

Preliminary Observations on Stockpile Destruction and the Retention of Anti-Personnel Mines

15 June 2022

President of the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties

I. STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION (ARTICLE 4)

1. At the close of the Nineteenth Meeting of the States Parties, two States Parties - **Greece** and **Ukraine** – were still implementing Article 4 of the Convention. The two states are in non-compliance with their Article 4 obligations, their four-year implementation deadline having expired on 1 March 2008 and 1 June 2010, respectively.
2. As of 15 June 2022, Greece had submitted updated information on stockpiled anti-personnel mines in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 7. Based on this information as well as previous reports, the following is understood to be the quantity of stockpiled anti-personnel mines destroyed and remaining to be destroyed:

State Party	Total number of anti-personnel mines destroyed	Total number of anti-personnel mines destroyed in 2021	Total number of anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed	Article 4 projected completion date
Greece	1,224,754	0	343,413	Not communicated
Ukraine	3,438,948	456	3,364,433 ¹	Not communicated
Total	4,663,702	456	3,707,846	

Information submitted by Greece on the implementation of Article 4

3. At the Fourth Review Conference, **Greece** indicated that complications emanating from environmental compliance issues caused the temporary pause of the demilitarization process of the remaining 343,413 stockpiled anti-personnel mines. The competent department of the Ministry of Defence and the Hellenic Defence Systems (HDS) are in close consultation to find the best possible solution to resolve this issue and set the destruction of the remaining stocks back on track.
4. In information provided in 2022 in accordance with its Article 7 transparency obligations, Greece reported that there were still 343,413 anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed and that these mines have been already gathered and transferred in 12 final sites, from which they are being collected and transferred to HDS in Lavrio, Attica, in order to be destroyed. In information provided in 2020 in accordance with its Article 7 obligations, Greece reported that since the beginning of the stockpile destruction programme, 1,224,754 stockpiled anti-personnel mines, out of a total of 1,568,167, have been destroyed. In 2021, no stockpiled anti-personnel mines were destroyed.
5. At the Nineteenth Meeting of the States Parties (19MSP) Greece indicated that it has not yet entirely fulfilled its obligation due to unforeseen circumstances that are beyond its control, such as the deadly explosion in 2014 at VIDEX facilities and the legal dispute with the HDS which led to a pause in the destruction process for almost 2 years.

¹ Article 7 report submitted by Ukraine in 2021.

6. Greece further indicated that the Hellenic Defence Systems (HOS) have recently concluded the international tender for the appointment of a new subcontractor for the demilitarization of the remaining anti-personnel mines stockpile and are in the process of submitting their proposal for the destruction of the remaining quantity of anti-personnel mines to the competent department of the Hellenic Ministry of National Defence. Greece indicated that information would be communicated once the process is completed.

Preliminary observations by the President on the information submitted by Greece

7. The President notes the importance of Greece presenting a time-bound plan for completion and proceeding with implementation as soon as possible in accordance with Action#14 of the Oslo Action Plan. As well, the President encourages Greece to continue to inform regularly on remaining challenges.
8. The President notes the importance of Greece keeping the States Parties informed on progress made to complete the destruction of its remaining 343,413 stockpiled anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. The President encourages Greece to make significant progress in implementation of its Article 4 obligations by the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties.
9. The President recognises the commitment of Greece to fully implement Article 4 and understands that impeding circumstances have led Greece to miss its Article 4 deadline in 2008. The President recognises that these circumstances have been beyond Greece's control and that it is clear that there has never been an intention by Greece to not fulfil its Article 4 obligations. The President further recognises that Greece has provided regular updated information on the situation and has been consistently transparent in this regard. However, the delays experienced have unfortunately led to Greece not being able to "destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of the Convention" and resulted in the country being in non-compliance with the provisions contained in Article 4 of the Convention. The President notes that Greece is unfortunately still in a situation of non-compliance, fourteen years after the expiration of its deadline. The President encourages Greece to do its utmost to put an end to this situation as soon as possible, communicate a time-bound plan for completion and work to start the destruction process.

Information submitted by Ukraine on the implementation of Article 4

10. At the Seventeenth Meeting of the States Parties (17MSP), Ukraine indicated that within the framework of the Partnership for Peace programme, the MoD of Ukraine, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) and Ukraine's State Enterprise "Scientific Production Association "Pavlograd Chemical Plant" had concluded a contract which envisaged the disposal of 3,192,696 PFM-1S type mines by 2021.
11. At the Eighteenth Meeting of the States Parties (18MSP), Ukraine indicated that the contract with the contractor Ukrainian State Enterprise "Scientific Production Association "Pavlograd Chemical Plant" had been terminated and therefore no stockpile destruction could take place in 2020. According to the implementation agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the NSPA, the Pavlograd Chemical Plant had been operated as a party to the contract. In order to identify a new contractor, Ukraine indicated that the NSPA was providing arrangements to conduct the relevant tender procedure. Ukraine further indicated that it is doing its best to intensify the interaction with relevant stakeholders on the matter. Ukraine

further indicated that as soon as the tender procedure will be completed, Ukraine will inform on the activities carried out under Article 4.

12. In information provided in its transparency report in 2021, Ukraine reported that 3,364,433 stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained to be destroyed as of 1 January 2021, including 3,363,828 PFM-type and 605 OZM-4 type mines. Ukraine also reported that the 605 OZM-4 mines are in areas outside of Ukraine's effective control. In 2020, to the exception of 456 stockpiled anti-personnel mines destroyed because of risks associated with their storage, no other stockpile destruction could place.
13. At the 19MSP, Ukraine indicated that due to the fact that the contract concluded on 1 February 2013 between the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the NSPA Enforcement Agency expired at the beginning of 2020, there were no legal grounds for continuing work on the disposal of anti-personnel mines under the NATO Trust Fund.
14. Ukraine further report that NSPA announced that it would initiate an international tender process open to bidders from all NATO member countries and Ukraine. At the time of the 19MSP, a working group of representatives of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and a representative of the NSPA was checking the actual state of ammunition to determine the possibility of their safe movement to the disposal site.
15. Based on the foregoing, Ukraine indicated that a completion plan can be prepared upon completion of the mentioned international tender process.

Preliminary observations by the President on the information submitted by Ukraine

16. The President notes that Ukraine has not provided information on the status of its stockpile destruction programme, including information on the total number and types of stockpiled anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed and those destroyed during the most recent reporting period.
17. The President notes that [due to Ukraine's national situation], progress in implementation of Article 4 may be hampered and a completion date may currently be difficult to provide. The President encourages Ukraine to continue to inform on remaining challenges and explore all existing avenues for cooperation and assistance in this regard.

Information provided by States Parties on destruction of previously unknown stockpiled anti-personnel mines

18. Since the Nineteenth Meeting of the States Party, no State Party has provided information on the discovery of previously unknown stockpiled anti-personnel mines, in accordance with *Oslo Action Plan*, Action #15.
19. In 2020, **the Gambia** had reported that, during the course of 2019, it became aware of a previously unknown stockpile of 3,000 anti-personnel mines. The President noted that since then no updated information has been provided by the Gambia on the progress made to destroy these anti-personnel mines in accordance with Action #15 of the Oslo Action Plan. The President noted that updated information on this matter would be welcome.

II. RETENTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES (ARTICLE 3)

At the start of the Nineteenth Meeting of the States Parties (19MSP), it was recorded that 67 States Parties had reported, as required by Article 7, paragraph 1 d), anti-personnel mines retained for the development of training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques in accordance with Article 3.

- Since then, one State Party – **Sudan** – has indicated that it no longer retains anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes. There are now 66 States Parties that have reported that they retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes (see table 1).

In 2022:

- 34 of the 66 States Parties retaining anti-personnel mines under Article 3 (51%) submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7.
- The following 32 States Parties have not yet submitted a transparency report: Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Republic of, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Finland, Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Romania, Rwanda, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
- The following 20 States Parties which have reported that they retain anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 3 have not submitted annual transparency information on their retained mines for two years or more: Benin (2008), Cameroon (2009), Cape Verde (2009), Congo, Republic of (2009), Côte d'Ivoire (2014), Djibouti (2005), Eritrea (2014), Gambia (2020), Honduras (2007), Indonesia (2020), Kenya (2008), Mali (2005), Namibia (2010), Nigeria (2012), Rwanda (2008), South Africa (2014), Tanzania (2009), Togo (2004), Uganda (2012) and Venezuela (2012).

Information provided on retained anti-personnel mines (OAP Action #16 and #17)

As of 15 June 2022, it is understood that 66 States Parties retain a total of 138,332 stockpiled anti-personnel mines under Article 3 based on information provided in Article 7 reports submitted in 2022 or previously. This represents a decrease of over 7,000 mines compared to 2021.

In 2022:

- **14 States Parties** - Angola, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe - reported **no change in the number of anti-personnel mines retained** under Article 3.
- **19 States Parties** - Belarus, Bhutan, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Peru, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Türkiye - reported a **decrease in the number of anti-personnel mines retained** under Article 3.
- **One State Party** – Cambodia - reported an **increase in the number of anti-personnel mines retained** under Article 3.

- **15 States Parties** - Angola, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Türkiye, Yemen and Zambia - **provided voluntary information** on the use (and or planned use) of retained anti-personnel mines.

In 2022, **4 States Parties** – Iraq, Slovenia, Sudan and Zimbabwe – indicated that they **were currently exploring available alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes or will be in the future.**

Table 1: Anti-personnel mines reported retained by 66 States Parties² for purposes permitted by Article 3 of the Convention

State Party	2019	2020	2021	2022
Angola	1304	1304	1304	1304
Bangladesh			12050	12050
Belarus	4505	4505		4492
Belgium	2066	2044	2021	
Benin ³				
Bhutan ⁴				146
Bosnia and Herzegovina	834	834	834	
Bulgaria	3318		3485	
Burundi			4	
Cambodia	1235	3730 ⁵	927	1213
Cameroon ⁶				
Canada ⁷	1878	1649	1540	1491
Cape Verde ⁸				
Congo Brazzaville ⁹				
Cote d'Ivoire ¹⁰				
Croatia	4973	4851	3858	3766
Cyprus	435	435	435	410
Czech Republic	2180	2155	2155	2138
Denmark	1748	1736	1730	1702
Djibouti ¹¹				
Ecuador	90	90	90	90
Eritrea ¹²				
Finland		15982	15851	
France	3941	1842	1841	1771
Gambia ¹³				
Germany	583	583	543	279
Greece	5599	5585	5570	5547
Guinea-Bissau				9
Guyana			80	
Honduras ¹⁴				
Indonesia	2148	2050		
Iraq	20	Unclear	Unclear	20
Ireland	55	54	53	51
Italy	617	617	563	563
Japan	898	803	719	663
Jordan	100	100	100	100
Kenya			3000	

² A number of States Parties report that they retain inert anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes. These States Parties are not included in the table as inert anti-personnel mines do not fit the Convention's definition of an anti-personnel mine.

³ In its report submitted in 2008, Benin indicated that it retains 16 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

⁴ In its report submitted in 2018, Bhutan indicated that it retains 211 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

⁵ This number includes anti-personnel mines as well as other devices.

⁶ In its report submitted in 2009, Cameroon indicated in Form B that 1,885 mines were held and in Form D that some thousands of mines were held for training purposes.

⁷ In 2022, Canada reported that 18 of the 1491 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 are without fuses.

⁸ In its report submitted in 2009, Cape Verde indicated that it retains 120 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

⁹ In its report submitted in 2009, Congo Brazzaville indicated that it retains 322 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

¹⁰ In its report submitted in 2014, Côte d'Ivoire indicated that it retains 290 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

¹¹ In its report submitted in 2005, Djibouti indicated that it retains 2996 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

¹² In its reports submitted in 2013 and 2014, Eritrea indicated that 71 of the 101 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 were inert.

¹³ In its report submitted in 2013, the Gambia indicated that it retains 100 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. While a report was submitted in 2020, it did not contain information on antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3.

¹⁴ In its report submitted in 2007, Honduras indicated that it retains 815 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

State Party	2019	2020	2021	2022
Mali ¹⁵				
Mauritania	728	728	728	
Mozambique ¹⁶	900		No info	
Namibia ¹⁷				
Netherlands	889	868	270	270
Nicaragua	448		448	448
Nigeria ¹⁸				
Oman	No info	No info	2000	
Peru	2015	2015	1705	1330
Romania	2395	2249	2020	
Rwanda ¹⁹				
Senegal ²⁰	50	50	50	50
Serbia ²¹	3134	No info	No info	3134
Slovakia	1035	1035	874	650
Slovenia	272	256	249	229
South Africa ²²				
Spain	1349	1357	1121	976
Sri Lanka	21153	20831	16718	
Sweden	6009	6009	5964	5948
Tanzania, United Republic of ²³				
Togo ²⁴				
Tunisia	4405	4375		4341
Türkiye	9259	6552	6439	6357
Uganda ²⁵				
Ukraine ²⁶	No info	No info	No info	
Venezuela ²⁷				
Yemen ²⁸	No info	No info	No info	No info
Zambia	907			907
Zimbabwe	450	450	450	450

¹⁵ In its report submitted in 2005, Mali indicated that it retains 600 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

¹⁶ In its report submitted in 2018, Mozambique indicated that 90 of the 1355 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 are inert without explosive and detonator.

¹⁷ In its report submitted in 2010, Namibia indicated that it retains 1634 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

¹⁸ In its report submitted in 2012, Nigeria indicated that it retains 3364 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

¹⁹ In its report submitted in 2008, Rwanda indicated that 65 anti-personnel mines had been uprooted from minefields and retained for training purposes under Article 3.

²⁰ In its reports submitted since 2019, Senegal indicated that 14 of the 50 mines retained have been defused.

²¹ In its report submitted in 2018, Serbia indicated that all fuses for 494 PMA-1 type and 540 PMA-3 type had been removed and destroyed. While Serbia submitted reports in 2020 and 2021, no updated information on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 was provided.

²² In its report submitted in 2014, South Africa indicated that that it retains 576 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

²³ In its report submitted in 2009, the United Republic of Tanzania indicated that it retains 1780 anti-personnel mines under Article 3, including 830 deactivated anti-personnel mines.

²⁴ In its report submitted in 2004, Togo indicated that that it retains 436 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

²⁵ In its report submitted in 2012, Uganda indicated that it retains 1764 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

²⁶ In its report submitted in 2013, Ukraine indicated that it retains 605 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

²⁷ In its report submitted in 2012, Venezuela indicated that it retains 4874 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

²⁸ In its Article 7 report submitted in 2017, Yemen indicated that it retains 3760 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. In its Article 7 reports submitted in the period 2020-2022, Yemen indicated that before 2014 Yemen submitted information about quantity and types of anti-personnel mines for permitted purpose in accordance with Article 3 after that Yemen did not use any anti-personnel mines for training and research activities. Under the current operating procedures forced upon YEMAC by the current conflicts, at any given time there are a number of AP mines (and AP mines of an improvised nature) held at YEMC storage locations whilst awaiting destruction. This is caused by the lack of access to explosives or other means to destroy items in place and the need to conduct large scale demolitions once coordination with relative contacts and approval of access to explosives besides burning items such as thermite is allowed. The numbers and types vary and are kept only for so long as it takes to organise their destruction. The conflict created a complex environment and currently Yemen is not performing any plan of development of mine detection, detection techniques for further training of the use of mines retained under Article 3.

Table 2: States Parties which have reported that they no longer retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes

State Party	2019	2020	2021	2022
Sudan	739	528	327	0

Table 3: Oslo Action Plan status of implementation

Oslo Action Plan Reporting Stockpile destruction and retention of anti-personnel mines							
Actions	Indicators		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
	2	the number of States Parties implementing Article 4 that have timebound plans in place for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines	1 ³⁰	0	0		
	3	the number of stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed	216'252 ³¹	41'653	0		
#14	1	% the percentage of States Parties that failed to meet their deadline that present timebound plans for completion and report progress in implementation	50 ³²	50 ³³	0		
#15	1	% the percentage of States Parties that have reported the discovery of previously unknown stockpiles destroy these anti-personnel mines within six months	0 ³⁴	0	50 ³⁵		
#16	1	% the percentage of States Parties with antipersonnel mines retained for permitted purposes that report on the current and planned uses of these mines	32	33	22 ³⁶		
#17	1	the total number of States Parties that report replacing live antipersonnel mines with alternative measures for training and research purposes	0 ³⁷	0	0		

²⁹ Sri Lanka.

³⁰ Sri Lanka presented a timebound plan for implementation.

³¹ Destruction by Ukraine since the 2019 Fourth Review Conference.

³² Ukraine reported progress in implementation but has not submitted a timebound plan.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ The Gambia has reported the identification of previously unknown stockpiled mines but has not reported on their destruction.

³⁵ The Gambia in 2020 and Montenegro reported the identification of previously unknown stockpiled mines and Montenegro reported on their destruction.

³⁶ 15 of the 66 States Parties retaining mines: Angola, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Türkiye, Yemen and Zambia.

³⁷ In 2020, 2021 and 2022, Iraq, Slovenia, Sudan and Zimbabwe reported efforts to explore alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes.

Annex I: Stockpile Destruction (Article 4) Background Information

The destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines is an obligation covered by Article 4 of the Convention which requires each State Party to “destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after entry into force of the Convention for that State Party”.

In the *Oslo Action Plan 2020-2024*, States Parties committed to a number of actions related to the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. In addition, the Fourth Review Conference appealed to States Parties which are in non-compliance with Article 4 obligations to intensify efforts for the completion of their stockpile destruction obligations.

- **Action #13** Develop a **time-bound plan with clear milestones for the fulfilment of Article 4 within their deadline as soon as possible** following the entry into force of the Convention, and regularly **inform States Parties on progress made and remaining challenges** in implementation.
- **Action #14** States Parties that have failed to meet their stockpile destruction deadline and therefore are in non-compliance with Article 4, will present a **time-bound plan for completion** and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner, regularly informing States Parties on progress made and remaining challenges.
- **Action #15** Any State Party that discovers previously unknown stockpiles after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed will **inform States Parties as soon as possible** and destroy these anti-personnel mines as a matter of urgent priority and no later than six months after their discovery.

As part of the transparency measures which exist under Article 7 of the Convention, each year, no later than 30 April, States Parties shall provide updated information on a number of matters including on:

- the **total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed** by them, or under their jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
- the **status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines** in accordance with Articles 4, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
- the **types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed** after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4.

Annex II: Retention of Anti-Personnel Mines (Article 3) Background Information

Article 3 of the Convention permits States Parties “the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine detection techniques. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

In the *Oslo Action Plan 2020-2024*, States Parties committed to the following actions related to the retention of anti-personnel mines:

- **Action #16** Any State Party that retains anti-personnel mines for reasons permitted under Article 3 of the Convention committed to “annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes and will destroy all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number. The States Parties will report annually by 30 April on the use of retained mines and on their destruction.”
- **Action #17** Explore available alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes where possible

As part of the transparency measures which exist under Article 7 of the Convention, each year, no later than 30 April, States Parties shall provide updated information on:

- The **types, quantities** and, if possible, **lot numbers** of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the **institutions authorized** by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3 (Article 7.1.d).