
Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

23 October 2024

Original: English

Siem Reap, 25-29 November 2024

Item 8 of the provisional agenda

Review of the operation and status of the Convention

Draft review of the operation and status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction: 2019-2024

Introduction, Universalizing the Convention, Stockpile Destruction and Retention of Anti-personnel Mines

Submitted by the President of the Fifth Review Conference^{*,**}

I. Introduction

1. The Convention provides a framework to “put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines” by ensuring universal adherence to a comprehensive set of prohibitions on the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines by ensuring the exclusion of civilians from mined areas, destroying all anti-personnel mines in mined areas, destroying stockpiles, and providing assistance to mine victims. The Convention also foresees that certain matters are essential for achieving progress in these areas, including cooperation and assistance, transparency and the exchange of information, national implementation measures to prevent and suppress prohibited activities, and facilitating compliance and implementation support.

2. Since the Fourth Review Conference of the Convention held in Oslo in 2019, significant progress has been made in meeting the Convention's purpose and objectives and meeting the 2025 aspirational goal set by the States Parties. While regular progress continues to be made, challenges remain to reach a mine-free world and ensure that healthcare and broader support services provide sustainable support to mine victims. Also, since the Fourth Review Conference, the situation in several States Parties has deteriorated, and protracted conflicts continue affecting their ability to implement their obligations under the Convention. Furthermore, since the Fourth Review Conference, the large-scale use of anti-personnel mines, including anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, has been recorded.

3. This review is intended to serve as a comprehensive record of the progress made by the States Parties in fulfilling their obligations since the Fourth Review Conference. It aims to take stock of the implementation status, document the decisions, recommendations, and

* The present document is being issued without formal editing.

** The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent developments/information.

understandings adopted by the States Parties since the Fourth Review Conference, and provide an analysis of the current situation. Based on this analysis, the review will highlight the challenges that remain in fulfilling the obligations of the Convention.

II. Universalizing the Convention

4. At the Fourth Review Conference, the States Parties recognised that the Convention has established a strong norm against any use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel mines and that while this norm is widely adhered to even by States not party to the Convention, efforts to promote universalization of the Convention and the strengthening of its norms must continue.

5. As of 1 September 2024, the Convention had entered into force for 164 States Parties. Since the Fourth Review Conference, no additional States have ratified/acceded to the Convention. In this regard, increased and regular efforts to encourage ratification/accession of States will be necessary going forward.

6. Today, there are 33 States which are not yet party to the Convention, including one signatory State: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Cuba, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Marshall Islands (signatory), Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, Tonga, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

7. At the Fourth Review Conference, the States Parties agreed to use all available avenues to promote ratification of/accession to the Convention by States not party, including by encouraging their participation in the work of the Convention. Since the Fourth Review Conference, in keeping with the States Parties' tradition of openness, all States not party were invited to each of the Convention's Pledging Conferences, Intersessional Meetings, Meetings of the States Parties and to the Fifth Review Conference and relevant Preparatory Meetings. In addition, States not party, were also regularly invited to informal meetings held by the President and the Convention's Committees. The following [18 TO BE UPDATED] States not party (54% of States not party) took part in at least one of the Convention's meetings since 2019: Armenia, Azerbaijan, India, Israel, Republic of Korea, Kazakhstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, the United States of America, and Viet Nam. Many of these States expressed their support for the humanitarian aims of the Convention and indicated how they provide support to States Parties in fulfilling their obligations under the Convention.

8. Since the Fourth Review Conference, the President of the Convention, Convention office holders, and other States Parties have promoted ratification of/accession to the Convention by States not party during informal and formal meetings of the Convention as well as in other fora such as the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons as well as meeting of the Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization. Continuing to take advantage of other fora to promote the Convention will be an important effort.

9. Considering the stagnant accession/ratification rates, each year since the Fourth Review Conference, the Presidents of the Convention have engaged with the 33 States not party through writing, requesting updated information concerning their positions vis a vis the Convention. The information provided was employed to develop observations and conclusions on the status of universalization of the Convention which were presented at Intersessional Meetings and Meetings of the States Parties. The Convention's Presidents (Sudan (2020), the Netherlands (2021), Colombia (2022), Germany (2023) and Cambodia (2024)) held bilateral meetings with representatives of States not party in Geneva, New York and capitals to encourage their engagement with the work of the Convention. Meetings were held with the representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Tonga, United Arab Emirates, the United States of America and Viet Nam. These

States not party, have been encouraged to continue their consideration to accede to/ratify the Convention as soon as possible and to make formal commitments to adherence with the Convention's provisions.

10. One measure of States' acceptance of the Convention's norms is through support expressed for the annual United Nations General Assembly resolution on the implementation of the Convention. Since 2019, the following 17 States not party voted in favour of the resolution: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Tonga, United Arab Emirates. Unfortunately, in 2023, and for the first time since entry into force of the Convention, one State not party, the Russian Federation, voted against the resolution. In the most recent vote on this resolution in 2024, the following States not party to the Convention voted in favour: [INSERT STATES]

11. In voting in favour of the resolution, many States not party acknowledged and supported, to varying degrees, the humanitarian goals of the Convention and highlighted the grave consequences of the use of anti-personnel mines. States not party have provided different reasons for not acceding to the Convention. In some cases, States not party expressed that proceeding with accession is dependent on the accession of another State, generally a neighbouring State. Other States not party have indicated that accession is tied to sovereignty issues. Still, other States have indicated the many competing priorities for the limited internal resources available as an obstacle to accession. Finally, others perceive that the marginal military utility derived from anti-personnel mines is not outweighed by the grave humanitarian consequences of their use.

12. Additionally, the Convention's norms have seen widespread acceptance by States not party to the Convention, with 9 States not party (27% of States not party)—Egypt, Georgia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Singapore, and the United States—reporting having put in place moratoria on the use, production, export, and/or import of anti-personnel mines.

13. In 2023, the President of the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties (20MSP) established an informal Universalization Coordination Group (UCG) to develop a strategic approach to universalization efforts. The UCG, which is co-facilitated by Belgium, has met 9 times since its establishment in 2023 to exchange information on universalization efforts, coordinate joint demarches, and discuss universalization opportunities more broadly. At present, the UCG is working to continue efforts to encourage targeted States not party to join the Convention given the affinity towards the Convention expressed by these States, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Georgia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Marshall Islands (signatory), Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Nepal, Tonga, and Viet Nam.

14. The States Parties have recognised that to ensure the success of universalization efforts, continuous engagement with States not party will be required by both States Parties and other stakeholders. While accession is the ultimate objective, States not party have been encouraged to take concrete steps towards accession, such as carrying out landmine policy reviews, enacting moratoria on the use, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines as well as destroying stockpiled mines, clearing mined areas, providing mine risk education, assisting mine victims, submitting voluntary transparency reports, voting in favour of the United Nations General Assembly resolution on the implementation of the Convention and participating in the work of the Convention.

15. Challenges persist despite the tremendous progress achieved in pursuing the universal acceptance of the Convention and its norms. While new emplacements of anti-personnel mines by States not party remain relatively rare, since the Fourth Review Conference, several States Parties have shared their concern of the erosion of multilateral norms and in particular the possible renaissance of the perspective that anti-personnel mines are a legitimate means of warfare with military value. Since the Fourth Review Conference, new use of anti-personnel mines has been reported in 2 States not party to the Convention: Myanmar and the Russian Federation¹. In the case of the Russian Federation's use of anti-personnel mines,

¹ Landmine Monitor Report 2023.

this is the first time since entry into force of the Convention that a State not party has employed anti-personnel mines in the territory of a State Party. Upholding the norm of the Convention going forward will be an important task for the States Parties. In this regard, States Parties should use every opportunity to demonstrate publicly their unwavering commitment to the implementation of the Convention and continue to reaffirm and reinforce the humanitarian norm of the Convention, including by condemning the use of anti-personnel mines by any actor.

16. All States not party to the exception of three – Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Uzbekistan – have participated at least once in a Convention-related meeting. Several States not party regularly deliver statements to provide information about their state’s position on accession and/or on their activities to implement certain provisions of the Convention and their contributions to mine action activities. Almost all the States not party which have contributed information on their position have acknowledged and supported the humanitarian aims of the Convention and have recognised the negative impact caused by anti-personnel mines.

17. The production of anti-personnel mines remains rare. At one time, more than fifty (50) States produced anti-personnel mines. Thirty-six (36) of these States are now party to the Convention and have ceased and prohibited all production, in line with the Convention. Today, only a handful of States not party have been recorded as producers of anti-personnel mines in the last years. Since the Fourth Review Conference in 2019, the Landmine Monitor listed 12 States not party as landmine producers because they have yet to disavow future production, unchanged from the previous report: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, and Viet Nam. Of these, India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia are reported to likely be actively producing.

18. On 21 June 2022, the United States of America announced important policy changes to their landmine policy which “align US APL policy outside of the Korean Peninsula with the key requirements of the Ottawa Convention,” including the commitment not to use, develop, produce, acquire, export anti-personnel mines or assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in any activity that would be prohibited by the Ottawa Convention as well as to destroy all APL stockpiled not required for the defence of the Republic of Korea. The United States indicated that along with the new policy, “the United States will undertake diligent efforts to pursue materiel and operational solutions to assist in becoming compliant with and ultimately acceding to the Ottawa Convention.”²

19. Since the Fourth Review Conference, the increased use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature by armed non-state actors and their impact on mine affected communities has also been recorded. The view has been expressed that engagement with these groups could help ensure that these actors cease the use stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the view was also expressed that when engagement by non-governmental organisations of armed non-state actors is considered, vigilance is required to prevent organisations that commit terrorist acts from exploiting the Convention for their goals. Some States Parties continue to be of the view that when engagement with armed non-state actors is contemplated, concerned States Parties should be informed, and their consent would be necessary for such an engagement to take place.

20. Since the Fourth Review Conference, the use of anti-personnel mines by “non-state actors” has been reported by the Landmine Monitor in the following States: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, and Tunisia. At the Fourth Review Conference, the States Parties resolved to continue to promote universal observance of the Convention’s norms and objectives, condemn violations of these norms and take appropriate steps to end the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines by any actor, including by armed non-State actors. The States Parties have acknowledged the importance of

² <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/21/fact-sheet-changes-to-u-s-anti-personnel-landmine-policy/>

continued efforts to condemn the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines by any actor, ensuring that the norm against the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines remains strong. Since the Fourth Review Conference, subsequent Presidents of the Convention and several States Parties have expressed deep concern in response to new emplacements of anti-personnel mines, including anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, and called for actors concerned to cease the use of such anti-personnel mines. Since the Fourth Review Conference, the States Parties, at their informal and annual Meetings of the States Parties as well as in other multilateral fora, have condemned the use of anti-personnel mines by any actor. Furthermore, subsequent Presidents since the Fourth Review Conference have publicly condemned the use of anti-personnel mines by any actor, including through press releases. States Parties should commit to denounce and condemn any violation of the treaty's norm and hold States using anti-personnel mines accountable to ensure that such violations are not repeated.

21. Since the Fourth Review Conference, allegations of use of anti-personnel mines by the Armed Forces of Ukraine were highlighted by Human Rights Watch in their report dated 31 January 2023. Since the allegations surfaced, subsequent Presidents and the Committee on Cooperative Compliance have been engaged in a cooperative dialogue with Ukraine to address these allegations and to ensure that the Convention's compliance mechanisms remain strong. The Committee on Cooperative Compliance welcomed the cooperative dialogue sustained with Ukraine and welcomes the information provided by Ukraine on its efforts to carry out investigations.

22. While the vast majority of States with stockpiled anti-personnel mines – 91 – have joined the Convention, the Landmine Monitor indicates that the following 30 of the 33 States not party to the Convention likely possess stockpiled anti-personnel mines: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Cuba, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

23. States not party can submit voluntary Article 7 transparency reports to communicate information about the key areas of implementation of the Convention. States not party that have expressed support for the Convention's object and purpose have been particularly encouraged to provide voluntary transparency reports. Since the Fourth Review Conference, of the 33 States not party, only Morocco has submitted such a report on an annual basis.

24. On 18 February 2021, the European Union (EU) adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 in support of the Oslo Action Plan (OAP) for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. Part of the Decision is focused on supporting the Presidency in implementing its universalization mandate and supporting the activities of the Convention's Special Envoys in this endeavour. The States Parties have recognised the important contributions of the EU Council Decision to implementing the Convention and the action plans adopted by the States Parties.

25. The Convention's Special Envoys, His Royal Highness Prince Mired Raad Al-Hussein, and Her Royal Highness Princess Astrid of Belgium, in coordination with the President, have continued to make themselves available to engage States not party to the Convention at a high level.

(a) In April 2022, in support of the President's universalization mandate, the President, together with the Convention's Special Envoy, His Royal Highness (HRH) Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, travelled to New York and met several delegations of States not party including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Marshall Islands, and Viet Nam to discuss barriers to accession and to explore the opportunity of visiting these countries to engage in similar discussions in capital;

(b) During their visit to New York, the President and the Special Envoy participated in a UN press conference to condemn the recent use of mines by the Russian Federation and to manifest the importance of strengthening the norm of and implementation of the Convention. To further promote the Convention's norm, the Special Envoy also met

with Eritrea, encouraging the State Party to return to compliance with the Convention. Other high-level meetings to discuss universalization and strengthening the norm of the Convention took place with the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and the ICBL.

(c) The Special Envoy HRH Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan took advantage of the Third Global Conference on Victim Assistance in October 2023 to join the Convention President, Germany, and incoming President, Cambodia, in meeting with States not party and other stakeholders. A technical meeting took place at the European Union Delegation in Phnom Penh, with representatives from Belgium, Germany, Japan, and the United Nations Development Programme to discuss the opportunity afforded by the Fifth Review Conference to promote the Convention in the region. A meeting was held with the Presidency Troika: Germany, Cambodia, Japan, and the Special Envoy to discuss possible follow-up for actions on universalization in a more cohesive manner. The Troika also discussed the best manners to support Cambodia in the lead-up to the Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap and its own universalization efforts. As a result, the Troika met with friends of the Convention to discuss universalization and the need to support Cambodia in its presidency and universalization efforts. In addition, the Special Envoy supported the Convention's President, Germany, in his universalization efforts, joining the President in meetings with Ambassadors and/or other high-level representatives of Indonesia (as Chair of the Association of South East Asian Nations), Lao People's Democratic Republic, Republic of Korea, Viet Nam, and the United States of America.

(d) On the margins of the Indo-Pacific Forum held on 2 February 2024 in Brussels, HRH Princess Astrid met with high-level representatives from the People's Democratic Republic of Lao, the Marshall Islands, and Viet Nam to discuss their position vis a vis the Convention and encourage them to take concrete steps towards accession to the Convention.

III. Stockpile destruction and retention of anti-personnel mines

26. The Fourth Review Conference noted that great strides have been made in destroying stockpiled anti-personnel mines since the Convention's entry into force and that each mine destroyed represents a potential life or limb saved. In this regard, the States Parties aimed to ensure that all stockpiled anti-personnel mines are expeditiously destroyed in line with Article 4 of the Convention and that anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 do not exceed the minimum number necessary for permitted purposes.

27. At the close of the Fourth Review Conference, there were three States Parties for which the obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained relevant – Greece, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine. In addition to these States, one State Party - Tuvalu – needed to confirm whether they held stockpiled anti-personnel mines. Tuvalu's initial report was due on 28 August 2012.

28. On 8 September 2021, Sri Lanka reported in a communication to the Convention's Implementation Support Unit (ISU) that it had completed its Article 4 obligations ahead of its 1 June 2022 deadline on 24 August 2021, with the destruction in Kilinochchi, Sri Lanka, of its last 11,840 stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

29. There are now two States Parties for which the obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines remains relevant – Greece and Ukraine – with the two being non-compliant since 1 March 2008 (Greece) and 1 June 2010 (Ukraine). One State Party, Tuvalu, has yet to provide its required initial transparency information and, hence, has not yet confirmed the presence or absence of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. However, Tuvalu is presumed not to hold stocks. Therefore, there are now 161 States Parties that do not hold stockpiles of anti-personnel mines because they have either completed their destruction programs or because they never held stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, together States Parties have reported the destruction of over 53.1 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

30. At the Fourth Review Conference, the States Parties also agreed that “States Parties that have failed to meet their stockpile destruction deadline and therefore are in non-

compliance with Article 4 will present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner, regularly informing States Parties on progress made and remaining challenges.” Since the Fourth Review Conference, all States Parties that have missed their Article 4 deadlines have responded to this call by regularly informing States Parties on progress made and remaining challenges. The States Parties have recognised the importance of States providing clarity on the status of stockpile destruction and the importance of State Parties providing concrete timelines for the implementation of obligations under Article 4.

31. Since the Fourth Review Conference, one of the main challenges in stockpile destruction has been the pending completion of stockpile destruction by Greece and Ukraine. Both States Parties have consistently reported on the situation concerning their stockpiled anti-personnel mines. One State Party – Greece – communicated a completion date, however, as of 15 September 2024, both States Parties have yet to provide a time-bound plan for completion. The States Parties have recognised that States Parties must make every effort to achieve completion of their Article 4 obligations, as soon as possible, and no later than their respective deadline, and that they do so transparently by communicating progress made and remaining challenges regularly. The importance of destroying stockpiled anti-personnel mines as soon as possible following entry into force has been spotlighted by the current unprecedented situation faced by Ukraine, where part of Ukraine’s stockpiled anti-personnel mines are no longer under Ukraine’s effective control and are now in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

32. [INSERT INFORMATION REPORTED BY UKRAINE AND GREECE ON PROGRESS IN DESTRUCTION AT THE FIFTH REVIEW CONFERENCE 2024].

33. At the Fourth Review Conference, it was agreed that any State Party that discovers previously unknown stockpiles after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed will inform States Parties as soon as possible and destroy these anti-personnel mines as a matter of urgent priority and no later than six months after their discovery. Since the Fourth Review Conference, 2 States Parties – Gambia (2019) and Montenegro (2020)- have reported the discovery of previously unknown stockpiled anti-personnel mines in accordance with the commitments made in the OAP. While Montenegro has reported the destruction of the 195 discovered unknown stockpile mines, Gambia, while reporting its commitment not to use these mines and to destroy them in full compliance with the Convention, has not provided an update on progress in the destruction of the 3,000 previously unknown stockpiled mines.

34. Since the Fourth Review Conference, subsequent Presidents have highlighted the importance of continuing to report the discovery of previously unknown stockpiles and ensuring their destruction as soon as possible following their discovery and have included information in this regard in their observations and conclusions on stockpile destruction.

35. At the Fourth Review Conference, it was agreed that “Any State Party that retains anti-personnel mines for reasons permitted under Article 3 of the Convention will annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes and will destroy all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number. The States Parties will report annually by 30 April on the use of retained mines and their destruction.”

36. At the Fourth Review Conference, it was recorded that 70 States Parties had reported anti-personnel mines, as required by Article 7, paragraph 1 d), for the development of training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention.

37. Since the Fourth Review Conference, the following has transpired:

(a) Nine States Parties – Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Slovakia and Sudan - indicated that they now no longer retain anti-personnel mines for training purposes;

(b) One State Party, Tajikistan, indicated that the anti-personnel mines it retains under Article 3 are inert and, therefore, do not fall under the Convention’s definition;

(c) Two States Party—Bulgaria and Cambodia—reported an increase in the number of anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3. Bulgaria further reported that in 2020, 9,059 anti-personnel mines (8927 M2A4 and 132 M3), previously owned by the Bulgarian private company “EXPAL BULGARIA” JSC, were successfully transferred to Italy, a State Party to the Convention, for destruction;

(d) One State Party - The Netherlands - reported that 606 anti-personnel mines (DM31) previously retained for training by the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands were transferred for the purpose of destruction to Italy on 30 November 2020. The transferred mines are in secured storage until the reactivation of the factory following an accident which led to its total lockdown;

(e) In its 2020 Article 7 report, Italy reported that it imported 9,059 anti-personnel mines for destruction and that 6,119 mines have been destroyed. Italy further reported that it imported 606 anti-personnel mines belonging to another State Party for destruction, but destruction activities have not yet started;

(f) One State Party—Guyana - has indicated in its 2021 Article 7 report that it retains anti-personnel mines for training purposes.

38. At present, there are sixty-one States Parties - Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Eritrea, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, the Netherlands, Oman, Peru, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe - that retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes. As of 1 September 2024, the number of anti-personnel mines reported retained by the States Parties totals 118,719. This is 44,077 less than at the time of the Fourth Review Conference.

39. Since the Fourth Review Conference, most States Parties have provided updated annual information on the number of anti-personnel mines retained for permitted purposes as required by Article 7, with 54 of them providing some level of voluntary information on the use (present and future) of retained anti-personnel mines. However, the following States Parties which have reported that they retain anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 3 have not submitted annual updated transparency information on their retained mines for many years: Burundi (2021), Cameroon (2009), Cape Verde (2009), Congo (2009), Côte d’Ivoire (2014), Djibouti (2005), Eritrea (2014), Gambia (2020), Guyana (2021), Honduras (2007), Indonesia (2020), Kenya (2008), Namibia (2010), Oman (2021), Rwanda (2008), Tanzania (2009), Togo (2003), and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (2012). In the future, improving reporting rates by States Parties with retained mines will be important.

40. Furthermore, since the Fourth Review Conference, the following States Parties have reported the same number of retained mines in their Article 7 Reports: Bangladesh, Ecuador, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Senegal, Serbia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Reporting the same number of retained mines over several years may indicate that these mines have not been used for permitted purposes and that the number of mines retained may not constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” for permitted purposes unless otherwise reported.

41. In addition to the above, at the Fourth Review Conference, it was agreed that States Parties retaining anti-personnel mines will “explore available alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes where possible.” Since the Fourth Review Conference, Iraq, Japan, Slovenia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe reported efforts to explore alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes.

42. Since the Fourth Review Conference, subsequent Presidents have included information on the status of Article 3 in their annual observations to the Intersessional Meetings and Meetings of the States Parties and have communicated through writing to States Parties reporting retained anti-personnel mines. Likewise, activities to promote the use of alternatives to live anti-personnel mines have been organised, including:

(a) During the 30 June – 2 July 2020 Intersessional Meetings, the President discussed “Alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training”. During the discussion, the President offered an update on the status of Article 3 and invited The Development Initiative (TDI) to provide a presentation on the use of 3D-printed training aids. In its presentation, TDI offered an overview of how it employs 3D-printed mines for training, detector calibration, and explosive risk ordnance risk education. TDI also discussed the challenge of using real mines for training, including 1) mines contain an explosive hazard, 2) unsafe for the operator, 3) special permission is needed for transporting mines, and 4) mines lose part of their composition and can become ineffective for training. In its presentation, TDI also provided examples of real cases in which it employs training mines.

(b) In the context of the European Council Decision 2021/257, the President of the Convention organised on 21 June 2024, together with the ISU, an event to further explore alternatives to anti-personnel mines. [INSERT SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES].

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