

**REQUEST FOR AN EXTENTION OF THE DEADLINE FOR COMPLETING  
THE DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Submitted by Ukraine

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (hereinafter - the Ottawa Convention) entered in force for Ukraine on 01 June, 2006. Having joined the Ottawa Convention Ukraine obliged to destruct all the then stockpiled anti-personnel mines (APM), inherited from the former Soviet Union times, which were stockpiled at the Armed Forces of Ukraine's arsenals. In 2007 Ukraine declared its full compliance with Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention by submitting its first national report under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention. It showed the absence of areas, being under Ukraine's jurisdiction and control, polluted with the APM. Later on this was confirmed in yearly national reports from 2007 through 2013. Thus, Ukraine fulfilled its obligations under Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention in full.

1. The explanation of reasons for the extension of the deadline under Article 5.

Despite significant challenges in the security area caused by the Russian military aggression, Ukraine remains committed to its international obligations in the field of mine action, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

By ratification the Ottawa Convention in 2005 and its enter into force for Ukraine in 2006 there were no mined areas, subject for demining activities. The first yearly report of Ukraine covering the period of 01 June 2006 - 31 December 2006 stated that Ukraine did not have mined areas. This fact was repeatedly confirmed in following reports until 2014.

The aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which started in 2014, created a situation, when Ukraine is faced with the legal obligation to fulfil the provisions of Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention, therefore it requests the extension of the relevant deadline. The reason for that is that armed groups subordinated to the Russian occupation administration, the armed forces of the Russian Federation in temporary occupied territories started planting the APM in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Such contaminated areas were indicated in national reports of Ukraine in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019.

Preliminary estimates show that about 8% of the lands (totalling to 7 000 км<sup>2</sup>), which were liberated from the occupation administration in Donetsk and Luhansk regions contain or suspected to contain the APM, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The areas contaminated with the APM are located along the contact line, where daily intensive fire takes place, which significantly obstructs the demining activities.

In view of the above, a request was submitted to extend the deadline under Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention for five years until June 1, 2021.

Currently, most of the areas contaminated with APM are along the demarcation line and they are shelled daily by the armed forces of the occupation administration of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which greatly complicates the demining process.

Besides founding the industrial-made APM in liberated areas, there are also many cases of use of improvised explosive devices (IED) as well as a large number of UXO. The sappers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine discovered PMN-2 mines in the liberated areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, formerly occupied by the Russian Federation. It is known that APM of that particular type is a regular ammunition used by the Russian Federation's Armed Forces. Ukraine fully destroyed such kind of mines which was reflected in its annual reports.

Starting from 2014 Ukraine repeatedly presented to the international community facts of APM discovered in liberated territories of Ukraine.

Some examples of APM detection:

- on January 30, 2020, the village of Orikhove (Donetsk region), 240 units;
- on July 13, 2019, the village of Maryanka (Donetsk region), 40 units;
- on July 21, 2018, the village of Vodiane (Donetsk region), serial number: 583-26-87;
- on April 2, 2017, the village of Taramchuk (Donetsk region), serial number: 15-69-85 (583-38-85);
- on September 14, 2016, the village of Taramchuk (Donetsk region), serial number: 15-60-87;
- on September 15, 2016, the village of Vodiane (Donetsk region), serial number: 15-65-87.

Areas suspected to contain mines (Annex A).

## 2. The preparation status of work under national demining programs.

On January 25, 2019, the Law of Ukraine “On Mine Action in Ukraine” came into force and the process of implementation of legislation in the field of mine action is going on. In particular, a draft Law on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Mine Action in Ukraine” was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in order to improve the existing Law and create a legal basis for the development of a national mine action program.

So far, the functions of the national authority for mine action are performed by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (the Regulation on the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine of 26.11.2014, № 671, para 4, subpara 100).

In order to have common approaches to the implementation of demining tasks in accordance with international mine action standards, the national standard DSTU P 8820-1: 2018 “Mine action. Management processes. Basic Provisions” was developed and entered into force on April 1, 2019.

In order to properly organize the management, control and coordination of demining activities, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine together with the interested authorities prepares annually a Plan of measures for the organization of humanitarian demining of the liberated territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Decree of the Cabinet of Ministries of 10.11.2015, № 41726/0/1-15).

In order to coordinate mine action activities, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine develops an Action Plan for the organization of humanitarian demining of the liberated territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The main objectives of the Plan are to conduct non-technical and technical inspections of potentially dangerous areas for mines and ERW, as well as demining of settlements, to provide security during restoration of infrastructure and clearing of agricultural areas from mines and explosive remnants of war.

In order to increase the efficiency of the mine action system in Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine creates an effective demining quality management system, which includes certification of mine action operators and demining quality control.

To implement quality management measures, the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine accredited the Demining Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as a certification body for demining operators in the field of "Humanitarian demining: non-technical inspection, technical inspection, clearing of combat areas, manual demining" and created a humanitarian inspection body.

A number of Ukrainian authorities are involved in mine action, including the MOD, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, as well as the non-governmental organizations. Other relevant state agencies also deal with demining activities: the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Police of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the State Service for Special Transport of Ukraine and the National Guard of Ukraine.

Apart of the overall coordination of the humanitarian demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the MOD is responsible for the survey of all the territories, where military contingents of the Joint Forces Operation are deployed. The State Emergency Service of Ukraine fulfils demining activities on land and in the sea in the regions out of combat areas, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine conducts demining in the regions under its direct control. The State Service for Special Transport of Ukraine is responsible for demining of the transport infrastructure (i.e. railways and roads). The Security Service of Ukraine and the National Police of Ukraine undertake counter-IED measures.

The main efforts are aimed at demining of critical infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including power lines, gas and water pipelines, thermal power plants, as well as agricultural lands, roads and railways.

Since the beginning of the plan, as well as in response to requests from the population and local authorities, demining groups and pyrotechnic units of central executive bodies have destroyed (neutralized) more than 460000 explosive devices, inspected more than 35000 hectares, 1754 km of roads, 938 km of railway tracks.

The main task of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine is humanitarian demining of territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions outside of combat areas. As a part of the Joint Forces Operations, units of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine being, conduct demining activities in order to restore the vital objects and provide security for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and for representatives of the international organizations, nearby combat areas and in the so-called “grey zone”.

About 60 local administrations are annually involved in demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (up to 300 people).

There are 5 non-governmental organizations working in Ukraine in the sphere of humanitarian demining: «The Halo Trust», «The Danish Demining Group (DDG)» and «Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD)». Since 2019 Ukrainian non-governmental operators «Demining Solutions» and «Demining Team of Ukraine» have joined mine action (organizations operate solely through donor funding).

41 demining groups with a total number of more than 500 people were involved from the mentioned organizations. Since the beginning of their activities, non-governmental organizations have identified 250 suspicious and dangerous areas with a total area of almost 2000 hectares, cleared about 500 hectares and found more than 1500 explosive devices.

As a result of demining work in 2019, the inspection body conducted quality control in 36 demined areas with a total area of 250,7 hectares. Inspections of these areas were conducted to confirm their compliance with the norms of the national mine action standards. According to the results of the inspections, 24 demined areas with a total area of almost 170 hectares were handed over to the representatives of local authorities.

The Halo Trust started its work in Ukraine in November 2015. DDG is active in Ukraine since 2014. FSD started its work in Ukraine in the beginning of 2015. Since then these organizations made significant input in demining process including by non-technical survey.

3. Financial and technical resources that can be used to destroy APM in mined areas. The spendings regarding the demining and destruction of the APM in the mined areas are provided

by budget expenses allocated to the relevant state authorities and military detachments, during the fiscal year.

The MOD works to equip the engineers corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the modern tools for the detection of explosive objects. They are provided at the expense of centralized procurement, as well as by the technical aid of donor states and international organizations. As a result of the relevant work, the detachments of the Armed Forces of Ukraine currently have a range of modern handheld mine detectors (123 mine detectors Vallone VMC-1, 9 mine detectors Vallone L-1302, 40 mine detectors Ceia CMD, 34 mine detectors Garet GTI-2500).

There is a need for additional 250 mine detectors Vallone VMC-1 to replace technically outdated USSR-made mine detectors that are currently used by demining units. Besides this, the demining units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which take part in the Joint Forces Operation, badly need armoured vehicles with reinforced anti-mine protection (more than 20 pieces).

Funding for demining activities performed by the SES is carried out within the budget allocations from the State Budget of Ukraine, local budgets and other sources of funding not prohibited by law.

The SES is taking measures to re-equip (replace obsolete machinery and equipment) pyrotechnic units that perform humanitarian demining tasks through centralized procurement, as well as logistical assistance from donor states and international organizations.

The SES projects provide support in the field of mine action by training personnel, providing logistical support for surveys, clearing from explosive objects (demining) and transferring areas for further use. The State Emergency Service of Ukraine needs more than 60 sets of equipment to survey explosive objects (search depth up to 6 m), 10 armoured vehicles for mine detection and explosive objects transportation as well as equipment for mechanical demining.

With the support of the OSCE and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) an automated information management system for mine action IMSMA has been implemented by the SES since 2014.

The IMSMA system is installed on the SES server, which is connected to 27 regional operators (territorial divisions) with the ability to enter information online into a common database. At present, about 47 thousand reports from all regions of Ukraine have been submitted to the IMSMA system on the completed tasks of clearing the area of explosives, conducting non-technical and technical inspections of territories.

4. Circumstances, which impede the ability of Ukraine to destroy all the APM in the mined areas. Currently Ukraine doesn't have control over the temporary occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as over the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. At the same time, the ongoing military standoff in Donbas and continuous hostilities cause further contaminations of the territories along the contact line. The irregularity and nonselectivity of the use of APM by the Russian occupation forces in Donetsk and Luhansk regions do not allow to estimate the scale of contamination with APM and identify all mined areas. Thus, it is impossible to arrange relevant national programs for their demining, to determine the required resources and to carry out demining works in full.

Demining of these territories will begin after the end of hostilities, withdrawal of the Russian occupation forces, restoration of constitutional order and return of Ukraine's control over all its territory, including over the state border with the Russian Federation.

Moreover, the Russian Federation refuses to provide any information regarding blasting booms in the Crimean Isthmus and in the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

5. Time requested for an extension of the deadline. Ukraine is requesting a 2 year extension of its deadline under Article 5 of the Ottawa convention (i.e. until 1 December 2023) provided completion of hostilities, restoration of the constitutional order and gaining the full control over the occupied territories, including over the state border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. It is suggested on the basis of the analysis of current and potential challenges, including the extend of the problems, human, materiel and financial resources expected and availability of survey and demining capacities.

6. Humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of the proposed extension. Fulfilment of the set of tasks aimed at complete destruction of the APM will promote:

- reduction of risks associated with mines and ERW for civilians in Ukraine;
- creating a safe environment, reducing the impact of explosive objects on the environment;
- further safe use of mine-cleared areas and infrastructure for economic purposes;
- essential decreasing of casualties among the civil population and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian cargos, in particular, to persons, who reside near the contact line and on the temporary occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
- improvement of the civil population's access to essential goods and services, agricultural lands, infrastructural objects, forests, rivers, recreational facilities, that will have positive impact on the internal migration of population;
- growth of economic indicators, in particular, increase in agricultural production and livestock;
- unimpeded access of workers to enterprises, institutions and organizations, to communications and other objects of special importance and environmental security;
- clearance of soils and waters, polluted as a result of explosions of shells, explosives and mines;
- decrease of risks of emergencies in connection with mines and explosive objects.

## Areas suspected to contain mines

Location				Type	Quantity	Date of emplacement	Supplementary information
From	To	UTM X	UTM Y				
BM SP TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4 TP5	SP TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4 TP5	389578 389642 389256 389238 389348 389415 389578	5274377 5273728 5273632 5273660 5274045 5274195 5274377	According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/D/037 of 11.01.2017) there is no exact information on the type of anti-personnel mines. The site was identified as suspicious.	accurate information is absent		Donetsk region, Volnovakha district (Volnovakha - 1). In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.
BM SP TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4 TP5 TP6 TP7 TP8 TP9 TP10	SP TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4 TP5 TP6 TP7 TP8 TP9 TP10	447364 448584 448609 448687 448696 448692 448666 448576 448528 448487 448448 448511	5405760 5406082 5406071 5406065 5406039 5405920 5405744 5405742 5405784 5405786 5405810 5405939	According to the non-technical survey report of the non-governmental organization DDG (No. HTS2L/09-16/31 of 16.09.2016), there is no exact information on the type of anti-personnel mines. The site was identified as suspicious.	accurate information is absent		Luhansk region, Popasna district (Volcheyarovka, Lisopolosa). In 2020, a technical survey was planned.
BM SP TP1 TP2 TP3	SP TP1 TP2 TP3	0403455 0403485 0403511 0403375 0403316	5409530 5409467 5409404 5409382 5409433	According to the report of the non-technical survey of the non-governmental organization FSD (No. 004 dated 01.06.2017), the anti-personnel explosive device (MON-50) was installed in a controlled	accurate information is absent		Donetsk region, Sloviansk district (Kotovskiy - 1) nongovernmental organization FSD conducted mine clearance in accordance with the international and national mine action standards (DA FSD Report 03-2017 of 24.10.2017).

				version. Identified as direct evidence of risk. Filmed in accordance with established procedure.		The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine carried out external quality control of mine clearance (Act 1627/12/19 a 23 of 10.10.2019).
BM SP TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4 TP5 TP6 TP7 TP8 TP9 TP10	SP TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4 TP5 TP6 TP7 TP8 TP9 TP10 SP	0402737 0402641 0402583 0402540 0402541 0402566 0402814 0402844 0402852 0402761 0402716 0402673	5411597 5411571 5411597 5411643 5411698 5411747 5411803 5411795 5411675 5411663 5411645 5411630	According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/D/003 of 19.04.2016). There is no exact information on the type of anti-personnel mines. The site was identified as suspicious.	accurate information is absent	Donetsk region, Sloviansk district (Semenovka - 1). In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.
BM SP TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4 TP5 TP6 TP7 TP8 TP9 TP10 TP11 TP12 TP13 TP14 TP15 TP16	SP TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4 TP5 TP6 TP7 TP8 TP9 TP10 TP11 TP12 TP13 TP14 TP15 TP16 TP17	0419287 0419383 0419389 0419400 0419413 0419426 0419450 0419490 0419515 0419544 0419565 0419576 0419591 0419592 0419595 0419593 0419589 0419586	5414855 5414840 5414870 5414898 5414913 5414929 5414944 5414969 5414987 5415014 5415038 5415067 5415103 5415121 5415147 5415185 5415228 5415251	According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/D/004 of 19.04.2016). There is no exact information on the type of anti-personnel mines. The site was identified as suspicious.	accurate information is absent	Donetsk region, Lyman district (Ozerne - 2). In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.

TP17	TP18	0419575	5415315			
TP18	TP19	0419586	5415335			
TP19	TP20	0419642	5415355			
TP20	TP21	0419630	5415308			
TP21	TP22	0419628	5415256			
TP22	TP23	0419635	5415206			
TP23	TP24	0419638	5415206			
TP24	TP25	0419647	5415148			
TP25	TP26	0419656	5415054			
TP26	TP27	0419652	5415037			
TP27	TP28	0419642	5415022			
TP28	TP29	0419632	5415005			
TP29	TP30	0419484	5414881			
TP30	TP31	0419472	5414871			
TP31	TP32	0419446	5414851			
TP32	SP	0419423	5414838			
BM	BM	0413627	5412225	According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/D/027 of 29.07.2016). There is no exact information on the type of anti-personnel mines. The site was identified as suspicious.	accurate information is absent	Donetsk region, Sloviansk district (Rai-Oleksandrivka - 2). In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.
SP1	SP1	0413838	5412232			
TP1	TP1	0413959	5472223			
TP2	TP2	0414143	5412204			
TP3	TP3	0414256	5412189			
TP4	TP4	0414388	5412186			
TP5	TP5	0414499	5412171			
TP6	TP6	0414494	5412154			
TP7	TP7	0414338	5412166			
TP8	TP8	0414209	5412175			
TP9	TP9	0414059	5412189			
TP10	TP10	0413839	5412216			
BM	SP2	1413627	5412225			
SP2	TP1	0413827	5412271			
TP1	TP2	0413840	5412087			
TP2	TP3	0413825	5412084			
TP3	SP2	0413820	5412211			



BM	SP	560246	5414109	According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/L/019 of 11.04.2017) information about the anti-personnel explosive device (OZM-72) is indirect evidence based on unconfirmed information provided by local residents. The site was identified as suspicious.	accurate information is absent	Luhansk region, Stanichno-Luhansk district (Chervona Talovka - 6). In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.
SP	TP1	561281	5415772			
TP1	TP2	561299	5415769			
TP2	TP3	561305	5415769			
TP3	TP4	561359	5415791			
TP4	TP5	561405	5415806			
TP5	TP6	561444	5415796			
TP6	TP7	561504	5415789			
TP7	TP8	561567	5415789			
TP8	TP9	561650	5415784			
TP9	TP10	561676	5415788			
TP10	TP11	561761	5415815			
TP11	TP12	561793	5415818			
TP12	TP13	561813	5415814			
TP13	TP14	561832	5415791			
TP14	TP15	561847	5415727			
TP15	TP16	561854	5415707			
TP16	TP17	561857	5415700			
TP17	TP18	561881	5415609			
TP18	SP	561326	5415497			
BM	SP	562768	5415596	According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/L/007 of 19.09.2016) information about the anti-personnel explosive device (OZM-72) is indirect evidence based on unconfirmed information provided by local residents. The site was identified as suspicious.	accurate information is absent	Luhansk region, Stanichno-Luhansk district (Chervona Talovka - 2). In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.
SP	TP1	562901	5415481			
TP1	TP2	562896	5415494			
TP2	TP3	562906	5415524			
TP3	TP4	562909	5415541			
TP4	TP5	562929	5415542			
TP5	TP6	562933	5415479			
TP6	TP7	562992	5415480			
TP7	TP8	562969	5415637			
TP8	TP9	563074	5415635			
TP9	TP10	563218	5415555			
TP10	TP11	563286	5415570			
TP11	TP12	563299	5415534			
TP12	TP13	563284	5415507			
TP13	TP14	563311	5415471			
TP14	TP15	563301	5415457			
TP15	TP16	563261	5415460			
TP16	TP17	563234	5415430			

TP17	TP18	563228	5415330			
TP18	TP19	563168	5415217			
TP19	TP20	562984	5415392			
TP20	TP21	562912	5415587			
TP21	TP22	562915	5415623			
TP22	TP23	562918	5415640			
TP23	TP24	562923	5415640			
TP24	TP25	562929	5415545			
TP25	TP26	562877	5415614			
TP26	TP27	562911	5415612			
TP27	TP28	562906	5415583			
TP28	TP29	562907	5415564			
TP29	TP30	562903	5415534			
TP30	TP31	562889	5415494			
TP31	TP32	562886	5415494			
TP32	TP33	562918	5415684			
TP33	TP34	562923	5415684			
TP34	TP35	562776	5415589			
TP35	TP36	562790	5415598			
TP36	TP37	562783	5415608			
TP37	TP38	562859	5415657			
TP38	TP39	562868	5415643			
TP39	TP40	562911	5415670			
TP40	TP41	562911	5415683			
TP41	TP42	562914	5415683			
TP42	SP	562914	5415670			
BM	SP	564130	5415409	According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/L/014 of 06.10.2016) information on an anti-personnel explosive device (OZM-72) is indirect evidence based on unconfirmed information provided by local residents. The site was identified as suspicious.	accurate information is absent	Luhansk region, Stanichno-Luhansk region (Chervona Talovka - 4). In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.
SP	TP1	564321	5415700			
TP1	TP2	564346	5415771			
TP2	TP3	564463	5415833			
TP3	TP4	564585	5415883			
TP4	TP5	564719	5415894			
TP5	TP6	564713	5415845			
TP6	TP7	564707	5415822			
TP7	TP8	564693	5415748			
TP8	TP9	564683	5415715			
TP9	TP10	564639	5415573			
TP10	TP11	564621	5415543			

TP11	TP12	564587	5415517			
TP12	TP13	564554	5415500			
TP13	SP	564499	5415570			
BM	SP	560246	5414109	<p>According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/L/020 of 12.04.2017) the anti-personnel explosive device (OZM-72) was installed in a controlled version. Identified as direct evidence of risk. Filmed in accordance with established procedure. The site was identified as suspicious.</p>	<p>accurate information is absent</p>	<p>Luhansk region, Stanichno-Luhansk region (Chervona Talovka - 7). In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.</p>
SP	TP1	561761	5415817			
TP1	TP2	561748	5415863			
TP2	TP3	561872	5415897			
TP3	TP4	561898	5415812			
TP4	TP5	562387	5415983			
TP5	TP6	562421	5415905			
TP6	TP7	562378	5415818			
TP7	TP8	562395	5415688			
TP8	TP9	562479	5415656			
TP9	TP10	562518	5415640			
TP10	TP11	562563	5415635			
TP11	TP12	562597	5415636			
TP12	TP13	562600	5415596			
TP13	TP14	562513	5415596			
TP14	TP15	562336	5415665			
TP15	TP16	562271	5415862			
TP16	TP17	561856	5415708			
TP17	TP18	561849	5415728			
TP18	TP19	561834	5415792			
TP19	TP20	561815	5415816			
TP20	SP	561793	5415820			
BM	SP	563883	5415160	<p>According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/L/031 of 24.10.2017) information on an anti-personnel explosive device (OZM-72) is indirect evidence based on unconfirmed information provided by local residents. The site was identified as suspicious.</p>	<p>accurate information is absent</p>	<p>Luhansk region, Stanichno-Luhansk region (Chervona Talovka - 12). In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.</p>
SP	TP1	564233	5415568			
TP1	TP2	564185	5415565			
TP2	TP3	563812	5415487			
TP3	TP4	563301	5415457			
TP4	TP5	563311	5415471			
TP5	TP6	563284	5415507			
TP6	TP7	563299	5415534			
TP7	TP8	563286	5415570			
TP8	TP9	563440	5415590			
TP9	TP10	563555	5415601			
TP10	TP11	563597	5415616			
TP11	TP12	563811	5415639			

TP12	TP13	563891	5415615			
TP13	TP14	564007	5415653			
TP14	TP15	564121	5415750			
TP15	TP16	564190	5415769			
TP16	TP17	564215	5415777			
TP17	TP18	564303	5415768			
TP18	TP19	564336	5415771			
TP19	TP20	564336	5415755			
TP20	TP21	564325	5415727			
TP21	TP22	564313	5415691			
TP22	TP23	564292	5415656			
TP23	SP	564262	5415606			
BM	SP	546323	5413499	According to the report of a non-technical survey of the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/L/017 of 18.10.2016), the anti-personnel explosive device (MON-50) was installed in a controlled version. Identified as direct evidence of risk. Filmed in accordance with established procedure.	accurate information is absent	Luhansk region, Stanichno-Luhansk district (Shiroky - 6). A non-governmental organization The Halo Trust conducted mine clearance in accordance with international and national standards for mine action (Report HT/CR/028 of 05.11.2019). An external quality control of mine clearance was carried out by the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (Act 2333/14/19/a26 of 03.12.2019).
SP	TP1	546427	5412492			
TP1	TP2	546482	5412498			
TP2	TP3	546536	5412047			
TP3	TP4	546496	5412024			
TP4	TP5	546474	5412021			
TP5	TP6	546474	5412039			
TP6	TP7	546476	5412049			
TP7	TP8	546483	5412059			
TP8	TP9	546492	5412062			
TP9	TP10	546492	5412066			
TP10	TP11	546486	5412067			
TP11	TP12	546480	5412069			
TP12	TP13	546470	5412077			
TP13	TP14	546457	5412197			
TP14	SP	546438	5412394			
BM	SP	436242	5368604	According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/D/057 of 07.06.2017) information on an anti-personnel explosive device (OZM-72) is indirect evidence based on unconfirmed information provided	accurate information is absent	Donetsk region, Bakhmut district (Novoluhansk - 5). In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.
SP	TP1	436514	5367688			
TP1	TP2	436799	5367724			
TP2	TP3	436936	5367742			
TP3	TP4	437094	5367757			
TP4	TP5	437088	5367835			
TP5	TP6	437350	5367819			
TP6	TP7	437514	5367835			
TP7	TP8	437522	5367795			
TP8	TP9	438277	5367859			

TP9	TP10	438283	5367835	by local residents. The site was identified as suspicious.		
TP10	TP11	437696	5367756			
TP11	TP12	437647	5367470			
TP12	TP13	437494	5367450			
TP13	TP14	437240	5367418			
TP14	TP15	437103	5367687			
TP15	TP16	436658	5367654			
TP16	TP17	436561	5367645			
TP17	TP18	436542	5367647			
TP18	TP19	436526	5367644			
TP19	SP	436520	5367644			
BM	SP	436242	5368604	According to a non-technical survey report by the non-governmental organization The Halo Trust (No. HT/D/087 of 04.05.2018) information about the anti-personnel explosive device (OZM-72) is indirect evidence based on unconfirmed information provided by local residents. The site was identified as suspicious.	accurate information is absent	Donetsk region, Bakhmut district (Novoluhansk - 13) In 2020, demining was planned by a non-governmental organization The Halo Trust.
SP	TP1	436116	5367347			
TP1	TP2	436199	5366862			
TP2	TP3	435804	5366806			
TP3	TP4	435803	5366831			
TP4	TP5	435795	5366860			
TP5	TP6	435788	5366888			
TP6	TP7	435762	5367102			
TP7	TP8	435757	5367150			
TP8	TP9	435746	5367244			
TP9	TP10	435742	5367278			
TP10	TP11	435768	5367288			
TP11	TP12	435818	5367300			
TP12	TP13	435920	5367320			
TP13	TP14	435997	5367331			
TP14	SP	436095	5367344			