

# **MILITARY OPERATIONS WITHOUT ANTIPERSONNEL LAND MINES**

Lt Col Charles N Holman  
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence

## **UK Position**

- **States Party to Ottawa and CCW**
- **Ottawa: 1 March 1999**
- **CCW: 10 April 1981 (ratified 13 February 1995)**
  - **AP2 / Protocol IV: 11 February 1999**
  - **Protocol V: 2004**
- **Production, storage and use: Absolute prohibition on military involvement in planning for or use of AP mines**

## **Assumptions**

- **Doctrine: “Manoeuvrist warfare”**
- **Less dense battlefields**
- **High intensity war fighting**
- **Close, dismounted combat**

## **Why AP Mines?**

- **Overview**
- **Principles of Deployment**
  - **Ways (how we do it)**
  - **Means (method of achieving desired outcome)**
  - **Endstate (what we want to happen)**
- **Usage**
  - **Deny freedom of movement**
  - **Inflict Casualties**

## Limitations

- **Post-conflict legacy**
- **Lack of graduated response**

## Key Characteristics

- **Cheap**
- **Simple**
- **Hard to detect**
- **Easy to deploy**
- **Autonomous**
- **Reduced dependence on manpower (troops)**

**BUT**

- **No graduated response**
- **Cannot alter or amend targets**

## **Future Characteristics?**

- **Differentiate between targets**
- **Finite life**
- **Militarily effective**
- **Affordable**
- **Wide utility**
- **Resistance to countermeasures**
- **24hour capability**


## **Future Options**

- **Legislation**
- **Ottawa constraints**


# Future Options - 1



# Future Options - 2



## Future Options - 3



## Future Options – So What?

- **Automatic**
  - Victim activated
  - Possibly not Ottawa compliant
- **Semi-automatic**
  - Man in loop
  - Ottawa compliant
- **Manual**
  - Man essential
  - Ottawa compliant

## **Future Options – New Technology**

- **“Technology” driven:**
  - Foams
  - Lights
  - Noise
  - Glue
  - Electricity
- **Physical barriers:**
  - Wire
  - Water
  - Walls
  - Trees

## **But .....**

- **No psychological effect**
- **Can be very equipment intensive**
- **Difficult to conceal**
- **Limited deterrence**
- **Slow to construct**

**Need to be reinforced or supported by lethal force**

## **Conclusions**

- **British Armed Forces initially hesitant**
- **Fully accept their loss**
- **Learned to live with capability gap**
- **UK forces remain effective but without danger of adding to humanitarian legacy of mines**

**Thank you for your attention**

**The only thing harder than getting an  
old idea out of the military mind is  
getting a new idea in**