NIGERIA

REVISED SUBMISSION ON

Request for Extension of Article 5

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

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I. Executive Summary

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (hereinafter - the Convention) entered into force for Nigeria on 01 March 2002. Since the Convention entered into force for Nigeria on 1 March 2002, Nigeria has been actively participating the State Party meetings and responding to the obligations of the Convention.

In its initial transparency report, submitted on 22 June 2004, Nigeria indicated that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. However, in its 2009 Article 7 report, Nigeria indicated that it had identified areas in which antipersonnel mines of improvised nature were suspected to be emplaced. In November 2011, at the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties, Nigeria presented a formal declaration of completion of destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas.

Since declaring completion, Nigeria has unfortunately identified newly laid mined areas in areas under its jurisdiction or control. In November 2019, at the Fourth Review Conference, Nigeria reported to the States Parties that it has been experiencing the “tragic consequences of the production and use of antipersonnel mines of an improvised nature by Non State Armed Groups (NSAG) especially in the northeast, causing internal displacement, loss of lives and properties”.

In compliance with the decision of the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties on addressing situations in which States Parties, after their original or extended deadline to implement Article 5 has expired, discover a mined area (as defined by Article 2.5 of the Convention), including a newly mined area, under its jurisdiction or control that is known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, Nigeria submitted a request for extension to the 2020 Eighteenth Meeting of the States Parties. In its request Nigeria committed to submit for consideration a more detailed request on the status of contamination and Convention implementation for consideration by the Nineteenth Meeting of the States Parties.

Unfortunately, at present, due to the difficulties presented by the security situation the extent of contamination is not clear. Furthermore, irregularity and non-selectivity of the use of IEDs in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) do not allow to estimate the scale of contamination with explosive ordnance and identify all contaminated areas. However, given the information that has been collected from the Nigerian Armed Forces and humanitarian organizations on the ground, including accident data and population reports, mined areas are suspected mostly in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States. It is important to highlight that, there are many cases of use of improvised explosive devices (IED) as well as a large number of unexploded ordnance (UXO). According to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) records, the majority of incidents take place due to the use of Road Planted IED, which greatly complicates the travelling process. At the time of writing, there are no proper records to estimate the extent of the contamination in BAY States. However, it is anticipated that conflict areas contain or are suspected to contain landmines of an improvised nature (IEDs), UXO and explosive remnants of war (ERW).
SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LANDMINES CONTERMINATION

A. SOCIAL IMPACTS: Socio-economic and demographic factors are important in understanding the humanitarian impact of Anti-personnel Mines. There is a higher incidence of casualties from Anti-personnel Mines and landmines among poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups. The poor casualties tend to occur among the poorest members of the population because very often they have little choice but to live in contaminated areas and to interact with Anti-Personnel Mines. Research has suggested “...a strong, direct correlation between Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination and poverty” while wealthier households have more options and are able to live in less contaminated areas and undertake livelihood activities that expose them to fewer threats from ERW.

Men of working age are the group most likely to be involved in anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, other ERW or landmine incident. These incidents often occur during the conduct of economic activities. Significantly more males are involved in incidents than females; the ICBL reports that of the ERW and landmine casualties recorded in 2006 of which the gender is known, 89% were male. This has been attributed to, among other things, the division of labour in a given community, with men often performing tasks of a nature that will put them at greater risk; and the tendency of men to be more likely to deliberately interact with ordnance, either for reasons of social display or because of increased confidence due to military experience. Likewise, most child casualties are male. While this might simply be due to the inquisitive nature of children, especially boys, there is also reason to suspect that this is also the result of social display, as well as the emulation of adult behaviours. In addition to economic activities there are other reasons why there tend to be more male than female victims. After conflict, men might return home or investigate the potential of an area as a new settlement site ahead of the other members of the family. Therefore the men are entering areas where local knowledge about the cluster contamination has not been developed.

Women: As incidents occur predominately during income-generating activities, the extent to which women are involved in these activities and the division of labour in a particular society influences the proportion of female victims.

Children and Youth: Children and youth account for a high proportion of Anti-personnel Mines victims. This is partly because they are curious and are less aware of dangers than adults. Anti-Personnel Mines may be attractive to children because many are shaped like balls or are brightly coloured. In Eritrea, children have used parts from Anti-personnel Mines to make bells to hang around the necks of animals. Children, particularly boys, are also involved in incidents because they are searching for scrap metal.
Refugees and IDPS: Aside from the direct threat of injury or death, and perhaps an increased likelihood of displacement, the use of Anti-personnel Mines and the resulting contamination exacerbates the difficulties faced by refugees and IDPs. Likewise, resettlement can be complicated for similar reasons, as well as the fact that property and land is contaminated. The displaced can also be the direct target of hostilities. There are instances when IDP camps have been struck with anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature used by Boko Haram operators in North-East Nigeria.

B. ECONOMIC IMPACT: Anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature use and contamination have an impact on the economy in a variety of ways. Aside from the damage to infrastructure and property, livelihood activities are interrupted or limited because of this damage or the lack of safe access to resources. It is significant that nearly all questionnaire respondents identified the lack of economic development as the major problem facing the countries or areas in which they work.

- **INFRASTRUCTURE**: Damage to infrastructure prevents a return to normality and contamination delays rebuilding, thus prolonging the impact of conflict. Following the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi authorities claim to have cleared thousands of unexploded land mines, for example from electrical power stations, communications equipment and bridges; and in Kuwait, the restoration of electrical power was delayed because of unexploded anti-personnel mines being found in critical parts of the grid. Not only is it necessary to rebuild infrastructure damaged in the conflict: in some areas new infrastructure is required to enable development, yet a new project might necessitate prior clearance activities. Example, a project to provide water to a certain village was delayed because of anti-personnel mines contamination. Damage to infrastructure has a wide-ranging impact on the economy. In addition to the cost of reconstruction, the loss of air transport for trade and tourism has a serious economic impact.

- **LIVELIHOODS**: The deaths and injuries caused by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature at time of use and post-conflict have an economic cost. As a greater proportion of these occur among males, who are often the primary income earners, affected households often face serious financial hardship. Victims who sustained serious injury, such as the loss of a limb, who are able to return to work cannot realistically do so sooner than six months after the incident. Furthermore, care for injured household members has either economic or opportunity costs for the caregiver. When a number of households are unable to make a contribution to the local economy, the whole community might be affected. While the impact of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature on livelihoods is broad, it tends to affect agriculture more than any other economic sector. People are unable to safely access land for cultivation, grazing livestock or the collection of resources. In addition, in many contaminated countries, livestock are lost to anti-personnel Mines incidents, which can be a devastating economic blow to the owner or the
community. Unfortunately, economic conditions often force people to take risks. A Negative effects on livelihoods can be seen even in situations with relatively minor contamination. The economic impact of contamination is felt at the individual and community levels.

In response to this threat Nigeria established an Inter-Ministerial Committee with an aim to develop a national mine action strategy and a work plan to start survey and clearance of antipersonnel mines in the affected areas. Currently, the Inter-Ministerial Committee is comprised of two female representatives and four male representatives from the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development, National Emergency Management Agency, Northeast Development Commission and National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs. The membership of the Committee will be expanded to include the Nigerian Police Force, National Security and Civil Defence Corps and the National Universities Commission.


At present, due to security challenges, the main efforts are aimed at Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) and strengthening capacity of the national security service providers to mitigate threat of explosive ordnance.

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) works with two international non-governmental organizations, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and a local non-governmental organization Youths Awaken Foundation (YAF) working in Nigeria in the sphere of humanitarian mine action (organizations operate solely through donor funding). As a result of this collaboration, since 2019, a total of 646,422 beneficiaries have been reached across Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) states.

Despite significant security challenges caused by the NSAG, Nigeria remains committed to its obligations under the Convention, including commitments under Article 5 related to survey and clearance and mine risk education. While the present situation make it impossible to conduct full survey operation to determine the required resources and to carry out systematic humanitarian demining, the aim of this request is to strengthen coordination efforts, carry out explosive ordnance risk education and prepare the ground works for survey and clearance once the security situation allows.

In view of the above, **Nigeria is requesting a 4 year extension of its 31 December 2021 deadline until 31 December 2025**

The purpose of this request is to allow Nigeria to carry out the following:
a. Establishment of a National Mine Action Centre to address the threat;
b. Development of National Mine Action Standards;
c. To strengthen the coordination of delivery of Explosive Ordnance Risk Education;
d. Continue information collection efforts on the threat posed by anti-personnel mines;
e. To develop a national mine action strategy and a work plan for implementation.

Fulfilment of the set of tasks aimed at complete destruction of the antipersonnel mines will promote:

a. reduction of risks associated with landmines of an improvised nature and other explosive remnants of war for civilians in Nigeria;
b. creating a safe environment, reducing the impact of explosive ordnance on the environment;
c. further safe use of mine-cleared areas and infrastructure for economic purposes;
d. essential decreasing of casualties among the civil population and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid, in particular, to persons, who reside in hard-to-reach areas;
e. improvement of the civil population’s access to essential goods and services, agricultural lands, infrastructural objects, schools, forests, rivers, recreational facilities, that will have positive impact on the internal migration of population;
f. growth of economic indicators, in particular, increase in agricultural production and livestock;
g. unimpeded access of humanitarian workers to hard-to-reach areas;
h. decrease of risks of emergencies in connection with explosive ordnance.

This extension request has been developed through an inclusive process with partner organizations, taking into consideration the different needs and perspectives of women, girls, boys and men and the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities.

II. Detailed Narrative

1. Origins of the Article 5 implementation challenge since 2011

2002 – 2011

In its initial transparency report, Nigeria indicated that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Nigeria’s Article 7 report submitted in 2009, indicated that it had identified areas in which antipersonnel mines were suspected to be emplaced.

Nigeria also indicated to the 28 May 2009 Intersessional Meetings that, should the outcome of a technical investigation result in a determination that there are anti-personnel mines in mined areas under Nigeria’s jurisdiction or control, Nigeria was aware of its obligation to “destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in these mined areas as soon as possible, but not later than ten years after entry into force” of the Convention for Nigeria. Nigeria noted that it would have a deadline of 1 March 2012 to conclude implementation of Article 5.
In the information Nigeria submitted in 2009 in accordance with its obligations under Article 7 of the Convention, Nigeria reported “in (a) war affected area of Eastern Part of Nigeria”, areas that were suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. Nigeria further reported that the type of mines would have been a “Biafran ‘locally fabricated’ explosive device (Obgunigwe) which was used as (an) AP landmine” and that they would have been emplaced “not later than January 1970”. Some conventional landmines in the holdings of the pre-civil war Nigerian Army including Rangers APM, POMZ from former Czechoslovakia and Dingbat APM were sparingly used.

Nigeria also reported at the time that it had constituted an Inter-Ministerial Committee to concern itself with mines and other explosive remnants of war to enable Nigeria to meet its Convention obligations and that the Committee consisted of 15 representatives of relevant Ministries, Departments and non-governmental organizations.

On 2 December 2010 at the Tenth Meeting of the States Parties, Nigeria reported that four cities and their environs had been cleared, namely Enugu, Owerri, Port-Harcourt and Makurdi. Nigeria further reported that, while it believed that there were as of that date no more areas in Nigeria containing or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, it would keep the contractor on site to carry out any additional required actions. At that time, Nigeria also reported that clearance operations had resulted in the destruction of 101 Ranger/ POMZ type mines, 61 locally fabricated (Obgunigwe) mines and 15,516 other explosive hazards.

After the end of the destruction of landmines, a collation exercise took place in all the 11 States where humanitarian demining took place. The 11 states technically surveyed totalled 153,278 square kilometres and the States that share common boundaries with those that the war took place (i.e., Adamawa in the north east and Ekiti and Edo in the south west) totalling 56,000 square kilometres were also checked because of traces of incursions by both troops during the war and the States that were created after the war. The total number of areas excavated that contained landmines or Ogbunigwe was 1,136. A total of 820 conventional landmines were destroyed (including 203 buried but abandoned by the Nigerian Army) along with 646 Ogbunigwe, 426 improvised explosive devices and a variety of other explosive remnants of war. Areas contaminated with both anti-personnel mines and other explosive remnants of war totalled 75,178 square kilometres.

In November 2011, at the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties, Nigeria presented a formal declaration of completion of destruction of mines in these areas.

**2018 – 2021**

Since declaring completion, Nigeria has unfortunately continued to identify newly laid mined areas in areas under its jurisdiction or control. In November 2019, at the Fourth Review Conference, Nigeria reported to the States Parties that it has been experiencing the “tragic consequences of the production and use of antipersonnel mines of an improvised nature by Non State Armed Groups (NSAG) especially in the northeast, causing internal displacement, loss of lives and properties", declaring newly-mined areas.
While the security situation does not allow for full survey and clearance activities, the information available has led to the suspicion of hazardous areas in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States due to their confirmed use by Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State in Western Africa Province (ISWAP).

The increased frequency of the use of IEDs are resulting in a growing threat to the population, refugees and IDPs. While it appears that the intended targets of numerous anti-government and non-state armed groups are the security forces, more and more civilians are indiscriminately killed and maimed.

2. Nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge: quantitative and qualitative aspects

Due to the security situation, a systematic survey of the suspected areas has not been possible and in this regard the full scope of contamination by anti-personnel mines and other ERW in northeast Nigeria is unknown. However, over eleven years of conflict it is suspected that significant contamination exists.

Furthermore, the conflict is ongoing and has seen an intensification of operations resulting in an increase in contamination. In addition to anti-personnel mines this includes small arms ammunitions, air dropped bombs, grenades, rockets, mortars, artillery and tank shells.

This contamination has significant impact on the population. For example, with a predominant agricultural sector, access to land and waters is hampered while land farmers, herdiers, fishermen, hunters and traditional beekeepers are at risk. Furthermore, the presence of unexploded or abandoned ammunition endangers populations and also provides a readily available source of explosives to manufacture Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), which further aggravates the threat to communities.

There are two predominant uses of Improvised Explosive Devices that affect civilians
i) IEDs emplaced along roads,
ii) Person Borne IED (PBIED) attacks (notably carriers are women, girls and boys).
The majority of incidents reported is due to improvised anti-personnel mines (Victim Activated IED - pressure plate activated).

The results derived from a recent Explosive Ordnance (EO) data analysis informs that the use of Road Planted IEDs have caused an upswing in casualty rates during the respective reporting periods marks a disturbing trend.

Table: incidents related to explosive ordnance in northeast Nigeria 2016-2021.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Road Planted</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Vehicle</th>
<th>Other IED</th>
<th>ERW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>149</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At present, information is being collected by UNMAS. This is being complemented by the APMBC Desk Office in Borno State. The information is collected and registered in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core. The information for this database is collected through both open, after quality checks, and closed sources based on partnerships with mine action operators and other humanitarian actors.

The data analysis made through IMSMA database are shared with the whole of the humanitarian community to inform about recent trends and thus impact strategic and operational planning. For instance, technical notes have been shared to UN and humanitarian actors regarding the use of rockets and types of IEDs used by NSAG.

3. Humanitarian, economic, social and environmental implications

Explosive devices continue to put millions of people at risk of death and injuries in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. In 2020, 433 civilian and non-civilian fatalities and casualties have been recorded. The presence of the explosive devices not only endangers the lives of the population and hampers the return to normal life, but also impedes humanitarian access and recovery efforts.

Nigeria’s partner organization Mine Advisory Group (MAG), reported that from January 2016 - April 2021, a total of 877 incidents involving EO with the vast majority of incidents recorded involved landmines of an improvised nature within Borno State. These incidents have resulted in 1,316 recorded casualties, including 500 deaths and 816 injuries. Roughly, 32% of casualties recorded were reported to be civilians while military/government forces make up the majority of casualties recorded, mostly caused by IEDs on roads. Borno State saw the highest recorded number of incidents, with Gwoza, Damboa, Dikwa and Bama LGAs being the top 4 most affected.

Majority of victims recorded were government forces/military personnel (approximately 68%), and most accidents took place while travelling by road. Among civilians, 74% were male and 40% of accidents were reported were related to economic/livelihood activities. 33% of victims were children under the age of 18 while 90% of victims had never received EORE before.

Threat faced by the population:

- **IDPs and refugees**: Influxes of IDPs and refugee movements are expected to continue on a significant scale and displaced populations are therefore considered an at-risk group given their mobility throughout contaminated areas. Borno State resettlement plans for 2021 to known contaminated areas will further contribute to the rise in at-risk displaced communities. A rocket attack against Maiduguri on 23rd February 2019, illustrates this fact with one unexploded 122mm rocket landing in the vicinity of a primary school and another one landing in Teachers’ village IDP camp.
Farmers: During cultivation, both men and women face similar levels of risk.

Scrap metal collectors: Mostly older boys and young men, they also face an especially high level of risk when attempting to collect scrap metal for resale.

Women: Women often face risks when going to collect firewood or water and are considered an at-risk group due to the high proportion of female-headed households.

Children: Children, especially boys, face risk when playing outside, particularly as a result of a lack of awareness surrounding the dangers of explosive ordnance and the tendency to mistake explosive devices as toys.

Nigerian Security Forces: Nigerian Security Forces are frequently targeted by explosive devices laid by Boko Haram, typically in the form of anti-personnel mines planted along roads. Many casualties and fatalities have been among security or military personnel accompanying civilian convoys between towns in Local Government Areas (LGAs), as well as in towns and villages.

Nigerian Civil Defence Forces: Equally at risk are Civil Defence Forces including the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC).

UNMAS has finalized a situation analysis on Victim Assistance that includes data analysis on explosive ordnance victims in north east Nigeria, needs assessment of persons with injuries and disabilities, and a mapping of specialized services available in the area.

Based on the first findings of the situation analysis, a surge of number of ERW/IED victims was identified between 2017 and 2018, with more than 700 direct victims in 2018.
According to available data sources, the majority of victims are men and boys (more than 70%). Quality data are still missing to better understand the profile of victims and circumstances of accidents. Access specialized services for persons with injuries and disabilities in North East Nigeria is limited, including for direct victims of ERW/IED, and uncovered needs remain for a large number. Despite federal and national initiatives for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in Nigeria, their inclusion in the society is still restricted.

Based on the feedback of organizations of persons with disabilities in Borno State, numerous barriers prevent them to access education, social activities and economic opportunities. Humanitarian assistance just begun to consider disability as an exclusion factor, and additional efforts are expected from the authorities and international community towards needs and rights of persons with disabilities, in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

In the coming months, Nigeria with the support of UNMAS and other stakeholders is planning to achieve the following:

a) Conduct a qualitative survey on explosive ordnance victims to better understand needs and barriers to access services;

b) Continue to map available services and initiate referral pathways between HMA operators and other actors to enhance assistance provided to ERW/IED victims;

c) Develop Victim Assistance national standards to be proposed to national authorities.”

4. National Demining Structures

To address contamination, Nigeria established an Inter-Ministerial Committee with an aim to develop a national mine action strategy and a work plan to start survey and clearance of antipersonnel mines in the affected areas.
Currently, the Inter-Ministerial Committee is comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Defence, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development, National Emergency Management Agency, Northeast Development Commission and National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs.

The membership of the Committee is in the process of being expanded to include the Nigeria Police Force, National Security and Civil Defence Corps and the Federal Ministry of Education (National Universities Commission and National Board for Technical Education).

Furthermore, a number of Nigerian authorities are involved in mine action, including the Ministry of Defence, Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development, National Emergency Management Agency, Federal Ministry of Education (the National Universities Commission of Nigeria). Other relevant state agencies also deal with mine action activities: the State Emergency Management Agency, the Nigeria Police Force, National Security and Civil Defence Corps, Borno State Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement, and the Borno State Agency.

In spite of the different entities involved in mine action, there is currently no Ministry/Government Agencies/ National Mine Action Authority dedicated to coordination Humanitarian Mine Action activities in Nigeria.

One of the aims of the extension period is to establish a Mine Action Centre to address contamination in a comprehensive manner and strengthen coordination with partners in the country.

**National Capacity**

The EOD department of the Nigeria Police force possessed some reasonable capacity which hitherto enable them to function as a department as witnessed between 2014 and 2018 in Borno State. They were called severally, to defuse IEDs and UXOs discovered within the metropolis while the military work in the field. They however, have limited technical equipment to enhance their operations. To this end, UNMAS assisted in improving the capacity of 20 EOD operators of the Nigeria Police Force personnel in Maiduguri. The training was on IED threat mitigation through the delivery IED disposal training and related equipment to reduce the impact of explosive ordnance, on conflict affected communities in northeast Nigeria.

Through the delivery of training and equipment, the technical, operational and managerial capacity of security service providers to deal with explosive ordnance was developed in a gender responsive manner, with a focus on IED and first aid assistance in the Nigerian states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.

In addition, as part of its initiative to strengthen national explosive hazard management capacities, UNMAS provided First Responder course to 163 frontline officers of the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) in Nigeria. This “First Responder” training package
aims at building local capacities to mitigate the risk of further injuries or death and attenuate the effect of explosive-related incidents. UNMAS also provided first aid and emergency trauma bag trainings to 44 Nigeria Police Force personnel in order to reinforce their capacity to assist civilians and colleagues affected by explosive-related incidents.

**Partners**

Nigeria is working together with a number of partners to carry out its commitment under the Convention including the following organizations:

**United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS):**

In response to the crisis, the UNMAS Nigeria Programme takes a strategic, multi-year comprehensive approach for protection of civilians and humanitarian actors through humanitarian mine action in northeast Nigeria, supported by multi-donor contributions. This approach encompasses a range of responses, including Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) with embedded COVID-19 safety messages for refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees and communities, Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) training and emergency medical response training for the Nigerian security service providers, Non-Technical Survey (NTS), Information Management (IM) to record and map explosive hazards, Victim Assistance (VA), and advocacy and support for compliance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), with coordination as a key cross-cutting enabling factor. UNMAS established its main office in Maiduguri to include programme leadership, technical experts and information management capacity in Maiduguri with a small presence in Abuja to liaise with the Federal government authorities, donor agencies and other relevant stakeholders. The current programme comprises of a Programme Manager, Medical Coordinator, IED Disposal Technical Advisor, two programme officers, EORE Advisor, Victim Assistance Specialist, Programme Support Officer and two Information Management Officers.

**Danish Refugee Council (DRC):**

DRC’s Humanitarian Disarmament & Peace building sector in Nigeria aims to contribute to the peace and stabilization, protection, and promotion of durable solutions to crisis-affected populations in the region. DRC conducts Mine Action and Conflict Management (PB former AVR) programmes to create a safer environment free from armed violence and the remnants of conflict. PB activities are aimed at empowering civilians with the tools and knowledge they need to be better prepared and protected against the use of explosive weapons, and other conflict related threats. PB results community safety through having dialogue fora with Security Providers, Inter-Faith dialogues with different religious leaders, Inter-Generational dialogue among Youths and Elders, Youth Engagement, conflict management, Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation.

DRC’s Mine Action approach encompasses a range of responses, including Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) with embedded COVID-19 safety messages for refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees and communities, Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IMAS EOD Level 1 & 2) training for the Nigerian Police Force EOD teams, Non-Technical Survey (NTS), Information Management (IM) to record and map explosive hazards, Victim Assistance (VA referral to ICRC), and advocacy and support for compliance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), with coordination with UNMAS. The HDP
sector established its main office in Maiduguri to include programme leadership, technical experts and information management capacity in Maiduguri with an additional presence in Mubi and Yobe to liaise with the Federal government authorities, donor agencies and other relevant stakeholders. The current programme comprises a Programme Manager, a NTS/CL Coordinator and Information Management Specialist.

**Mines Advisory Group (MAG):**
MAG Nigeria have a total of total of 16 Community Liaison staff including the Community Liaison Manager, 3 Community Liaison Team leaders and 12 Community Liaison officer, 1 program manager 1 finance, one support services and 1 security officer. MAG delivers EORE in multiple languages dependent on the audience in 21 of the 27 local government areas of Borno state. The essence was to provide men, women and children with vital safety messages, helping them to identify possible dangerous devices, teaching them about the effects of the weapons, how to minimize the likelihood of detonating them, how to reduce the impact if someone is injured and what to do if one is found as well as promoting the sharing of these messages.

**Youths Awaken Foundation (YAF):**
The YAF comprises of 1 Programme Manager and 15 Project officers who are primarily conducting EORE across BAY states in Nigeria. The organization provides relief materials (food items and non-food items (NFIs) to the internally displaced persons in Maiduguri and conducting Explosive Ordinance Risk Education (EORE) to IDPs in camps and host communities.

5. **Methodologies and Standards Employed**

At present, International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) provides the relevant framework and working guidelines to follow for EO Risk Education and Non-Technical Survey efforts. Nonetheless, over the course of the extension period, Nigeria will work with its partners to establish National Mine Action Standards to provide a framework for mine action activities in the country. Presently, in collaboration with the UNMAS, Nigeria has drafting National Standards for EORE.

6. **Nature and extent of progress made: Quantitative and Qualitative aspects**

As indicated, due to the security situation and lack of access, it has not been possible to carry out systematic Non-Technical Survey and clearance operation. Nonetheless, some progress has been made in this regard by partner organizations, as follows:

**Non-Technical Survey**

a. **IMCAPMBC**
The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (IMCAPMBC) in collaboration with the security operatives gets some incidents reports of suicide bombs and road side bombs particularly those that are vehicle activated. Unfortunately, most of these
incidents are gotten after detonation with tragic consequences of deaths and injuries. Between 2016 and January 2021 a total of 732 road side bombs were discovered. Out this number 493 of these bombs were successfully defused by the military in their daily routine scanning with majority of them between Bama – Gwoza road, Bama – Firgi and Banki roads. Others are between Maiduguri - Damboa road, Maiduguri – Mafa – Dikwa – Gambaru Ngala road and Dikwa – Ran road. Unfortunately, the balance of 239 were detonated with tragic consequences with most of the fatalities and injuries been the security forces. Some the civilian vehicles involved included some hired trucks conveying relief materials.

While these information are not effort of IMCAPMBC at NTS, they nonetheless give insight into the existence of road side IEDs (vehicle activated) in large numbers. This indicate how active the NSAG are in these areas and will also no doubt assist in data collation for further survey and planning.

b. Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

Due to the limited opportunity for NTS, MAG also conducts Remote Contamination Baseline Assessments (RCBA), which takes the form of focus group discussions among IDPs and host communities who have witnessed anti-personnel mines, ERW or IEDs in their communities and is cross-checked with secondary sources on incidents/accidents (primarily through INSO reports). Of the 372 RCBA conducted by MAG since November 2019, 251 assessments from EO reported in Bade, Bama, Damboa, Dikwa, Guzamala, Gwoza, Konduga, Kukawa, Mafa, Marte, Monguno and Ngala have concluded that there to be a high degree of confidence of contamination in these LGAs, with the vast majority of suspected items being comprised of UXO (mortars, projectiles, grenades) followed by aerial bombs and IEDs.

- In Borno State: MAG conducted 7 NTS in Damboa during December 2019, where no explosive hazards were found; 5 NTS were conducted in Monguno in December 2019, where no explosive hazards were found; 7 NTS were conducted in Gwoza in September 2020, where 6 single ERW were identified and recorded.
- In Yobe State: 7 NTS were carried out in Gujba where no explosive hazards were found.
- In Adamawa State: 6 NTS were conducted in Madagali where no explosive hazards were found.

Mine Risk Education

a. Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

MAG methodology is based on direct presentation and face-to-face activities, as these offer the maximum opportunity to engage with audiences, respond to queries or questions, and give information about the nature of the risks and the best method to mitigate it. The CL teams aim to keep the number of participants to between 10-15 people (in line with COVID regulations) in order to ensure high levels of engagement. EORE for children is particularly engaging and participatory, with key messages emphasized through a variety of methods,
including educational games and songs. MAG will also incorporate puppet shows at least once a month under this project to reinforce risk education messaging provided to children. Following the session, children will receive colouring books with pencils, flyers, and/or board games to sustain the impact of the messages conveyed during this session.

For adults, RE sessions last between 45 minutes to an hour, as adults often have questions following the sessions. The materials used during the sessions will include banners and posters, while leaflets and/or bags will be distributed after to sustain the message in the individuals’ minds and allow dissemination amongst individuals who did not attend the session.

In the last year MAG has started identifying community members to be nominated and trained as Community Focal Points (teachers, humanitarian workers, traditional leaders, women’s group leaders, Camp Committee Leaders, and other community leaders) to carry on EORE messaging within their communities and establish reporting mechanisms between MAG and local authorities when new contamination is discovered. This approach has been tested and developed by MAG Nigeria and proven to be very successful in ensuring that local capacity endures within communities long after MAG EORE activities conclude.

The training of Community Focal Points has two primary objectives. First, it equips the trainees with knowledge and awareness to recognise explosive ordnance, and understanding of the risks posed by EO and identify safe behaviour. Second, the training enables the trainees to sustain this messaging through brief safety sessions to community members about recognition of explosive ordnance and risk mitigating actions. MAG has developed a verifiable and thoroughly tested comprehensive Train the Trainer curriculum to prepare individuals to serve as Community Focal Points.

b. Youths Awaken Foundation (YAF)

The Youths Awaken Foundation (YAF), the only national mine action organization, has reached 39 community members through seven safety messages of EORE to convey the safe behaviour and with the help of flyers and practical demonstrations (in the context of children). YAF states that most common unsafe behaviours include but not limited to;

- Scrap metal collection in dangerous areas
- Venturing into unknown territories for firewood collection

The projects implemented by YAF (consists of 16 staff) covered a total number of 173 IDPs including; women, men, boys and girls in two different locations residing in host communities namely; Dipcharima street old G.R.A Maiduguri and Islamiya Camp located at Polo in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC). YAF conducted several EORE sessions during the implementation of the projects tailored to men, women, boys and girls to ensure proficient means of conveying the safety messages.

The sessions were based on groups divided to aid understanding and ensure comprehensive assimilation by the IDPs. YAF also distributed hand bills and used flyers to convey the safety
messages as encapsulated by UNMAS. YAF usually conduct a feedback mechanism as part of their monitoring and evaluation efforts after each EORE session in the field.

The table below illustrates the number of beneficiaries achieved through EORE activities by the mine action operators in Nigeria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>106,109</td>
<td>113,927</td>
<td>104,774</td>
<td>76,545</td>
<td>401,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>51887</td>
<td>58,907</td>
<td>55,095</td>
<td>41,081</td>
<td>206,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>9920</td>
<td>10533</td>
<td>9787</td>
<td>7857</td>
<td>38,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>167,916</td>
<td>183,367</td>
<td>169,656</td>
<td>125,483</td>
<td>646,422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**c. UNMAS**

UNMAS delivers Explosive Ordnance Awareness (EOA) for humanitarian workers and national authorities. In May 2020, UNMAS launched a Humanitarian Hub Campaign, to raise awareness of the threat of explosive ordnance to the Humanitarian Hub personnel in Ngala, Banki, Monguno, Bama and Gwoza.

It has been suggested that Non State Armed Groups (NSAG) have no intention of distinguishing between civilians and combatants. Placing explosive devices around humanitarian hubs and specifically targeting humanitarian workers and civilians would strongly suggest attempts to create fear among the civilian and humanitarian workers. This was evident based on the findings of our rapid assessment mission following the recent attacks in Monguno where armed assailants had left an unexploded projectile at the gate of the humanitarian hub.

On 11 April 2021, the UN Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator emphasized in his Press Release that civilians and aid workers, their facilities and assets should never be a target and must be protected and respected at all times.

The table below illustrates the number of beneficiaries achieved through EOA activities by UNMAS in Nigeria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>606</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In light of the above, UNMAS recognized that personnel employed in the humanitarian hubs are at high risk of incidents involving explosive ordnance and they lack sufficient knowledge and training to effectively and efficiently manage such incidents. Therefore, explosive ordnance awareness is deemed vital to empower the personnel employed in the humanitarian hubs to prevent unfortunate explosive ordnance incidents.

Through raising awareness about the threats posed by explosive hazards, the risk of injury and death to humanitarian workers can be minimized. Humanitarian Hub Campaign has been a high-impact explicit approach initiated by UNMAS to empower the staff of humanitarian hubs, to learn and build resilience on potential risks of explosive ordnance.

During the reporting period, the first phase of the campaign completed training 77 humanitarian hub staff (IOM, UNDP-UNDSS LSA, prudential guards) in Ngala, Banki, Monguno, Bama and Gwoza hubs on the management of explosive ordnance incidents.

With the distinctive rise of e-learning and in response to the shift from conventional physical meetings to virtual meetings precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the critical need to protect humanitarian actors, UNMAS conducted virtual explosive ordnance awareness sessions to humanitarian actors. The virtual explosive ordnance awareness sessions were attended by UN agencies, high-level officials from the Federal Ministries, members of the Education in Emergencies Workgroup (EiEWG), Civil Society Organizations, International and local NGOs, national authorities, commissions and the private sector.

Considering the limited time and opportunities that were available to target humanitarian workers in the field, virtual explosive ordnance awareness was considered the most efficient and effective approach to continue raising awareness about the threats posed by explosive hazards. The safety messages and materials that are currently considered appropriate will need to be reviewed as the context evolves. Explosive ordnance awareness, including raising awareness of various types of IED is crucial to the humanitarian response in Nigeria in order to minimize the number of fatalities or injuries caused by explosive hazards to not only to humanitarian workers but displaced and returning civilians.

In order to promote national ownership in mine action, UNMAS has trained 32 staff of National Emergency Management Agency to conduct EORE. The Inter-Ministerial Committee is collaborating with UNMAS to advocate for inclusion of EORE train-the-trainer courses in the school curriculum (at the distance learning platform of the National Universities Commission) for national authorities to enhance their capabilities on mine action. These initiatives will help public dissemination of the EORE messages across the schools and universities in BAY states, Nigeria. UNMAS has conducted preliminary studies towards a possible innovative approach to launch a Risk Education Technical Device (RETD) to disseminate EORE messages in hard-to-reach areas and to inaccessible at-risk populations in BAY States. The RETD application will be used to deliver EORE messages along with basic COVID-19 prevention awareness messages.

For 2022, subsequent investment is planned by UNMAS through different initiatives including training of 40 persons from three Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and 40 officers from National Emergency Management Agency, State Emergency Management Agency, Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps and 20 person each from the
3 local implementing companies with the support of the Governments of Japan and Germany. These interventions will be completed by June 2022. MAG and DRC also will prioritize NTS for 2022. NTS is a priority as primary source of information of contamination.

**Resources provided for implementation**

Progress made in the implementation by partner organizations is credited to the contributions provided by the following partners:

- Nigeria Victim support Fund
- North East Development Fund
- Nigeria Humanitarian Fund
- BHA
- OFDA
- DFID
- The Federal Republic of Germany
- The Government of Japan
- Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
- Stichting Vluchteling

7. **Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines.**

At presence the main challenges faced by Nigeria to survey and address all mined areas relate to the current security situation. The security situation has limited access to at risk persons and suspected hazardous areas and has logistics. Insecurity, violence and conflict instigated by Boko Haram is driving massive displacement in the North-Eastern States of Nigeria and is now spilling over into neighbouring countries.

Communities are overwhelmed by the influx due to displacement by the AOGs and leads to extreme poverty, vulnerability to natural hazards and pre-existing inter-communal conflicts are all aggravating factors, particularly in the areas hosting the most IDPs.

Access to the communities that have been taken over from the insurgents is difficult for Mine action activities to take place. Some of the location is accommodating not actual people of community rather the people from the neighbouring villages, it makes it difficult to conducting NTS Activities.

8. **Amount of time requested and a rationale for this amount of time**

Given that Nigeria is not able to currently access suspected mined areas and in line with the States Parties recognition of the “value of States Parties requesting only the period of time necessary to gather and assess data on landmine contamination and other relevant information with a view to develop a meaningful forward looking plan based on this
information,” and then submitting a second request containing plans based on a clearer understanding of the extent of the challenge and which project with greater certainty the amount of time that will be required to complete Article 5 implementation.” Nigeria is requesting a period of 4 years until 31 December 2025.

The purpose of this extension request is to prepare the groundwork for NTS, TS and clearance when access to these areas becomes available, to continue and strengthen efforts to deliver on Mine Risk Education activities, establish a mine action centre and continue strengthening coordination between partners to deliver a comprehensive response. During this time period, Nigeria will continue to assess the situation on the ground in terms of accessibility and will liaise with partners to carry out survey and clearance once the affected areas are accessible. Nigeria will keep the States Parties informed through its Article 7 Reports and will provide updates during formal and informal meetings of the Convention. Should the situation persist, Nigeria will submit a second request by 31 March 2025.

9. Detailed work plan for the period of the requested extension

During the extension period, Nigeria intends to focus on the following:

Nigeria remains quite optimistic that the current situation will come to a favourable end to enable humanitarian demining activities in earnest. The North Eastern States of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe have a total of 34 Local Government Areas affected by the insurgents’ activities which are in potential danger of IEDs, UXO and ERW. Borno has 18 out of 27 LGAs, Adamawa has 5 out 21 LGAs and Yobe has 11 out 17 LGAs affected respectively. It is envisaged that Nigeria will be able to conduct NTS and TS that will enable mapping out of the contaminated areas and subsequently, clearance as from July 2024.

The NMAC once established, will collaborate further with UNMAS, MAG and DRC to conduct an evidence-based survey to determine the extent of contamination and the size of the contaminated area. To this end, UNMAS will assist in carrying out an evidence based survey, once possible, to acquire detailed, disaggregated information on contamination. Currently, the sizes of SHAs are not available. However, below are lists of some known and suspected contaminated areas within the BAY States as compiled by MAG:

Known contaminated areas:

- **Konduga LGA, Borno** (Konduga-Bama road, Auno/Chabbol, Nyaleri/Sandia/Yejiwa village) – **antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature found**
- **Gwoza LGA, Borno** (Pulka, Bokko, Dure, Wala, Warabe villages, Ngoshe ward, Ashigashiya village, Firgi) - **UXO found: projectiles, aircraft bombs**
- **Bama LGA, Borno** (Shehuri/Hausari/Mairi, Dipchari/Jere/Dar-Jamal/Kotembe, Gulumba/Jukkuri/Batra, Kasugula, Kumshe Nduguno, Lawanti/Malam/Mastari/Abbaram, Wulbari/Ndine/Chachile) - **UXO/ERW (aircraft bombs, mortars) and antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature found**
- Damboa LGA, Borno (Damboa Central and Koyeri Fulatari village) – ERW and antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature found
- Dikwa LGA, Borno (Massa Village, Motor Park IDP Camp, Alhaji Bashir Camp) - Antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature found
- Jere LGA, Borno (Gongulong, Dala Lawanti, Dusuman village) – ERW and antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature found
- Kukawa LGA, Borno (Kuluguwa village) - antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature found
- Mafa LGA, Borno (Bulamari, Ibramti, Kwatabul villages) - ERW and antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature found
- Mobbar LGA, Borno (Damasak) - antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature found
- Monguno LGA, Borno (Gana Ali, Ngurno village) - ERW and antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature found
- Ngala LGA, Borno (Ngala Ward, Old Gamboru) – ERW

Suspected Contaminated Areas (Remote Contamination Baseline Assessment):

- Bama LGA, Borno (Zangeri, Goniri, Soye, Dipchari, Abbaram village) – UXO, ERW (aerial bombs) and antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature suspected
- Damboa LGA, Borno (Shettima Abogu, Talala, Luwa, Mulgoi, Bulajani, Modube village) – UXO, ERW (aerial bombs) suspected
- Dikwa LGA, Borno (Ajiri, Amtul, Anderi, Ardori, Boboshe, Bulana, Bulanga Maie, Bulunguwa Maiye, Dure, Gajibo, Isari, Kawari, Kotokuma, Kude, Lawanti, Mallam Maja, Mana Waji, Masa, Mida, Muliye, Mussule, Shehuri, Sulala village) – UXO, aerial bombs suspected
- Guzmalga LGA, Borno (Lingir, Bunari village) – UXO (mortars) suspected
- Gwoza LGA, Borno (Amdaga, Ashigashiya, Bille, Dure, Fadagwe Digire, Firgi, Gahta, Gidan Block, Gobara, Godole, Gahta, Hambagda, Jeta Bush, Jige, Kirawa, Madube, Nagadiyo, Ngileri, Shiyaadawuye, Subaka Garga, Uvaha, Uvaliye, Warabe village) – UXO, ERW (aerial bomb) and antipersonnel-mines of improvised nature suspected
- Kala Bage LGA, Borno (Sangaya, Rann, Addari, Meleri village) – UXO, ERW (aerial bombs) suspected
- Konguga LGA, Borno (Ngalamari, Sojiri, Kayamla, Kellumiri village) – UXO, aerial bombs suspected
- Kukawa LGA, Borno (Katari, Kekeno, Yoyo Pompomma, Karwaram village) – UXO (projectiles) suspected
- Mafa LGA, Borno (Ajiri, Awada 1, Boskoro, Bula Lawan Boramye, Dagumba, Farjallari, Gawa, Giskilla, Gumule, Kajeri, Madina, Saleri, Sunabaya village) – UXO/ERW suspected
- Marte LGA, Borno (Abbaganaram, Bukar Mairambe, Dubuwa, Gumawa Shuwari, Large, Moforo, Musune, Njillam, Old Marte village) – UXO (aerial bombs, rocket propelled grenades, mortars) suspected
- Monguno LGA, Borno (Abbari B, Adishiram, Barkannari, Fannameri, Gana Ali 1, Grade, Gumnari, Kaza, Kazallari, Kessa Tamsuwa Ngurno, Kudo Ngan, Kuluwu Ajja Kaniya, Kwata Kura, Ngollom Kura, Ngurno, Rontoi, Shehuri, Zankari village)
– UXO (mortar, aerial bombs) suspected

- Ngala LGA, Borno (Saleri, Hausari Wulgo, Bula Kesa, Ngudiru Ganya, Nguro Yalaye of Wulgo, Warshele, Tongule village) – **UXO, aerial bombs suspected.**

### Accessible and Non-accessible Areas.

The assessment of reachable or hard to reach or inaccessible areas is based on the prevailing security situation owing to the on-going kinetic military activities within the **North Eastern States of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States.** It is pertinent to state that all the LGA Headquarters are reachable. However, vast majority of areas within some LGAs are inaccessible. Consequently, LGAs with more than 40% of the hinterlands or total land areas known or suspected to be contaminated are reachable. While those areas that have less than 40% of the known or suspected contaminated areas accessible are considered inaccessible. The table below shows accessible and inaccessible/hard to reach areas in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borno</th>
<th>Adamawa</th>
<th>Yobe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accessible</td>
<td>Hard to Reach Areas</td>
<td>Accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Inaccessible)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Askira/Ub a</td>
<td>Abadam</td>
<td>Madagali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubio</td>
<td>Gubio</td>
<td>Gombi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jere</td>
<td>Marte</td>
<td>Mubu North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaga</td>
<td>Kala/Balge</td>
<td>Mubi South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwaya Kusar</td>
<td>Konduga</td>
<td>Yola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Kukawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shani</td>
<td>Mafa</td>
<td>Magumeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monguno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ngala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nganzai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Land release methods and standards to be applied**

The priority for survey, clearance and eventual hand over will be determined largely by number and category of persons displaced from communities. This will enable large numbers of persons return to their localities to resume their normal livelihood that will ensure dignified way of living rather than living in the IDP Camps depending on hand outs. Borno State is most
affected by the insurgents’ activities and therefore more prone to IED, UXO and ERW hazards. It will therefore be handy to start with Borno State to achieve maximum impact.

While Nigeria acknowledges lack of adequate capacity to wholly conduct a comprehensive humanitarian demining activities, it is our resolve that existing local partners particularly Deminers Concept Nigeria Limited which participated in the demining activities in the South East Nigeria and one emerging company Good Heart Nigeria Limited will be handy for improved capacity training that will enable them deliver the desired result. To this end, UNMAS has pledged to hire a Chief of Operations in September 2021. The Chief of Operations will be capable to deliver knowledge, training, evaluation and other services for NMAC. UNMAS will also provide technical assistance to NMAC in order to assist them and build their capacity to fulfil their obligations under the APMBC. In close collaboration with the Implementation Support Units of the Convention, UNMAS will assist NMAC to formulate completion plans for treaty obligations, and compliance declarations as well as advise on the development of transition plans for national mine action capacities to address any residual risk from landmines of an improvised nature through sustainable and nationally owned capacity.

The demining, survey, clearance and land Release methods to be adopted would include:

a. By survey.
Lands would be released by survey once the suspected contaminated areas or land is surveyed (using NTS or TS) and found to be free of any hazard posed by IEDs, UXOs, and ERW, such lands will be released in accordance with the release process and procedures. Such lands would however remain under constant monitoring to ensure prompt action to protect the women, boys, girls and men should the circumstance or situation changes.

a. By Clearance.
The essence of clearance after confirmation of contamination of an area or land is to ensure that girls, boys, women and men affected by the hazards posed by IEDs, UXOs and ERW are returned to their communities in safety to pursue their dignified ways of livelihood. To this end, on completion of clearance, the land will be hand over to the community in accordance with the laid down standards of release.

b. By Cancellation.
The benefits accruing to the local inhabitants through their casual engagement by the Humanitarian Demining Implementers could possibly lead to exaggerated report of contamination of their localities. While this would not be discountenanced, the reports will be subjected to integrity test before necessary survey activities. If the report fails the integrity test, the concerned land would be declared cancelled for survey activities and hence safe. Such lands would therefore be released accordingly.

Giving that there are no National Standards for NTS yet in Nigeria, the land release by cancellation could be an output of NTS. However, where the following conditions exist, the cancellation will be considered rather than wasting time and resources to conduct survey.
Reasons for deciding that an area should not be defined as a CHA (e.g. Cancelled) may include but not limited to the following:

- No evidence of previous armed conflict in the area;
- The land has been used by people and/or farm animals for a specific period with no evidence of EO;
- No EO accidents in the area (including animal accidents);
- Land indicated by local communities (and land owner/land user) as posing no hazard.

Expected sources of funding / other resources to implement the plan

The National Government has appropriated some funds (pending release) for take-off of activities of IMCAPMBC. Additionally, based on the recommendation of IMCAPMCR, the mine action activities are also being captured for Year 2022 Appropriation Bill. It is also envisaged that on the establishment of NMAC, other sources of funding in addition to the Government’s appropriation will be available. The NMAC will enjoy the magnanimity of local and international donor organizations such as those listed below who are magnanimously taking the lead and as well other potential donors:

- Nigeria Victim support Fund
- North East Development Fund
- Nigeria Humanitarian Fund
- Victims Support Funds (YSF)
- BHA
- OFDA
- DFID
- The Federal Republic of Germany
- The Government of Japan
- Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
- Stichting Vluchteling.

Assumptions are made regarding the realization of the plan

Considering the on-going military combat activities between the armed groups and the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) and the fact that Nigeria is yet to receive any form of funding directly, it would be safe to make the following assumptions;

a. That there would be cessation of hostilities and the affected areas would be free for safe conduct of survey, clearance and handover to communities.

b. That the Federal Government of Nigeria will fund the Humanitarian de mining activities through the normal yearly budgetary allocation.

c. That after the establishment of NMAC Nigeria will get adequate local and international financial and technical support.

Potential risk factors that may affect realization of the plan
There exist some potential risk factors that may affect the realisation of this plan. This includes:

- If the on-going conflicts persist. This may lead to more contamination that even areas that may have been considered safe for return may be re mined.
- Delayed receipt of necessary funds or outright lack of funds.

**Proposed Work Plan over the extension period.**

**During the extension period, Nigeria intends to focus on the following:**

- **Mine Risk Education Action** - detailed, costed, and multi-year plans for context-specific mine risk education and reduction in affected communities (as requested in the Oslo Action Plan).
- **Estimate for the Conduct of EORE**
  EORE remain an essential tool to minimize avoidable casualties (death and injuries) of women and children, hence it is imperative that it is conducted nationwide. To this end, NMAC when established will with assistance of UNMAS and other stakeholders that are already taking the lead, collaborate with the Federal Ministry of Education and its relevant agencies to ensure that EORE is included in the school curriculum. However, it is expediently essential that it starts with the North Eastern states of BAY to reduce would be victims that may ignorantly take for granted IEDs, UXO and ERW.

  National Standards for Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) was already completed after the validation by the Inter-Ministerial Committee. The standards was adopted on the Mine Action Sub-Workgroup (MASWG) meeting on 9 July 2021. Furthermore, the National Standards for Non-Technical Survey drafted by UNMAS will be finalized in October 2021.

There are 34 LGAs in BAY States that face potential threats of the IED, UXO and ERW hazards. Although these threats are more potent in Borno State, the 34 LGAs will however be considered in the estimate for the conduct of EORE. To ensure maximum impact within a short period of six months, it is expected that a minimum of 100 persons per LGA would be engaged and trained to carry out EORE in these states. These one hundred persons will be trained at the Headquarters of the LGAs by the initial set of 2 persons each from the LGA that would attend the Train the Trainer Course that will be done first. To ensure regular movement of the trainers to the hardly accessible localities, 3 Hilux Pickup vans will be hired per LGA for the six months. The total estimate for the cost of conducting EORE is tabulated below.

**Table Showing Estimate for the Conduct of EORE/MRE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Item or Subject required</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Sub Total</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Train the trainer course</td>
<td>2 Per LGA 2x 34 = 68</td>
<td>$500 per person</td>
<td>$ 500 x 68 = $17,000</td>
<td>Training to include printed materials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Establishment of National Mine Action Centre –

At present, besides the Inter-Ministerial Committee on APMBC set up by the FGN, there is no any existing body at the national level yet. However, plans are on top gear to ensure the establishment of a National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) as earlier stated. The National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) will be a novel concept in Nigeria, the Government has felt the need to understand and learn precisely the mandate and functions of a NMAC. Hence, on 7 July 2021, the Government has submitted a concept note to the APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) requesting support to raise funds for a themed study tour to a national mine action authority in a country which has a similar context and background to Nigeria. The request for a study tour of a country with functional Mine Action Centre/Authority and possibly which shares similar terrain with Nigeria is to avail the Committee adequate knowledge of the structure and operation of the Centre to enable adequate recommendation that will facilitate quick establishment of a NMAC in Nigeria. The initial consideration was Afghanistan, but the recent development in that country made the Committee members to propose Sri Lanka or another suitable country. The study tour is aimed at least in March 2022. The proposed 14-day study tour will be participated by 8 members of the inter-ministerial committee. Subsequent to the study tour, the Inter-Ministerial Committee needs 1-2 month of preparation and officially launch the NMAC in June 2022.

Nigeria has the unique advantage of having a privileged partnership with all international mine action partners who have been working primarily on Explosive Ordnance Risk Education and Non-technical survey in the northeast over four years now. This partnership makes it easier for NMAC (when established) to take over the national leadership role for mine action. While mine activities have been carried out with success in Nigeria, NMAC will more systematically address mine action directly with all concerned ministries and institutions. With the guidance and support of UNMAS, the NMAC will continue to partner with international and national mine action partners and other relevant stakeholders to strengthen the coordination of humanitarian mine action. The Government of Nigeria acknowledges that the primary responsibility for mine action lies with the government for addressing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Engagement of Local trainers</td>
<td>100 per LGA (100 x 34 = 3400) x $ 150 per head x 3400 = $510,000 per Month for 6 Months $3,060,000</td>
<td>$510,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Hiring of Hilux vans</td>
<td>3 per LGA for 34 LGA at $ 3,500 x 3 x 34 x $3,500 = $357,000</td>
<td>$357,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Production of printed material for the 34 LGA</td>
<td></td>
<td>$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3,434,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Contingence</td>
<td>10% of Total</td>
<td>$343,400</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Grand Total** $3,777,400
the issue and accountable to the beneficiaries in affected communities. This responsibility should be vested in a NMAC as soon as it is established. The NMAC will be charged with the regulation, management and coordination of a national mine action programme within its national borders, including the development of national mine action standards, standing operating procedures and instructions. In light of the above, the NMAC will work in close coordination with UNMAS, MAG, DRC and other stakeholders as well as local and international donor representatives in all mine action related activities.

The proposed structure and anticipated roles to be played by the various section and stakeholders of the NMAC, when establishment is explained in the organogram below.

**PROPOSED NMAC ORGANOGRAM**

Through the structure NMAC will be directly involved in most, aspects of coordination as well as the strategy of building capacity through day-to-day involvement in the business of coordination (planning, stakeholder meetings, representation to government, field visits, and workshops). In addition to being involved in general coordination of the programme, NMAC will play the key role in facilitation of Government processes relevant to the mine action programme. The NMAC when established will employ about 50 national staff to man the Headquarters and the zonal offices. NMAC would be charged to coordinate multilateral, bilateral and commercial sector mine action operations. The office will work directly with government representatives, implementing partners, other UN offices, and relevant aid organizations.
The roles and responsibilities of NMAC in coordination of mine action activities will be as follows:

- **Management of the national database (Information Management system for Mine Action)**

NMAC would be the custodian of the national database for mine action and the record keeper of what has taken place. It will also be responsible for maintaining the national database for mine action, using data provided by the mine action agencies, IMSMA forms the primary basis for planning of field operations ranging from EORE to demining to post-clearance developmental concerns, as well as its decision-support capability for decisions will be made at higher levels on the overall national mine-action plan future actions it would therefore be pertinent that these data are realistic and up to date.

The information management systems to be used are expected to be in line with IMAS. Furthermore NMAC’s information management section would be such that could monitor and evaluate mine action activities in depth. The IMSMA database will contain data concerning hazard and clearance progress and also incorporate geographical information systems in order to have an up to date and adequate representation over data generated through extensive surveys and clearance operations expected.

- **Coordination of survey, clearance and ERW removal**

It is expected that once the NMAC come on board, addressing IED and ERW problems, will be one of its primary functions. This is will be coordinated through planning and priority setting of mine and ERW contaminated areas in accordance to the agreed impact and priority setting factors. Each year once the priority areas for survey, clearance and ERW removal will be identified, the implementers of mine action will develop specific project proposals. The project proposals are subjected to a thorough review by an expert group made up of individuals from different sections within NMAC and UNMAS. Throughout the process, progress reports will be rendered which will ensure update of the database and form the basis of Article 7 at the end.

- **Coordination of EORE**

NMAC will also coordinate the plan for EORE delivery. It would provide progressive and real time analysis of data on accident trends and new risks that will determine the prioritization of resource allocation and assist in the development of EORE plans in support of the national mine action strategic plans. NMAC will ensure the participation of implementing partners and necessary government counterparts, in particular the Ministry of Education (MoE) in the planning processes and provides inputs to donors and other stakeholders. This will be to ensure asset and resource allocation that can guarantee the best possible EORE outreach to affected communities within available budget.
• **Victim Assistance**

At the moment a lot is been done by necessary government agencies such as NEMA, NEDC Min of HAMR&IDPs and other relevant national stakeholders and INGOs. The prominent INGOs prominent in this regard are MAG and DRC. This is however without any central coordinating body. Consequently, getting data assess the impact of these assistance has been difficult. When NMAC comes on board, it will address this gap and as well get the nature and categories of victims viz a viz the assistance required or rendered.

• **Promotion of Gender Equality**

Nigeria through the NMAC (when established) with full support of UNMAS and other implementing partners will plan for optimum use of resources, prioritizes and targets services, and provides policy and advocacy leadership ensuring a gender perspective throughout its operations. To this end, UNMAS has taken into serious consideration to promote women’s participation in the capacity building trainings. All the trainings so far conducted by UNMAS, MAG and DRC on EORE have gender balanced. The NMAC will key in to UNMAS advocacy across UN system that ensures gender perspective in all our operations. The IMCAPMBC at present, is reaching out to Ministries of Humanitarian Affairs, Education and Women Affairs and Social Development to ensure a comprehensive inclusion of all (girls, boys, men, women and people with disability). This will be done at the National Headquarters of NMAC and the Regional or State offices when established. While the Ministry of Education would ensure inclusion of EORE into the school curriculum at elementary and tertiary levels, the Ministries of Humanitarian Affairs and Women Affairs and Social Development will collaboratively drive our out of school programmes. Additionally, the State Ministries of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs will also be engaged to ensure full support of the traditional institutions in the targeted communities. This will ensure that the beneficiaries in the targeted communities are all inclusive.

• **Quality Control (QC), Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)**

This section will explain the quality control and monitoring and evaluation activities to be delivered by NMAC on behalf of the FGN and donors. Thus NMAC will:

a. Maintain the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) in consonance with IMAS to ensure best practice.

b. Manage accreditation of national and international humanitarian and commercial implementers.

c. Conduct external QA and Quality Control (QC) of operations implemented by national and international humanitarian and commercial implementers.

d. Record in IMS the results of internal QA and QC undertaken by national and international humanitarian and commercial implementers.

e. Conduct Board of Inquiries when required.

f. Certify clearance/cancellation and land release documentation.
g. Attend handover ceremonies.

h. Implement Quality Circles.

i. Implement the Project Monitoring Tool.

j. Draft and issue Balanced Score Cards.

k. Implement end of project monitoring.

l. Review multilateral and bilateral project proposals in Proposal Review Team.

• **Coordination; outreach, information sharing, best practice**

At the Coordination Centre, NMAC will provide significant amount of information and expertise on mine action across all sectors of government, humanitarian and development agencies, mine action implementers, donors, and the security sector, among others.


There exist a considerable gap in the essential capacities required. Although some work is already been done in the area of EORE, more capacity Train the Trainer is still very much required to make a positive and adequate impact on EORE. Other capacities expediently require would include; Technical capacity and capacity in processes and procedures.

**Technical Capacity.**

As earlier stated, Nigeria Police Force (EOD Unit) and the national commercial implementing partners possess technical capacities. However, these capacities are far from been adequate to address our current needs. Consequently, a comprehensive technical capacity building assistance in terms of supply of modern and advanced equipment and training to effectively man those equipment is required. This will enhance a speedy and qualitative survey and clearance whenever the humanitarian demining starts in earnest.

**Capacity in Processes and Procedures.**

A lot of literatures on Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention activities from most State Parties are online for everyone to peruse and get reasonable guidance. However, those literatures are not necessarily sufficient or adequate to replace practical experiences such as workshops/symposiums and field trips for case studies. An example is the visit of the IMCAPMBC to Borno state between 7th and 11th of April 2021. The trip, apart from giving the Committee insight into the life of some of the IED, UXO and ERW victims, it also afforded the Committee the opportunity to know and appreciate what our priorities should be.

The presentation by the various partners during the meeting was also a practical guide. Of particular reference was the presentation on the Information Management system for Mine Action (IMSMA). It did not only showcase the data so far collated but also presented the importance data collection on mine action activities. Consequently, capacity building on processes and procedures will be a priority need, particularly now.

**Monitoring System to Determine Security Access**

Monitoring and reviewing the national mine action strategy will provide opportunities to understand the situation, to make corrections to the direction and structure of the mine
action programme and to improve future versions of the strategy to enable a seamless Humanitarian demining activities. Monitoring is a continuous function that uses systematic data collection on specified indicators to provide main stakeholders with information about the extent of progress, current security situations/access and the achievement of objectives, measured against the established baselines.

The NMAC or IMCAPMBC, in collaboration with relevant national and international stakeholders, would be responsible for monitoring the implementation of this strategy. This will be predicated on effective information management/sharing with clear and regular reporting systems and sound coordination and collaboration with relevant stakeholders. Monitoring will enable strengths and weaknesses of the national mine action programme to be identified. It will further enable NMAC or IMCAPMBC and partners to address problems, improve performance, build on success and adapt to changing circumstance.

**Development of National Strategic Plan.**

The National Mine Action Strategy is to be developed with the active participation of all relevant stakeholders with the NMAC when established or IMCAPMBC in the interim to lead the National Mine Action programme. The National Mine Action Strategic Plan will be developed within the year 2022. The participants would include:

- The IMCAPMBC as presently composed;
- The Nigerian Police Force EOD Unit (NPFEODU);
- National and International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); and
- Civil Society Organizations.

To this end, Nigeria would solicit for UNMAS and other relevant International NGOs (MAG and DRC) assistance in facilitating a strategy and prioritization workshop to ensure a robust and comprehensive strategic plan. This workshop will bring all key stakeholders in the Humanitarian Demining Sector together for a fruitful engagement. It is hoped that before the workshop, the NMAC and/or IMCAPMBC would have established an IMSMA and collected some relevant data. These data as well data from UNMAS, MAG and DRC would form the basis for the strategy.

It is hoped that everything being equal, the following milestones will be achieved within the periods stated below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2024</th>
<th>2025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development of a Mine Action Strategy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishment of a Mine Action Centre and capacity building</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study visit to mine action programme</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development of National Mine Action Standards</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver EO Risk Education efforts</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a national platform for regular dialogue and coordination with partners</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Carry out NTS activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Carry out clearance efforts</td>
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</table>

- Subsequent to the establishment of a NMAC, UNMAS will host a National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA) meeting which will be participated by the Inter-Ministerial Committee, critical staff of NMAC, Mine Action Area of Responsibility members as part of the Humanitarian Response Plan and other relevant partners on a bi-monthly basis (every second month) to encourage regular dialogues and effective coordination of mine action. This platform will be led by the Chairperson of the Inter-Ministerial Committee and co-lead by UNMAS where mine action stakeholders will have the opportunity to discuss emerging issues, and exchange best practices and lessons learned. Additionally, the discussions will focus on national case studies, and to go deeper into thematic mine action discussions, as well as to explore innovative approaches and solutions to the most pressing challenges facing the mine action community. UNMAS will also host a high-level meeting on Humanitarian Mine Action and Coordination on annual basis to gather mine action community of practice, for sharing knowledge and experiences, and triggering northeast exchange.
Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development, Ministry of Defence, Federal Ministry of Education, Ministry of National Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Ministry of Women Affairs as well as institutions such as civil protection, police, university and auxiliaries like the UN, Red Cross, all have a stake in issues related to landmines of an improvised nature. NMAC needs to build on its strengths and lessons learned and strategically work on partnerships to leverage development and recovery through mine action.
10. **Annexes**

### 1. ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APMBC</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention</td>
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<td>APM</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mines</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAY</td>
<td>Borno, Adamawa and Yobe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHA</td>
<td>British Humanist Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Civilian Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnant of War</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>EORE</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Risk Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOA</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EiEWG</td>
<td>Education in Emergencies Workgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>Information Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEDs</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISWAP</td>
<td>Islamic State in West Africa Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEDD</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device Disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>Information Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGAs</td>
<td>Local Government Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSA</td>
<td>Local Security Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMC</td>
<td>Maiduguri Metropolitan Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MREA</td>
<td>Mine Risk Education Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>Non State Armed Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMAC</td>
<td>National Mine Action Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMAS</td>
<td>National Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCDC</td>
<td>National Security and Civil Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>Non-Technical Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTS/CL</td>
<td>Non-Technical Survey/Community Liaison</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U. S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBIED</td>
<td>Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>POMZ</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RCBA</td>
<td>Remote Contamination Baseline Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Risk Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPIED</td>
<td>Rocket Propelled Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RETD</td>
<td>Risk Education Technical Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Technical Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP-UNDSS</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Development Program ---------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>VA</strong></td>
<td>Victim Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YAF</strong></td>
<td>Youths Awaken Foundation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Explosive Hazards Threat Assessment – Northeast Nigeria,

January-July 2019

Date: 4 September 2019

What: The following paper relates to analysis of the explosive threats and hazards and their resulting impact in the North East of Nigeria.

When: This analysis was based on explosive hazard events reported and recorded from 1 January 2019 to 30 July 2019.

Who: The dynamics within the parties to the conflict are complex, prone to sudden changes and at times shifting allegiances or leadership issues can make such determinations problematic. For this reason, the term “perpetrator” has been used to refer to such parties as defined in the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal standards.

Where: Although most of the available information relates to Borno State, it covers the States in the Northeast states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa which are collectively referred to herein as BAY. Owing to the transnational nature of the perpetrator groups operating in BAY and where relevant, the wider Lake Chad Basin has been examined for Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination, namely the regions surrounding Lake Chad in Chad, Niger (Diffa Region) and Cameroon (Extreme-Nord Region). It should be noted that most of recorded information is restricted to the accessible areas in BAY and the surrounding Lake Chad regions.

How: It has been compiled using reliable, confirmed from different sources and credible information concerning Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) along with a brief assessment of potential Anti-Personnel Mines (APM). It is noted that due to the absence of a dedicated process to collect the information pertaining to explosive hazards in BAY, some events have not been recorded and it is acknowledged that the available information does not permit an in-depth analysis. However, UNMAS is reasonably confident that this assessment reflects on the wider actual nature and trend of explosive hazards and associated threats in BAY. The information contained in this document are subject to change if additional details are received and as the explosive hazard threats continue to evolve. The technical and tactical terminology used in this assessment are defined in the glossary of terms annex.

Why: It serves to better understand the risks and threats affiliated to explosive ordnances, and consequently inform safety and security, access and inclusion of Mine Action in the humanitarian-development nexus response in BAY.

Acknowledgements: UNMAS would like to acknowledge and thank the International NGO Safety Organisation, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and the Mine Advisory Group for their kind review and inputs.

Security: As the subject contained herein is of a sensitive nature, the sharing of this information is based on need-to-know and should not be done without prior authorization from UNMAS Nigeria programme personnel.

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Introduction

Overall this assessment indicates that IEDs emplaced along routes of movement typically targeting Nigerian Security Forces (NSF) are the main explosive hazard threat at present in terms of the number of such their wide geographic spread. Person Borne IED (PBIED) constitute a persistent threat to lives although there has been a decline compared to previous years. The use of Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED) is limited in number and is used for specific tactical effect.

This assessment considers there to be three predominant IED perpetrator groups operating in BAY, namely: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Liddaawati Wal Jihad (hereinafter referred to as JAS), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and a third group, referred to as Ba Koura’s faction, operating in the Diffa region of Niger and in the Lake Department in Chad, with Tactics, Techniques and Procedures similar to JAS’s.

Also, of concern are incidents related to Explosive Remnant of War (ERW) which are assessed as a serious life threatening and destabilising issue that has not yet reached its peak due to restricted access to potentially affected areas, caused by the ongoing armed conflict. A brief overview of potential Anti Personal Mines threats is also provided. This assessment concludes with an outline of how best the humanitarian and development community can take this issue into account when considering the responses in order not to hamper operations required in this region.

Concerning victims, available figures of casualties are assessed as inaccurate and likely too low; e.g. the most of incidents indicate those killed but not injured. When number of injured persons is indicated, there is much often a lack of information concerning the severity of injuries. It can be reasonably stated that some injuries subsequently result in death for lack of first aid or immediately accessible relevant medical care and casualty evacuation assets. A key finding is that civilians represent more than one third of victims being killed and more than a half of injured.

In assessing explosive hazard threats in BAY and Lake Chad Basin, the intended targets and actual victims are important metrics to track and understand. It is to be reminded in the light of technics used by the perpetrators
that the non-discriminatory nature of some IED constitutes a threat to the civilians, humanitarian and development workers.

Graph 2: repartition of victims by type of explosive ordnance from January to July 2019. NB: IEDs planted along roads are prevalent.

Mapping of explosive hazard incidents indicates ERW contamination resulting from frequent small-scale armed clashes, air strikes and indirect fire (rockets, mortar shelling, and artillery) is spread across Borno State, with some levels of ERW contamination in Yobe State (mostly on the eastern part, bordering with Borno State) and in the northern part of Adamawa State. ERW incidents are also recorded in the area near Lake Chad in the North West of Cameroon.

IED activity mapping indicates the areas where perpetrator groups are active in their efforts to attack members of the NSF, the Multi National Joint Task Forces (MNJTF) and in some cases members of the civilian population. IED activities are mainly concentrated in Borno State with lesser level of IED attacks occurring in Yobe and Adamawa States. These attacks are concentrated along routes of movement used by the NSF and MNJTF as well as in population centers. IED attacks have also been recorded in the wider region in Cameroon, Chad and Niger typically along the border with Nigeria.
Map 1: ERW and IED incidents recorded from January to July 2019
I. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)

a. Overview

There are three predominant uses of IEDs in BAY and Lake Chad Basin, namely:

- IEDs emplaced along roads;
- Person Borne IED (PBIED) attacks;
- Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED) attacks.

A. IEDs Emplaced Along Routes of Movement

This IED threat refers to the emplacement of IEDs along roads used by the NSF and MNJTF but also civilians and humanitarians.

Currently representing the greatest threat linked to explosive devices, IED emplaced along routes of movement represent a direct risk to lives and restrict freedom of movement for the humanitarian activities, the civilian population and the security forces.

There have been 105 recorded incidents related to IED emplaced along roads resulting in 115 persons being killed and 143 others being injured. These IED are equally employed by both JAS and ISWAP. In the absence of systematic exploitation and reporting of these incidents, the technical and tactical design cannot be precisely assessed. In addition, the absence of further information does not allow to count the number of victims or disaggregate them between civilians and security forces in many instances. However, in many cases, coordinates are available to map the incidents.

Map 2: IEDs emplaced along roads. It highlights the challenge to freedom of movement, access and security.
From a combination of observed component of IED, interviews and narratives of the incidents it shows that majority of IEDs are Victim Operated (VOIED), more precisely in the form of Pressure Plates.

VOIED do not discriminate targets once they have been armed and, unlike command IEDs, there is no triggerman in the loop that can choose the intended target. When armed the first victim (person or vehicle) to pass over the pressure plate causes the firing switch to actuate resulting in the IED functioning. It is also important to mention that although emplaced to destroy vehicles, the observed pressure plates can be activated by the weight of a person, giving these devices a *de facto* antipersonnel capability.

While most of the victims belong to the Nigerian military, civilians are also amongst the victims including NGO affiliated e.g. on 6 March 15 farmers were killed and 5 other injured in Khaddamari (Jere LGA); on 18 March, 8 civilians were killed in Warrabe (Gwoza); on 16 May, between Banki and Free Town, a civilian truck part of a convoy escorted by the military initiated an IED killing 3 civilians and injuring 2 others.

A similar incident, 22 June 2019, resulted in 5 civilians being killed. It happened in Fotokol, Cameroon. Although not in Borno, the close proximity to Gambar-Ngala once again highlights the actual threat these devices pose to civilians and the humanitarian community.
Picture 2: 16 May, a civilian truck part of convoy hit by an IED. 3 civilians were killed and 2 other injured.

There are no received reports nor indication that the humanitarian personnel and activities were specifically targeted. However, Pressure Plate IED do not discriminate victims. Road planted IEDs thus constitute a clear challenge and threat to the humanitarian in terms of access and safety. The explosion of an IED against a NGO rental truck on the Pulka-Gwoza road, 23 July, is a clear reminder of this risk.

Nigerian Security Forces managed to discover and neutralize at least 46 IEDs (approximatively with a ratio of 2:3 of Recovered:Actuated). Most of these IED have been recovered by the Nigerian Army. The Police Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit deployed in Maiduguri and in some LGAs also support this effort although to a lesser extent. In the absence of other clearance capability, UNMAS recommends continuing to make the best use of security forces assistance when and where appropriate.

However, the number of road planted IED that are not detected indicate that this capability requires further development and support. In the absence of any other similar capacity, both Civil Military Coordination and initiatives aiming at improving these EOD capacities are of primary importance.

In addition, UNMAS strongly recommends to specifically train—or reinforce existing trainings—of drivers and other personnel involved in movement planning and execution.

Graph 3: numbers of recovered and detonated IED along roads.
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It is noted that the presence of Pressure Plate IEDs emplaced in locations other than roads have been recorded in previous periods. In 2018, 2 IEDs have been spotted by Mine Action partners during non-technical surveys thus avoiding further accidents.

In addition to pressure plates other types of switches have been mentioned by the Nigerian military during interviews and a few elements corresponding to command wire switches have been observed. This type of switch allows to more precisely aim at an intended target.

B. Person Borne IED (PBIED)

A PBIED is an IED worn, carried or housed by a person, either willingly (suicide) or unwillingly (proxy). Observed vests indicate that the PBIED bearers initiate the detonation. There is no indication of additional switches allowing a second party to initiate the device from distance (so-called “chicken-switch”).

During the period, 24 events related to PBIED have been registered: 16 in Northeast Nigeria, 5 in Niger and 3 in Cameroon. In 16 cases, PBIED were not successful. In Nigeria, 1 case has been registered in Yobe state, 4 in Adamawa and 11 in Borno.

Map 3: PBIED incidents from January to July 2019. The concentration of incidents in JAS area of operations is clearly visible.

The crossed analysis of the locations narrative and victims account of recorded events indicates a differentiated approach by JAS and ISWAP. Whereas both groups use PBIED, JAS continues to target civilians and ISWAP includes this weapon in its tactics to attack security forces. This difference in doctrinal use of PBIED between ISWAP and JAS is an important one to understand in order to inform the IED threat assessment and the
subsequent measures and efforts to be invested in. Another important issue in the use of PBIED is whether they are suicide bombers (willing and compliant) or are they proxy bombers (unwilling and coerced or unwitting).

The 5 cases reported in Niger bring even more complexity and may tend to confirm the rise of the Bakoura faction, reportedly closer to JAS views. The deliberate targeting of civilians and the use of female PBIEDs -17th February and 26th March – highlights JAS’ modus operandi illustrated by the PBIED attack against civilians in Konduga on 16th June.

In Nigeria, 7 of the total events resulted in civilian victims: 43 killed and 92 injured. Amongst them, two PBIED resulted in a total of 34 killed and 83 injured and can be associated to JAS due to their location and modus operandi employed.

In all other cases no other victims -except the persons wearing the IED in some instances- have been accounted for. Most of them have been foiled by Nigeria Security Forces, especially at the moment when the PBIEDs tried to infiltrate their target. In other instances, the PBIED prematurely detonated their charge. This may indicate a low level of training and competency among PBIED bombers or handlers who may controlling them.

PBIED targeting civilians have been registered in urban areas and deliberately aimed at populated areas: security check-points, IDP camp, hospital, cinema, church and mosque. Most of them happened on the outskirts of these urban areas indicating that the PBIED come from the outside. Indeed, security forces stopped PBIED when trying to cross trenches or at the entrance of built-up areas on several occasions.

There is no indication that the humanitarian community is specifically targeted. However, UNMAS strongly encourages humanitarian partners to avoid locating in in the fringes of urban localities in JAS and Bakoura areas of operation. It is also recommended to limit the presence close to usual targets.

The geographical pattern of PBIED employment combined with an analysis of victims, confirms different doctrinal approaches between the IED perpetrator groups active in BAY. In the areas of operations of ISWAP, PBIED are most commonly used against military targets. Where JAS operates, civilians are the prevalent victims. This is consistent with the original Boko Haram credo based on religious exclusivism: *al-wala’ wa-l-barā’* (exclusive loyalty to “true” Muslims and disavowal of non-Muslim persons and systems). Based on this approach, JAS considers that civilians who are not joining them are legitimate targets.

*Picture 3: one of the 3 IEDs recovered following the attack against civilians in Konduga, 16th June, killing 29 and injuring 40. The technically simple designed IED remains deadly.*
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While the information concerning the gender of perpetrators is incomplete, it appears that female PBIED are still used to perpetrate attacks. Concerning the age of perpetrators, there is no clear indication. However, and whereas an elderly PBIED was reported once, pictures and information collected through interviews and different sources indicate that most of PBIED are young adults and likely children.

C. Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED)
A VBIED is an IED delivered or concealed in a ground-based vehicle. VBIEDs involve IEDs that are packed into and/or concealed inside vehicle’ compartments such as dashboard, door compartments, boot, back seat, main load carrying area, within voids and spare wheel compartments.

During the period, 4 events relate to VBIED: 3 in Nigeria and 1 in Niger, resulting in 18 members of security forces being killed. Given the context and the location of the attacks, most of these VBIED can be attributed to ISWAP faction. However, ISWAP did not claim the attack in Molai (outskirts of Maiduguri) on 7th May. As a reminder, JAS previously made use of VBIED on February 2018 in Sambisa forest against security forces.

Of note, ISWAP makes an effort to armor VBIED which is likely inspired by similar Islamic State (IS) technics used in Iraq and Syria with the intention of preventing the security forces stopping them. There is no indication that the humanitarian community is specifically targeted as it clearly appears that the VBIED have been used against the military, either as a defensive or offensive weapon.

Summary of IED Threats
From Maiduguri to Banki and from Banki to Madagali (Adamawa state), the use of Victim Operated IED and PBIED matches with the presence of JAS. This area corresponds to the east and west fringes of Sambisa forest known as JAS safe heaven. Further north in Borno State as well as on the Bamboa-Maiduguri and Maiduguri-Damaturu directions, the use of IED is persistent but seems to be more dependent on the fluidity of security force operations. Of note, Niger, Chad and Cameroon are also subject to the use of IED although to a lesser extent that likely relates to a lesser volume of activities.

IED are a protection issue. Because of their technical nature or their intended use, they represent a threat to the lives of civilians and humanitarian-development workers. IED are also an obstacle to the access to humanitarian-development support and more generally to freedom of movement.
II. Explosive Remnant of War

The contamination by ERW due to unexploded and abandoned ordnance (UXO and AXO), is the result of past and present armed confrontations. A full analysis requires to take into account data prior to 2019. This analysis will be presented in a separate document. It is however possible to present an overview and some key findings concerning ERW contamination in BAY, from the data collected in 2019.

Map 4: known armed confrontations with the use of indirect fires (artillery, rockets, and mortar) and airstrikes from January to July 2019.

ERW in northeast Nigeria range from small arms ammunition to air dropped bombs. They are the results of confrontation between NSF and Non State Armed Groups: ground battles, skirmishes, artillery and indirect fires, airstrikes. The risk to encounter ERW in newly or temporary accessible areas is highly likely. For example, on 21 June, the locality of Doro Naira (Kukawa LGA) was retaken from ISWAP by NSF following a battle including ground fights, artillery fires and air strikes.

The likelihood of contamination by explosives is significant given that from 10 to 20% of fired explosive ammunitions do not function properly. The rocket attack against Maiduguri on 23rd February illustrates this ratio with one unexploded 122mm rocket landing in vicinity of a primary school and another one landing in Teachers’ village IDP camp.

While constituting a risk to the humanitarian community, ERW have been less challenging in terms of access during the considered period. Most of the places currently accessible by humanitarians are not heavily contaminated by ERW and as such does not represent an obstacle to access. However, reinforced tailored explosive ordnance awareness and Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), to include refresher training, is required by people in the field in order to avoid accidents involving ERW.
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Graph 5: number of ERW recovered and number of ERW accidents in BAY from January to July 2019.

Recorded accidents resulting in casualties, in Yobe and Borno, involve civilians who detonated Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) for lack of awareness. In 2 other instances, NGO spotted UXO in the proximity of their compound and reported them to security forces who disposed of them. In other places, Non-technical surveys conducted by Mine Action partners resulted in the mapping of Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHA)—that is to say areas where the presence of explosive devices was confirmed.

Nigeria Army and Police EOD are responsive when ERW are reported. However, it seems that many civilians are reluctant to report findings by fear to be in trouble. As a pilot, UNMAS delivered pilot 1st Responder trainings to both Nigerian Police Force and Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps. In addition to procedural skills aiming at consolidating the management of incidents involving reported explosives or detonations, it was the opportunity to insist on the right of civilians for protection.

Picture 4: this UXO was recovered in the back of an NGO compound in Monguno, 16th March 2019.
Graph 6: known number of civilians injured and killed by ERW and unknown explosive devices from January to July 2019.

Out of 11 civilians killed by ERW, 8 have been clearly reported as boys, 1 as a male and 1 as a female. Overall, boys and men seem to be more at risk. It should be noted that unsafe behavior developed by civilian populations may endanger humanitarian workers.

UNMAS recommends pursuing efforts to educate the civilian population in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). This risk education must also aim at improving communities’ sustainable resilience to include the development of first aid to decrease the mortality resulting from wounds and reactions to new threats such as indirect fires. Equally, it is needed to reinforce the training of the humanitarian and development workers in order to provide the appropriate knowledge that supports those actions and practices that lead to safe behavior. UNMAS also recommends conducting Non-Technical Surveys when the humanitarian and development communities plan to access new areas. For example, the expansion or relocation of IDP camps and guesthouses, or the creation of new ones requires to make sure the area is safe. In addition, and in a context where socio-economical structures are already fragile, it is recommended to invest in assisting the reintegration of survivors.

Mine Action partners have a limited footprint in the field and mostly operate through roving teams. Thus, it is essential to prepare other Protection partners with a permanent presence in LGAs to collect information and refer it to the Mine Action Sub Sector in order to ensure an adequate and timely response. Whereas the security forces are now better experienced against IED and whereas they are keen on disposing of ERW that are reported to them, there is no formal process to conduct the systemic and certified clearance of areas from ERW. It results in a lack of guarantees that areas claimed to be cleared are effectively safe.
III. Anti-Personnel Mines (APM)

Nigeria is a party to the Anti-Personnel Mines Ban Convention (APMBC) since 2001 and the Convention entered into force for Nigeria on 1 March 2002. At the 2011 Meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Nigeria announced that it had fulfilled its obligation under Article 5 of the Convention. On 29 November 2011, at the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties in Phnom Penh, Nigeria presented a formal Declaration of Completion.

It has been recorded that some VOIED employed by perpetrator groups are actuated similarly to Anti-Personnel Mines (APM).

The delegation of Nigeria at the intersessional meetings and first preparatory meeting for the fourth review conference of anti-personnel mine ban convention 22-24 May, 2019 at Geneva, Switzerland, recognize the issue of contamination by mines in northeast Nigeria and emphasized on the need for non-technical survey.

In addition, the question of manufactured landmines requires additional investigation. So far and in the absence of tangible element, the threat posed by manufactured APM cannot be currently evidenced. In July 2019, unconfirmed but credible information about the presence of manufactured APM in the region of Damboa was shared with UNMAS. A different source had previously reported that on 3rd April 2019, 1 hunter was killed and another 1 was injured after stepping on an unknown explosive device in the vicinity of Bula Njimbam, 15 kilometers west of Damboa. Although it could also be due to a VOIED or an item of ERW, the possibility of a manufactured APM cannot be excluded. Although this information requires further investigation and subsequent assessment of its potential geographical extent, Mine Action partners will include APM mine risk education in their safety messages delivered in the region of Damboa.
Conclusion

The analysis of events from January to July 2019 confirms that the use of explosive devices continues to affect the population in BAY thus constituting an unabated protection issue. The maintenance and development of a scaled-up Mine Action response is thus necessary. It also represents a risk to the United Nations, International and Local Non-Governmental Organizations, and Civil Society Organizations personnel deployed in BAY as well as representing an obstacle to their operations if not addressed properly. UNMAS recommends the following support so as such explosive hazards do not hamper humanitarian and development operations required in this region.

- Development of Mine Action activities, with an emphasis on conducting Non-Technical Surveys especially when the humanitarian and development communities plan to access new areas and in areas of returns.
- Improvement in the understanding of the contamination and its impact through an appropriate referral system. This will require support from other Protection partners with a permanent presence in LGAs to collect information and refer it to the Mine Action Sub Sector, thus ensuring an appropriate and timely threat aligned responses. It will initially require to train and mentor these partners.
- Delivery of bespoke Explosive Ordnance Risk Education to prepare the civilian population in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and to train the humanitarian and development workers in order to provide the appropriate knowledge that supports those actions and practices that lead to safe behavior.
- Continuation of bilateral efforts to develop the Nigerian Army EOD capacity and support to Mine Action partners’ projects aiming at consolidating Police EOD capacity.
- Support to the Mine Action Sub Sector’s efforts to consolidate knowledge management –to include the monitoring of survivors- and to strengthen response capacity of institutions.
- Support to the Mine Action Sub Sector’s efforts to include Nigerian authorities in the development of a Mine Action normative and operational framework.
Annex A

Glossary of Terms

**Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO):** explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for use. *Source: CCW protocol V*

**Accident:** an undesired event which results in harm. *Source: IMAS 4.10*

**Anti-Personnel Mines (APM):** a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. *Source: IMAS 4.10*

**Command Wire IED (CWIED):** A switch where the firing point and contact point are separate but joined together by a length of wire. A Command Wire may contain multiple power sources located near both the firing point and the contact point to overcome the resistance in the length of the wire. *UNMAS IED Lexicon 2018*

**Explosive Hazard (EH):** An explosive hazard is any hazard containing an explosive component. All explosive hazards encountered can be broken down into the categories: Mines, ERW, IEDs and compoBAYts and precursor chemicals thereof. *Source: UN IEDD Standards May 2018;*

**Explosive Ordnance (EO):** all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature. [AAP-6] *Source: IMAS 4.10*

**Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE):** activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from explosive ordnance by raising awareness of men, women, and children in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles and needs, and promoting behavioural change including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.

**Explosive Remnants of War (ERW):** Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO). *Source: CCW protocol V.*

**Incident:** an event that gives rise to an accident or has the potential to lead to an accident.

**IED Risk Mitigation (IED-RM).** IED-RM refers to all tactical responses intended to mitigate the risk posed of IED attacks to such a level to allow those required to operate in an IED threat environment to do so effectively to execute wider security strategies as well as stabilisation, developmental and humanitarian initiatives through efficient & lean processes.

**Non-Technical Survey (NTS):** refers to the collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritisation and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. *Source: IMAS 4.10*

**Perpetrator:** Term used to describe any person or group of persons or organization that has the intent and capacity to inflict physical violence. *Source: UN IEDD Standards May 2018*

**Person Borne IED (PBIED):** An IED worn, carried, or housed by a person, either willingly (see *Suicide*) or unwillingly (note: see Proxy). *Source: UNMAS IED Lexicon 2018*

**Pressure:** A switch designed to function when pressure is applied in a predetermined direction (plate, tube, plunger, crush wire). *Source: UNMAS IED Lexicon 2018*
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**Pressure Plate IED (PPIED):** An IED utilising a triggering device that occurs when an object is used to complete a circuit when pressure is applied or removed in a predetermined direction. Many pressure initiated IEDs explode when pressure plates are compressed under the weight of passing vehicles or foot soldiers. Source: *IMAS 04.10, 2nd Ed, 01 Jan 03, Amd 7, Aug 14, Glossary of Mine Action*

**Proxy:** A person (unwitting or coerced) who acts as a means of delivery of an IED. Source: *UNMAS IED Lexicon 2018*

**Suicide:** An IED initiated by the attacker at a time of their choosing in which they intentionally kill themselves as part of the attack, or possibly to deny capture. Source: *UNMAS IED Lexicon 2018*

**Survivor:** a man, or a woman or a child who has suffered harm as a result of a mine, ERW or cluster munition accident. Source: *IMAS 4.10*

**Unexploded Ordnance (UXO):** EO that has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected yet remains unexploded either through malfunction or design or for any other reason. Source: *IMAS 4.10*

**Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED):** An IED delivered by or concealed in a ground-based vehicle. Source: *UNMAS IED Lexicon*

**Victim:** persons either individually or collectively who have suffered physical, emotional and psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to the use of mines or the presence of ERW. Victims include directly impacted individuals, their families, and communities affected by landmines and ERW. Source: *IMAS 4.10*

**Victim assistance/survivor assistance:** refers to all aid, relief, comfort and support provided to victims (including survivors) with the purpose of reducing the immediate and long-term medical and psychological implications of their trauma. Source: *IMAS 4.10*

**Victim Operated IED (VOIED):** A type of switch that is activated by the actions of an unsuspecting individual. These instruments rely on the intended target to carry out some form of action that will cause it to function. Source: *UNMAS IED Lexicon 2018*
### Annex B

**Lexicon of Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mine(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>Abandoned Explosive Ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>Confirmed Hazard Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Explosive Hazard(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHAT</td>
<td>Explosive Hazard Awareness Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>EORE</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Risk Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED-RM</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device Risk Mitigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISWAP</td>
<td>Islamic State West Africa Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAS</td>
<td>Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Liddaawati Wal Jihad</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Locally Governed Area</td>
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<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multi-National Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mine Risk Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Nigerian Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>Non-Technical Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBIED</td>
<td>Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>VBIED</td>
<td>Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOIED</td>
<td>Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Explosive Ordnance</td>
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