

## Preliminary Observations on Stockpile Destruction and the Retention of Anti-Personnel Mines

2 June 2023

### President of the Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties

#### I. STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION (ARTICLE 4)

1. At the close of the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties, two States Parties - **Greece** and **Ukraine** – were still implementing Article 4 of the Convention. The two states are in non-compliance with their Article 4 obligations, their four-year implementation deadline having expired on 1 March 2008 and 1 June 2010, respectively.
2. As of 15 May 2023, Greece and Ukraine had submitted updated information on stockpiled anti-personnel mines in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 7. Based on this information as well as previous reports, the following is understood to be the quantity of stockpiled anti-personnel mines destroyed and remaining to be destroyed:

State Party	Total number of anti-personnel mines destroyed	Total number of anti-personnel mines destroyed in 2022	Total number of anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed	Article 4 projected completion date
Greece	1,224,754	0	343,413	Not communicated <sup>1</sup>
Ukraine	3,438,948	0	3,364,433 <sup>2</sup>	Not communicated <sup>3</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,663,702</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3,707,846</b>	

#### Information submitted by Greece on the implementation of Article 4

3. At the Fourth Review Conference, **Greece** indicated that complications emanating from environmental compliance issues caused the temporary pause of the demilitarization process of the remaining 343,413 stockpiled anti-personnel mines. The competent department of the Ministry of Defence and the Hellenic Defence Systems (HDS) are in close consultation to find the best possible solution to resolve this issue and set the destruction of the remaining stocks back on track.
4. In information provided in 2023 in accordance with its Article 7 transparency obligations, Greece reported that there were still 343,413 anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed and that these mines have already been transferred and gathered in 12 final sites, from which they are being collected and transferred to HDS in Lavrio, Attica, in order to be destroyed. In information provided in 2020 in accordance with its Article 7 obligations, Greece reported that since the beginning of the stockpile destruction programme, 1,224,754 stockpiled anti-personnel mines, out of a total of 1,568,167, have been destroyed. In 2022, no stockpiled anti-personnel mines were destroyed.

<sup>1</sup> At the 20MSP, Greece indicated that the destruction of the remaining stockpiled anti-personnel mines will take place within a period of 18 months following the signature of the revised contract with the new subcontractor.

<sup>2</sup> Article 7 report submitted by Ukraine in 2023. Ukraine also indicated that if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or if they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and carrying out relevant inspections.

<sup>3</sup> In its Article 7 report submitted in 2023, Ukraine indicated that its stockpiled anti-personnel mines will be destroyed in accordance with Article 4 commitments after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.

5. At the 20-22 June 2022 Intersessional Meetings, Greece indicated that it has not yet entirely fulfilled its obligation due to unforeseen circumstances that are beyond its control, including the legal dispute with the HDS, the deadly explosion in 2014 at VIDEX facilities in Bulgaria and the subsequent legal obstacles that were raised, the environmental issues during the demilitarization process of anti-personnel mines at Lavrio Plant, as well as restrictive measures due to the COVID-19 pandemic leading to a pause in the destruction process for over 8 years.
6. At the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties (20MSP), Greece informed that since the 20-22 June 2022 Intersessional Meetings, the competent department of the Hellenic Army General Staff concluded the necessary internal procedures and a revised contract with the HDS company was going to be signed in the upcoming days which will put the destruction of the stockpiled antipersonnel mines back on track. The amendments in the said contract provide, inter alia, that the destruction of the remaining antipersonnel mine stockpile will take place at the installations of the new subcontractor of the HDS, namely the DEMIL-TECH company in Croatia, within a period of 18 months following the signature of the revised contract, notwithstanding of course any future unforeseen circumstances beyond our control.

#### **Preliminary observations by the President on the information submitted by Greece**

7. The President notes the information communicated by Greece which indicates that the destruction of the remaining stockpiled antipersonnel mines will take 18 months starting from the signature of the revised contract. The President notes the importance of Greece presenting a time-bound plan for completion before the start of the destruction process and proceeding with implementation as soon as possible in accordance with Action#14 of the Oslo Action Plan. As well, the President encourages Greece to continue to inform regularly on progress and remaining challenges in this respect.
8. The President notes the importance of Greece keeping the States Parties informed on progress made to complete the destruction of its remaining 343,413 stockpiled anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. The President encourages Greece to make significant progress in implementation of its Article 4 obligations by the Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties.
9. The President recognises the commitment of Greece to fully implement Article 4 and understands that impeding circumstances have led Greece to miss its Article 4 deadline in 2008. The President recognises that these circumstances have been beyond Greece's control and that it is clear that there has never been an intention by Greece to not fulfil its Article 4 obligations. The President further recognises that Greece has provided regular updated information on the situation and has been consistently transparent in this regard. However, the delays experienced have unfortunately led to Greece not being able to "destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of the Convention" and resulted in the country being in non-compliance with the provisions contained in Article 4 of the Convention. The President notes that Greece unfortunately remains in a situation of non-compliance, fifteen years after the expiration of its deadline. The President notes that the announcement made by Greece at the 20MSP is encouraging and that it is positive that Greece intends to communicate a time-bound plan for completion and work to start the destruction process as well as do its utmost to put an end to this situation as soon as possible.

#### **Information submitted by Ukraine on the implementation of Article 4**

10. In information provided in its transparency report in 2023, **Ukraine** indicated that anti-personnel mines, the presence of which was declared by Ukraine as part of the implementation of Article 4 of the Convention, are in the warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and will be destroyed in accordance with the commitments made after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.
11. In information provided in its transparency report in 2023, Ukraine reported that 3,364,433 stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained to be destroyed as of 1 January 2023, including 3,363,828 PFM-type and 605 OZM-4 type mines which were left in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea occupied by the Russian Federation. Ukraine also indicated that if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or if they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and carrying out relevant inspections.
12. Ukraine indicated that in 2022, implementation of programmes to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines has been suspended due to the ongoing full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation.

#### **Preliminary observations by the President on the information submitted by Ukraine**

13. The President notes that Ukraine has provided information on the status of its stockpile destruction programme, including information on the total number and types of stockpiled anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed. The President notes that the number of remaining stockpiled antipersonnel mines will be subject to a review once information is available. The President also notes that the implementation of the stockpile destruction programme has been suspended and that no destruction took place during the reporting period.
14. The President notes that due to the current situation in Ukraine, progress in implementation of Article 4 is hampered and a completion date may currently be difficult to provide. The President encourages Ukraine to continue to inform on remaining challenges and explore all existing avenues for cooperation and assistance in this regard.

#### **Information provided by States Parties on destruction of previously unknown stockpiled anti-personnel mines**

15. Since the Twentieth Meeting of the States Party, no State Party has provided information on the discovery of previously unknown stockpiled anti-personnel mines, in accordance with *Oslo Action Plan*, Action #15.
16. In 2020, **the Gambia** had reported that, during the course of 2019, it became aware of a previously unknown stockpile of 3,000 anti-personnel mines. The President noted that since then no updated information has been provided by the Gambia on the progress made to destroy these anti-personnel mines in accordance with Action #15 of the Oslo Action Plan. The President noted that updated information on this matter would be welcome.

## II. RETENTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES (ARTICLE 3)

At the end of the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties (20MSP), it was recorded that 66 States Parties had reported, as required by Article 7, paragraph 1 d), anti-personnel mines retained for the development of training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques in accordance with Article 3.

- Since then, 2 States Parties – **Nicaragua** and **Nigeria** – have indicated that they no longer retains anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes. There are now 64 States Parties that have reported that they retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes (see table 1).

In 2023:

- 34 of the 64 States Parties retaining anti-personnel mines under Article 3 (53%) submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7.
- The following 30 States Parties have not yet submitted a transparency report: Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Republic of, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Eritrea, Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Oman, Romania, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
- The following 17 States Parties which have reported that they retain anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 3 have not submitted annual transparency information on their retained mines for two years or more: Benin (2008), Cameroon (2009), Cape Verde (2009), Congo, Republic of (2009), Côte d'Ivoire (2014), Djibouti (2005), Eritrea (2014), Gambia (2020), Honduras (2007), Indonesia (2020), Mali (2005), Namibia (2010), Rwanda (2008), Tanzania (2009), Togo (2004), Uganda (2012) and Venezuela (2012).

### Information provided on retained anti-personnel mines (OAP Action #16 and #17)

As of 2 June 2023, it is understood that 64 States Parties retain a total of 123,730 stockpiled anti-personnel mines under Article 3 based on information provided in Article 7 reports submitted in 2023 or previously. This represents a decrease of more than 11,000 mines compared to the total reported retained in 2022.

In 2023:

- **11 States Parties** – Bangladesh, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Zambia and Zimbabwe - reported **no change in the number of anti-personnel mines retained** under Article 3.
- **20 States Parties** – Angola, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Peru, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Türkiye - reported a **decrease in the number of anti-personnel mines retained** under Article 3.
- **One State Party** – Cambodia – reported an **increase in the number of anti-personnel mines retained** under Article 3.

- **One State Party** – Yemen – reported that it could not provide updated information on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 because of the ongoing conflict.
- **One State Party** – Ukraine – submitted an annual report but the reports did not contain information on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3.
- **11 States Parties** – Angola, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Iraq, Ireland, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Türkiye, Zambia **provided voluntary information** on the use (and or planned use) of retained anti-personnel mines.

In 2023, **2 States Parties** – Iraq and Zimbabwe – indicated that they **were currently exploring available alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes or will be in the future.**

**Table 1: Anti-personnel mines reported retained by 64 States Parties<sup>4</sup> for purposes permitted by Article 3 of the Convention**

State Party	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Angola	1304	1304	1304	1304	536
Bangladesh			12050	12050	12050
Belarus	4505	4505		4492	
Belgium	2066	2044	2021	967	
Benin <sup>5</sup>					
Bhutan <sup>6</sup>				146	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	834	834	834	unclear	817
Bulgaria	3318		3485		
Burundi			4		
Cambodia	1235	3730 <sup>7</sup>	927	1213	1298
Cameroon <sup>8</sup>					
Canada <sup>9</sup>	1878	1649	1540	1491	1475
Cape Verde <sup>10</sup>					
Congo Brazzaville <sup>11</sup>					
Cote d'Ivoire <sup>12</sup>					
Croatia	4973	4851	3858	3766	3747
Cyprus	435	435	435	410	380
Czech Republic	2180	2155	2155	2138	2102
Denmark	1748	1736	1730	1702	
Djibouti <sup>13</sup>					
Ecuador	90	90	90	90	
Eritrea <sup>14</sup>					
Finland		15982	15851	15771	15665
France	3941	1842	1841	1771	1770
Gambia <sup>15</sup>					
Germany	583	583	543	279	271
Greece	5599	5585	5570	5547	5527
Guinea-Bissau				9	9
Guyana			80		
Honduras <sup>16</sup>					
Indonesia	2148	2050			
Iraq	20	Unclear	Unclear	20	20
Ireland	55	54	53	51	49
Italy	617	617	563	563	563
Japan	898	803	719	663	617
Jordan	100	100	100	100	100
Kenya			3000		

<sup>4</sup> A number of States Parties report that they retain inert anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes. These States Parties are not included in the table as inert anti-personnel mines do not fit the Convention's definition of an anti-personnel mine.

<sup>5</sup> In its report submitted in 2008, Benin indicated that it retains 16 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>6</sup> In its report submitted in 2018, Bhutan indicated that it retains 211 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>7</sup> This number includes anti-personnel mines as well as other devices.

<sup>8</sup> In its report submitted in 2009, Cameroon indicated in Form B that 1,885 mines were held and in Form D that some thousands of mines were held for training purposes.

<sup>9</sup> In 2022, Canada reported that 18 of the 1491 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 are without fuses.

<sup>10</sup> In its report submitted in 2009, Cape Verde indicated that it retains 120 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>11</sup> In its report submitted in 2009, Congo Brazzaville indicated that it retains 322 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>12</sup> In its report submitted in 2014, Côte d'Ivoire indicated that it retains 290 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>13</sup> In its report submitted in 2005, Djibouti indicated that it retains 2996 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>14</sup> In its reports submitted in 2013 and 2014, Eritrea indicated that 71 of the 101 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 were inert.

<sup>15</sup> In its report submitted in 2013, the Gambia indicated that it retains 100 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. While a report was submitted in 2020, it did not contain information on antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3.

<sup>16</sup> In its report submitted in 2007, Honduras indicated that it retains 815 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

State Party	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Mali <sup>17</sup>					
Mauritania	728	728	728	658	
Mozambique <sup>18</sup>	900		No info	No info	
Namibia <sup>19</sup>					
Netherlands	889	868	270	270	
Oman	No info	No info	2000		
Peru	2015	2015	1705	1330	956
Romania	2395	2249	2020		
Rwanda <sup>20</sup>					
Senegal <sup>21</sup>	50	50	50	50	50
Serbia <sup>22</sup>	3134	No info	No info	3134	3134
Slovakia	1035	1035	874	650	590
Slovenia	272	256	249	229	229
South Africa <sup>23</sup>			483		
Spain	1349	1357	1121	976	976
Sri Lanka	21153	20831	16718	14489	9825
Sweden	6009	6009	5964	5948	5173
Tanzania, United Republic of <sup>24</sup>					
Togo <sup>25</sup>					
Tunisia	4405	4375		4341	4320
Türkiye	9259	6552	6439	6357	5728
Uganda <sup>26</sup>					
Ukraine <sup>27</sup>	No info	No info	No info		No info
Venezuela <sup>28</sup>					
Yemen <sup>29</sup>	No info	No info	No info	No info	No info
Zambia	907			907	907
Zimbabwe	450	450	450	450	450

<sup>17</sup> In its report submitted in 2005, Mali indicated that it retains 600 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>18</sup> In its report submitted in 2018, Mozambique indicated that 90 of the 1355 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 are inert without explosive and detonator. In its report submitted in 2022, Mozambique indicated that the Defence and Interior Ministries have a certain number of guarded mines that are intended, solely and exclusively, for the instruction of the Defence and Security Forces.

<sup>19</sup> In its report submitted in 2010, Namibia indicated that it retains 1634 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>20</sup> In its report submitted in 2008, Rwanda indicated that 65 anti-personnel mines had been uprooted from minefields and retained for training purposes under Article 3.

<sup>21</sup> In its reports submitted since 2019, Senegal indicated that 14 of the 50 mines retained have been defused.

<sup>22</sup> In its report submitted in 2018, Serbia indicated that all fuses for 494 PMA-1 type and 540 PMA-3 type had been removed and destroyed. While Serbia submitted reports in 2020 and 2021, no updated information on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 was provided.

<sup>23</sup> In its report submitted in 2022, South Africa indicated that that as at 31 December 2020 it retained 483 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>24</sup> In its report submitted in 2009, the United Republic of Tanzania indicated that it retains 1780 anti-personnel mines under Article 3, including 830 deactivated anti-personnel mines.

<sup>25</sup> In its report submitted in 2004, Togo indicated that that it retains 436 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>26</sup> In its report submitted in 2012, Uganda indicated that it retains 1764 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>27</sup> In its report submitted in 2013, Ukraine indicated that it retains 605 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. In its report submitted in 2023, Ukraine indicated "did not save" when reporting on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3.

<sup>28</sup> In its report submitted in 2012, Venezuela indicated that it retains 4874 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>29</sup> In its Article 7 report submitted in 2017, Yemen indicated that it retains 3760 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. In its Article 7 reports submitted in the period 2020-2022, Yemen indicated that before 2014 Yemen submitted information about quantity and types of anti-personnel mines for permitted purpose in accordance with Article 3 after that Yemen did not use any anti-personnel mines for training and research activities. Under the current operating procedures forced upon YEMAC by the current conflicts, at any given time there are a number of AP mines (and AP mines of an improvised nature) held at YEMC storage locations whilst awaiting destruction. This is caused by the lack of access to explosives or other means to destroy items in place and the need to conduct large scale demolitions once coordination with relative contacts and approval of access to explosives besides burning items such as thermite is allowed. The numbers and types vary and are kept only for so long as it takes to organise their destruction. The conflict created a complex environment and currently Yemen is not performing any plan of development of mine detection, detection techniques for further training of the use of mines retained under Article 3. In its report submitted in 2023, Yemen indicated that Since the fourth review conference and because the conflict the fate of the Anti-personnel mines retained is unknown because of the control of militias in Sanaa and there are no changes or updates on this matter.

**Table 2: States Parties which have reported that they no longer retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes**

State Party	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Nicaragua <sup>30</sup>	448		448	448	0
Nigeria <sup>31</sup>					0

**Table 3: Oslo Action Plan status of implementation**

Oslo Action Plan Reporting Stockpile destruction and retention of anti-personnel mines							
Actions	Indicators		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
#13	1	the number of States Parties that have completed their Article 4 obligations	0	1 <sup>32</sup>	0	0	
	2	the number of States Parties implementing Article 4 that have timebound plans in place for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines	1 <sup>33</sup>	0	0	0	
	3	the number of stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed	216'252 <sup>34</sup>	41'653	0	0	
#14	1	% the percentage of States Parties that failed to meet their deadline that present timebound plans for completion and report progress in implementation	50 <sup>35</sup>	50 <sup>36</sup>	50 <sup>37</sup>	0 <sup>38</sup>	
#15	1	% the percentage of States Parties that have reported the discovery of previously unknown stockpiles destroy these anti-personnel mines within six months	0 <sup>39</sup>	0	50 <sup>40</sup>	0 <sup>41</sup>	
#16	1	% the percentage of States Parties with antipersonnel mines retained for permitted purposes that report on the current and planned uses of these mines	32	33	30 <sup>42</sup>	17 <sup>43</sup>	
#17	1	the total number of States Parties that report replacing live antipersonnel mines with alternative measures for training and research purposes	0 <sup>44</sup>	0	0	0	

<sup>30</sup> In a communication sent to the ISU on 19 April 2023, Nicaragua indicated that it does retain anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>31</sup> In its report submitted in 2012, Nigeria indicated that it retained 3364 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. In its report submitted in 2023, Nigeria indicated that it does not retain anti-personnel mines for training, only dummies are used for training.

<sup>32</sup> Sri Lanka.

<sup>33</sup> Sri Lanka presented a timebound plan for implementation.

<sup>34</sup> Destruction by Ukraine since the 2019 Fourth Review Conference.

<sup>35</sup> Ukraine reported progress in implementation but has not submitted a timebound plan.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Greece reported progress in implementation but has not submitted a timebound plan.

<sup>38</sup> Greece has specified the duration of the destruction process once it starts.

<sup>39</sup> The Gambia has reported the identification of previously unknown stockpiled mines but has not reported on their destruction.

<sup>40</sup> The Gambia in 2020 and Montenegro reported the identification of previously unknown stockpiled mines and Montenegro reported on their destruction.

<sup>41</sup> The Gambia reported the identification of previously unknown stockpiled mines in 2020 but has not reported on their destruction

<sup>42</sup> 20 of the 66 States Parties retaining mines: Angola, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Türkiye, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

<sup>43</sup> 11 of the 64 States Parties retaining mines: Angola, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Iraq, Ireland, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Türkiye and Zambia.

<sup>44</sup> In 2020, 2021 and 2022, Iraq, Slovenia, Sudan and Zimbabwe reported efforts to explore alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes. In 2023, Iraq and Zimbabwe reported on efforts to explore alternatives.



## Annex I: Stockpile Destruction (Article 4) Background Information

The destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines is an obligation covered by Article 4 of the Convention which requires each State Party to “destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after entry into force of the Convention for that State Party”.

In the *Oslo Action Plan 2020-2024*, States Parties committed to a number of actions related to the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. In addition, the Fourth Review Conference appealed to States Parties which are in non-compliance with Article 4 obligations to intensify efforts for the completion of their stockpile destruction obligations.

- **Action #13** Develop a **time-bound plan with clear milestones for the fulfilment of Article 4 within their deadline as soon as possible** following the entry into force of the Convention, and regularly **inform States Parties on progress made and remaining challenges** in implementation.
- **Action #14** States Parties that have failed to meet their stockpile destruction deadline and therefore are in non-compliance with Article 4, will present a **time-bound plan for completion** and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner, regularly informing States Parties on progress made and remaining challenges.
- **Action #15** Any State Party that discovers previously unknown stockpiles after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed will **inform States Parties as soon as possible** and destroy these anti-personnel mines as a matter of urgent priority and no later than six months after their discovery.

**As part of the transparency measures** which exist under Article 7 of the Convention, each year, no later than 30 April, States Parties shall provide updated information on a number of matters including on:

- the **total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed** by them, or under their jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
- the **status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines** in accordance with Articles 4, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
- the **types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed** after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4.

## **Annex II: Retention of Anti-Personnel Mines (Article 3) Background Information**

Article 3 of the Convention permits States Parties “the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine detection techniques. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

In the *Oslo Action Plan 2020-2024*, States Parties committed to the following actions related to the retention of anti-personnel mines:

- **Action #16** Any State Party that retains anti-personnel mines for reasons permitted under Article 3 of the Convention committed to “annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes and will destroy all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number. The States Parties will report annually by 30 April on the use of retained mines and on their destruction.”
- **Action #17** Explore available alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes where possible

**As part of the transparency measures** which exist under Article 7 of the Convention, each year, no later than 30 April, States Parties shall provide updated information on:

- The **types, quantities** and, if possible, **lot numbers** of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the **institutions authorized** by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3 (Article 7.1.d).