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**Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention  
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,  
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel  
Mines and on Their Destruction**

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**Thirteenth Meeting**

Geneva, 2–5 December 2013

**Item 9 of the provisional agenda**

**Informal presentation of requests submitted**

**under article 5 and of the analysis of these requests**

**Request for extension of the deadline for completing the  
destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with  
article 5 of the Convention**

**Executive summary**

**Submitted by Chad\***

1. In 1987, after the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti, the Government of Chad discovered the extent of the contamination caused by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in these regions, which cover around a third of the country. Following the return of displaced populations, many accidents occurred involving civilians, particularly around the towns of Faya-Largeau and Fada.

2. The Government appealed to France for assistance in dealing with this problem, and in 1987 and 1988 a French company of military engineers was deployed to Faya-Largeau and the surrounding area. The Government contributed to the operation by deploying a national army engineering unit to Fada to commence demining and decontaminating these places and the nearby villages. After numerous accidents involving French soldiers and in view of the extent of the problem, it was decided to transfer the demining and decontamination mission to Chadian engineering units once they received training from the French military.

3. During the 1987–1988 conflict between Libya and Chad, the assistance of the Chadian national army and French forces was requested in the regions of Ennedi, Borkou and southern Tibesti, with a particular effort being made in the areas of Faya-Largeau and Bédou. Operations consisted of demining and decontaminating these places and the nearby villages in order to assist the settled and nomadic communities living there and allow the military to move around this northern area of the country safely.

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\* Document submitted after the deadline, without having been edited, as soon as the Secretariat received it from the Implementation Support Unit.



4. As accidents continued to plague the region, in 1996 the President of Chad allocated funding for a survey in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti so as to conduct an objective study and obtain the information needed to call upon the international community to fund a resumption of demining and decontamination operations. In 1997, the Government used the resulting report to call upon the United Nations for assistance. The United Nations subsequently deployed a team to carry out a feasibility study in the field.

5. In 1999, Chad carried out a country-wide landmine impact survey. However, because of security constraints in the north, the survey could not be carried out in the Tibesti region, recognized as one of the regions most affected by mines and explosive remnants of war. The situation portrayed by the data compiled by the survey proved to be far from the reality on the ground. Furthermore, the teams that conducted the survey were forced to keep a distance from minefields reported by the local communities. This survey provided an excellent initial assessment tool, but was limited in terms of accurately locating and delimiting the affected areas. The information gathered was insufficient for a thorough understanding of the contamination problem.

6. In 2000, Chad deployed demining teams for the first time. The teams were sent to Faya-Largeau and Fada, in the regions of Ennedi and Borkou. The operations were carried out under the supervision of international mine clearance operators, who contracted staff from the National Demining Centre. In 2004, Chad was forced to relocate most of its resources to its border with the Sudan. Meanwhile, demining activities continued in the minefield at Ouadi Doum in the Ennedi region. In 2006 and 2007, Chad carried out a technical survey along the Route des Puits in southern Tibesti, and undertook to secure the road linking Zouar, Zouarké and Bardaï.

7. From 2010 to 2012, Chad carried out a country-wide technical survey. The results obtained do not include any data on the regions of Moyen-Chari or northern Tibesti, but they do confirm that, after Tibesti, the two other regions that have been most affected are Borkou and Ennedi. Tibesti has 36 mined areas, Borkou has 24 and Ennedi has 4.

8. According to the results of the 1999 landmine impact survey and the 2010–2012 technical survey, the at-risk areas have a combined surface area of 61,231,143 square metres. Based on this information, the Government has decided to prioritize the regions of Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti.

<i>Location</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Number of areas (dangerous areas)</i>			<i>Surface m<sup>2</sup></i>
		<i>Total</i>	<i>Mines</i>	<i>ERW</i>	
North	Borkou	<b>43</b>	24	27	26 201 162
	Ennedi	<b>52</b>	4	34	16 513 668
	Tibesti	<b>138</b>	36	63	19 433 797
<b>Total</b>		<b>189</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>61 148 817</b>
East	Ouaddaï	<b>17</b>	0	17	10 840
	Salamat	<b>6</b>	0	6	634
	Sila	<b>10</b>	0	9	8 191
	Wadi Fira	<b>22</b>	0	22	55 974
<b>Total</b>		<b>54</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>75 639</b>

<i>Location</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Number of areas (dangerous areas)</i>			<i>Surface m<sup>2</sup></i>
		<i>Total</i>	<i>Mines</i>	<i>ERW</i>	
West	Hadjer-Lamis	1	0	1	6 180
	N'Djamena	2	0	2	707
<b>Total</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6 880</b>
<b>Total general</b>		<b>246</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>61 231 143</b>

9. Marking operations, mainly conducted during the 2009–2012 technical surveys, led to the marking of 17 square kilometres of mined areas.

10. In 2013, the information gathered during the 2010–2012 technical survey allowed the unit of the National Demining Centre responsible for the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to draw up a more precise map of at-risk areas in Chad. A better idea of contamination levels in northern Tibesti and the Moyen-Chari region will be obtained as supplementary surveys are carried out under a multi-year action plan.

11. A technical survey conducted by competent minefield survey and community liaison teams has been extended to the whole country, and the resulting data have been added to the national database, supplementing the information previously recorded. The teams have visited all accessible mine suspected areas and have collected data through interviews with administrative, military and municipal authorities, as well as with local inhabitants, victims, nomads, accident survivors and the families of deceased victims. No one is aware of any maps of where the mines were laid. All the information has been collected on IMSMA forms, which have been examined and approved by the national authority with the support of the department for quality assurance. After the information has been analysed, it is added to the National Demining Centre's IMSMA database.

12. A minefield of the same type as that located in Ouadi Doum has been found in the north of the country, at the border between Chad and Libya. It was not possible to record this minefield and its borders during the technical survey; the area has restricted access and is inaccessible to vehicles. Access routes are blocked by randomly laid mines. It is necessary to wait until these roads are opened up in order to complete the survey. In the south, a technical survey is immediately required along the border with the Central African Republic to eliminate the problem of anti-personnel mines. This operation will be carried out as funds become available to support Chad in the removal of anti-personnel mines. The area was identified by an impact survey carried out by Handicap International and is on the outskirts of the town of Ikea. Additional technical surveys will thus be required in northern Tibesti and in the south of the country, near the border with the Central African Republic.

13. At the beginning of 2010, the Chadian Government granted the National Demining Centre the financial resources needed to resume demining operations in Fada. In the same year, Chad deployed an international mine clearance operator to conduct quality control inspections in the cleared areas in the Ouadi Doum minefield. In 2009 and 2010, with assistance from Libya, the National Demining Centre undertook demining operations in Ouadi Doum. That activity complemented the work done by the Mines Advisory Group, an international mine clearance operator contracted by the United Nations Development Programme with funding from the Japanese Government. Between 2008 and 2011, 1,414 anti-personnel mines were destroyed during demining operations in Chad.

14. In 2012, Chad deployed demining and decontamination teams in Tibesti to secure the main roads and access routes between communities in the south of the region. At the end of 2012, Chad acquired a mechanical demining tool to support demining teams

working manually. Since the start of 2013, Chad has continued to demine the main roads in southern Tibesti. A national project is now under way in parallel with an international one.

15. The mined areas found on the outskirts of Ouadi Doum consist of lines of anti-personnel mines comprising blast mines and bounding mines. One assessment suggests that there are around 15,000 anti-personnel mines there, although this figure does not count the three minefields discovered next to the one at Ouadi Doum. These figures are unreliable, as mines are displaced by shifting sand dunes. To date, 209,366 square metres have been cleared, leaving an estimated surface area of 720,000 square metres still to be demined.

16. The total funding made available to support the progress achieved so far amounts to US\$ 26.89 million. The financial contribution of Chad amounts to US\$ 14.4 million, or 54 per cent of the total.

17. There is currently no mapping of the minefields that were laid by the Libyan army. The other mine hazards discovered in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti were laid randomly by combatants who did not comply with “regulation” mine-laying procedures; these mines were laid by guerrillas operating mainly in Tibesti. The nature of the terrain, coupled with the movement of the sand dunes, complicates detection and occasionally makes demining more difficult.

18. Twenty-two years after the end of the conflict between Chad and Libya, anti-personnel mines and other military explosive devices continue to kill and maim people in the settled and nomadic communities, particularly in the northern regions of Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti. They remain an obstacle to development in the region, which has an abundance of ores and a wealth of resources for activities such as tourism, agriculture and livestock farming.

19. The results of an impact study using information from mine-affected communities reveal that mines pose a major obstacle to accessing the following infrastructure: housing, roads, pastures, water points, irrigated agricultural land and non-agricultural land. They also hinder tourism development and prospecting. Suspected danger zones thus have a significant impact on socioeconomic development in northern communities.

20. According to the National Demining Centre’s IMSMA database, there have been 2,834 victims of accidents caused by mines or explosive remnants of war. Consolidated data in the national database account for 1,538 victims as at 13 April 2013. The rest of the data has not yet been consolidated.

21. At the end of 2010, security in the north improved following the cessation of clashes between rebels and the Chadian army that had begun in 2008. Chad redefined its strategy and shifted humanitarian demining operations to the north of the country. In 2010, Chad drew up its first national standards for mine action, relating to land release, quality control, requirements in terms of demining and decontamination, education on the dangers of mines and assistance for victims.

22. Following the project establishing national standards, the Mines Advisory Group, a non-governmental organization (NGO), carried out a technical survey of the country (with the exception of the Tibesti region) with funding from Japan. The mine suspected areas identified in the 2001 impact survey were either confirmed or ruled out. The areas were reclassified in accordance with the national standards in force, and only those dangerous areas that were confirmed and could be accessed were recorded in the national database. The land release process has never been initiated. Owing to conflict and changes in priorities, no demining operation has ever been fully completed, and no post-demining quality control inspection has ever been carried out, with the exception of an external inspection conducted by the NGO Digger in 2010 and 2011. The new strategy and

provisions call for the gradual implementation of this policy as and when areas are cleared, taking into account logistical constraints.

23. In 2011, a special delegation for Tibesti was established by presidential decree. In 2012, the Government confirmed that humanitarian demining was part of the National Development Plan, thus confirmed its will to respect its obligations under article 5 of the Ottawa Convention on Landmines. In 2012 and 2013, Chad drew up all 24 of its national standards. The information management, quality control and planning departments can now stipulate that mine clearance operators must refer to the rules and applications defined by those standards.

24. From 2010 to 2012, owing to a lack of transparency in the management of human resources, the staff of the National Demining Centre once again increased to 720 employees. In 2012, the Government ordered the National Demining Centre to reduce its staff from 720 to 320 employees. A series of measures is currently being implemented to that end.

25. Between 2009 and 2013, the United Nations, followed by several donors, began to support activities against landmines in Chad. International mine clearance operators also supported the National Demining Centre by strengthening the technical capacities of the Centre's Chadian staff. Action by humanitarian organizations working to combat mines makes it possible to ensure that projects are properly supervised in the country. During this period, activities to combat landmines in Chad were supported by various donors, including Canada, Switzerland, the United States of America, Japan and the European Union, and technical assistance was also received from the United Nations to bolster institutional and technical capacities.

26. Chad is facing a number of circumstances preventing it from conforming to the Convention:

(a) The country's geography and climate have also affected the work carried out. Because of its large surface area, poor roads and the fact that the most heavily mined areas are situated in places with no asphalt roads, working conditions have been difficult;

(b) Management of the information contained in the database has proven to be too complex, and the problems encountered over the years have made the information unreliable and the data difficult to put to use;

(c) At the national level, the national demining commission was restructured on several occasions between 2007 and 2013 owing to mismanagement of financial and human resources, weak mobilization of resources and, between 2010 and 2012, shortcomings in planning;

(d) After the first extension was granted in 2008, a delay in the provision of Japanese funding for a technical survey set back the deployment of teams and the gathering of information by a year;

(e) Between 2010 and 2012, the lack of transparency in the management of human and financial resources significantly decreased the effectiveness and worsened the performance of the National Demining Centre and the programme in general. Mine action in Chad lacked strategic vision, operational planning, coordination and coherence. Both in Chad and internationally, such activities lost credibility and the confidence of partners. Financial support waned.

27. The objective of the two-year extension previously granted was to allow Chad to gather solid data in order to draw up both a national strategy and a justified request for an extension. The technical survey completed in October 2012 and the information already recorded in the database reveal the extent of the problem of anti-personnel mines in Chad.

Through its strategy, Chad can realistically commit to eradicating all mines by the end of 2019. The extension requested by the Government is thus for a period of six years, from 1 January 2014 to 1 January 2020.

28. The objectives of the strategic plan, and consequently the request for an extension, are realistic provided that financial resources are regularly made available at the national and international levels. The strategic plan both supports the request for the extension to the deadline set out in article 5 of the Ottawa Convention on Landmines and at the same time takes into account the needs of the current Chadian National Development Plan (2012–2015). An intermediate review of the strategic plan will thus be carried out in 2015, when the new national development plan is drawn up, and adjustments will be made if necessary.

29. The work plan for the proposed extension period is as follows: between 2013 and 2017, all roads and priority areas in the Tibesti region will be demined; from 2015 to 2019, all contaminated areas in the regions of Ennedi and Borkou will be demined and decontaminated, and the regions of Wadi Fira, Sila, Ouadaï and Salamat will be demined; and in 2015, the contaminated areas in N'Djamena and Hadjer-Lamis will be cleared. With regard to the technical survey of the still to be tallied contaminated areas in southern regions: at the start of 2015, or when sufficient funding is available, a technical survey in mine suspected areas in the regions bordering the Central African Republic (the Ikea region) will be conducted; in mid-2015, priority areas will be defined and demining and decontamination operations will be planned; and from the end of 2015, operations will be implemented, followed up and monitored.

30. Risk factors that might affect the implementation of the plan include staff turnover at the National Demining Centre, a lack of funding at the national and international levels and conflict and security problems. This assessment is based on experience and the cost of operations under recent contracts. It considers the need for Chad to carry out a technical survey at the national level and create new demining units to deal with known areas and eradicate the problem of mines in the country.

31. The total estimated cost of the demining and technical surveys in the new national strategy is US\$ 16 million, or an average of US\$ 4 million per year. The anticipated financial contribution of Chad towards these operations is US\$ 1 million per year. Additional resources from international contributors (and possibly the commercial sector) must be mobilized in the amount of US\$ 3 million per year.