing Human Security Representative Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, described under 42. 2.) is the most directly connected to the mine-clearance activities, although victim's assistance, rehabilitation, awareness raising are also

Action 46: States Parties in a position to provide assistance will, where possible using existing mechanisms, coordinate their support for the effective implementation of Convention obligations by affected States Parties.	included. Core support to the operations of ITF Enhancing Human security partly contributes to the mine clearance activities, implemented by the ITF. In 2020, did your State coordinate its support for the effective implementation of the Convention? A variety of donors contribute to the programme and projects of the ITF Enhancing Human Security and thus coordinate their support. ITF field offices (a representative office and five implementation offices) also play an important role in communication with the affected State Parties' authorities as well as with other donors and implementers, present in the field.
Action 47: Continuously explore opportunities for cooperation, including international, regional and bilateral, cooperation between affected States Parties or South-to-South, with a view to voluntary sharing of best practices and lessons learned. Cooperation of this kind may include making mutually supporting clearance commitments in border areas, sharing experience of integrating gender and taking the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities into account into programming, and, in line with Article 6, exchanging equipment, material and scientific and technological information (or donating them after one State Party reaches completion) in order to promote the implementation of the Convention.	In 2020, which cooperation activities did you engage in order to promote the implementation of the Convention? Not directly, but the ITF Enhancing Human Security (to which Slovenia provides core contribution) engages in advocacy activities as well, with the aim of generating publicity and raising awareness concerning mine/ERW impact, the dangers posed by surplus and deteriorating stockpiles of excess and aging munitions, and promoting rights of persons with disabilities.
Action 3: Ensure that the different needs and perspectives of women, girls, boys, and men are considered and inform all areas of Convention implementation and mine action programmes, in order to deliver an inclusive approach.	Does your State's cooperation and assistance efforts integrate gender and take the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities into account? ITF Enhancing Human Security as an implementing partner needs to take in to account the gender equality mainstreaming in all the projects, financed from the Slovenian ODA budget.

Strive to remove barriers to full, equal and gender balanced participation in mine action and in Convention meetings. Inclusiveness and special needs of different target groups, as well as gender, economic, ethnic and religious diversities, are also taken into account.

2. Please provide information on how your cooperation and assistance efforts promote and help ensures the integration of gender and the divers needs and experience of people in affected communities?

In the context of war, women and members of other marginalized groups feel a disproportionate share of the consequences. There are significant differences between men and women and boys and girls in their exposure to mines and other ERW and in their knowledge, which generally puts women at a disadvantage. The clearance of mines and ERW is generally non-selective in terms of gender race, religion, economic and social status and age. Mines and ERW threaten all residents of mine-affected areas equally. However, the status and position of women in the **Bosnian** society, for example, affect their vulnerability level, as they perform a lot of work in the gardens, meadows, fields and forests, where a large number of mines are still located today and one could argue that the level of their exposure is lowered above proportionally with the clearance activities.

In northeast **Syria**, on the other hand, women are relatively well integrated into public life and represented in official institutions. On the project level, women will be actively involved in the surveys and contamination data collection phase and in other consultation procedures. The project team will lay foundations for the representation of women in demining teams in the next phases of the project (currently 7 out of 32 employees are women). As part of the activities in 2022, the project team will actively strive to meaningfully include women farmers, owners or users of agricultural land and women as heads of households. In **Jordan**, gender- and age-sensitive mine risk education has been put in place, a gender-balanced number of schools (separated for boys and girls) will be included in the project, and gender balanced engagement and employment of staff in the project on all levels has been sought.