

## Preliminary Observations on Stockpile Destruction and the Retention of Anti-Personnel Mines

### President of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties Intersessional Meetings 17 – 20 June 2025

#### I. STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION (ARTICLE 4)

1. At the close of the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties, two States Parties - **Greece** and **Ukraine** – were still implementing Article 4 of the Convention. The two states are in non-compliance with their Article 4 obligations, their four-year implementation deadline having expired on 1 March 2008 and 1 June 2010, respectively.
2. As of 1 June 2025, Greece had submitted updated information on stockpiled anti-personnel mines in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 7. Based on this information as well as previous reports, the following is understood to be the quantity of stockpiled anti-personnel mines destroyed and remaining to be destroyed as of 31 December 2024<sup>1</sup>:

State Party	Total number of anti-personnel mines destroyed	Total number of anti-personnel mines destroyed in 2024	Total number of anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed	Article 4 projected completion date
Greece	1,306,820	73,591	261,347	Not communicated <sup>2</sup>
Ukraine	3,438,948	0	3,364,433 <sup>3</sup>	Not communicated <sup>4</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,746,768</b>	<b>73,591</b>	<b>3,625,780</b>	

#### Information submitted by Greece on the implementation of Article 4

3. At the Fourth Review Conference, **Greece** indicated that complications emanating from environmental compliance issues caused the temporary pause of the demilitarization process of the remaining 343,413 stockpiled anti-personnel mines. At the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties (20MSP), Greece reported that the competent department of the Hellenic Army General Staff concluded a revised contract with the HDS company to put the destruction of the stockpiled anti-personnel mines back on track. The revised contract provides that the destruction of the remaining anti-personnel mines stockpile will take place at the installations of the new subcontractor of the HDS, namely the DEMIL-TECH company in Croatia, within a period of 18 months following the signature of the revised contract, notwithstanding of course any future unforeseen circumstances beyond Greece's control.
4. At the 18-20 June 2024 Intersessional Meetings, Greece further indicated that on 28 May

<sup>1</sup> Greece further reported the number of destroyed anti-personnel mines (see paragraph 6).

<sup>2</sup> At the 18-20 June 2024 Intersessional Meetings, Greece indicated that the sixth amendment to the contract between HDS and competent Department of the Hellenic Army General Staff foresees that the transportation and destruction of its remaining stockpiled antipersonnel mines will be completed by May 2025.

<sup>3</sup> Article 7 report submitted by Ukraine in 2024. Ukraine also indicated that if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines were stored were located in the territories occupied by Russia, or if they had been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines could be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and carrying out relevant inspections.

<sup>4</sup> In its Article 7 report submitted in 2023, Ukraine indicated that its stockpiled anti-personnel mines would be destroyed in accordance with Article 4 commitments after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.

2024, the sixth amendment to the contract for the destruction of the remaining stockpiled anti-personnel mines between Hellenic Defence Systems company (HDS) and the competent department of the Hellenic Army General Staff was signed. This amendment foresaw that the transportation and destruction of the remaining stockpiled anti-personnel mines at the installations of Demil-Tech company in Croatia would be concluded by the end of May 2025, notwithstanding circumstances beyond Greece's control.

5. At the Fifth Review Conference, Greece indicated that since July 2023, when the destruction process of Greece's anti-personnel mines stockpile was set back on track, 100,076 mines - representing 30% of Greece's stockpile - have been safely transferred to Demil Tech Company's facilities in Croatia for destruction. Greece underlined that, thus far, the destruction process and the transportation of the anti-personnel mines from the warehouses of the Hellenic Army General Staff, was proceeding smoothly and in a timely manner.
6. In information provided in 2025 in accordance with its Article 7 transparency obligations, Greece reported that 73,591 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in 2024 and that there were still 261,347 anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed. Further, Greece reported to the President on 16 May 2025 that 2,293 mines had been destroyed so far in 2025, and that the remaining number of anti-personnel mines for destruction stood at 259,054. Greece also informed that there had been delays in destruction schedule due to unforeseen events.

#### **Preliminary observations by the President on the information submitted by Greece**

7. The President recognizes the commitment of Greece to fully implement Article 4 and understands that impeding circumstances have unfortunately led to Greece not being able to meet its Article 4 deadline in 2008, and resulted in the country being in non-compliance with the provisions contained in this Article. The President also notes that Greece unfortunately remains in a situation of non-compliance, seventeen years after the expiration of its deadline. The President recognises that these circumstances have been beyond Greece's control and that it is clear that there has never been an intention by Greece to not fulfil its Article 4 obligations.
8. The President recognises that Greece has provided regular updated information on the situation and has been consistently transparent in this regard. The President notes that the report of increase in the number of destroyed mines (73,591 in 2024 compared to 8,475 in 2023) is a step in the right direction and encourages Greece to make further progress in its destruction programme. The President recalls the information communicated by Greece at the 2024 Intersessional Meetings, in which it was indicated that the destruction would be concluded by the end of May 2025. The President also notes the new information provided by Greece about unforeseen delays, and that no new timeline has yet been shared for the destruction of the remaining anti-personnel mines. The President notes the importance for Greece to keep the States Parties regularly informed, and to present by the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties a realistic, costed, time-bound plan with clear milestones for fulfilling Article 4 as soon as possible in accordance with Action 14 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan.

#### **Information submitted by Ukraine on the implementation of Article 4**

9. In information provided in its transparency report in 2023, Ukraine indicated that in 2022, the implementation of programmes to destroy stockpiled anti- personnel mines was suspended due to the ongoing full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation.

10. In information provided in its transparency report in 2024, **Ukraine** indicated that anti-personnel mines, the presence of which was declared by Ukraine as part of the implementation of Article 4 of the Convention, are in the warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and will be destroyed in accordance with the commitments made after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.
11. In information provided in its transparency report in 2024, Ukraine reported that 3,364,433 stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained to be destroyed as of 1 January 2024, including 3,363,828 PFM-type and 605 OZM-4 type mines which were left in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea occupied by the Russian Federation. Ukraine also indicated that if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or if they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and carrying out relevant inspections.
12. At the Fifth Review Conference, Ukraine indicated that the ammunition storages and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored had been under constant air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. In addition, some of them were located in the territories under the occupation of the Russian armed forces. Ukraine further indicated that there was no possibility, whatsoever, to conduct audit and verification of anti-personnel mines stockpiles. Ukraine indicated that there were also stockpiles on the territories that had been recently liberated by Ukrainian Armed Forces, however, the non-stable security situation did not allow Ukraine to audit these stockpiles.
13. Also at the Fifth Review Conference, Ukraine assured that the anti-personnel mines in the stockpiles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine declared by Ukraine as part of the implementation of Article 4 would be destroyed in accordance with the obligations after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

#### **Preliminary observations by the President on the information submitted by Ukraine**

14. The President notes that Ukraine has not provided updated information on the status of its stockpile destruction programme, including information on the total number and types of stockpiled anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed. Based on information previously submitted in 2023 and 2024, the President notes that the number of remaining stockpiled anti-personnel mines will be subject to a review once the situation allows.
15. The President notes that due to the ongoing aggression against Ukraine by Russia, progress in implementation of Article 4 by Ukraine is hampered, the stockpile destruction programme has been suspended, and a completion date is currently difficult to provide. The President encourages Ukraine to continue to inform on its challenges and explore all existing avenues for cooperation and assistance in this regard.

#### **Information provided by States Parties on destruction of previously unknown stockpiled anti-personnel mines**

16. Since the Fifth Review Conference, no State Party has provided information on the discovery of previously unknown stockpiled anti-personnel mines, in accordance with *Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan*, Action 15.
17. In 2020, **the Gambia** reported that, during the course of 2019, it had become aware of a

previously unknown stockpile of 3,000 anti-personnel mines. The President notes that since then no updated information has been provided by the Gambia on the progress made to destroy these anti-personnel mines in accordance with Action 15 of the *Siem Reap Angkor Action Plan*. The President notes that updated information on this matter would be welcome.

## II. RETENTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES (ARTICLE 3)

At the end of the Fifth Review Conference, it was recorded that 61 States Parties had reported, as required by Article 7, paragraph 1 d), anti-personnel mines retained for the development of training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques in accordance with Article 3.

- Since then, one State Party – **Angola** – has indicated that it no longer retains anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes. There are now 60 States Parties that have reported that they retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes (see table 1).

Since the Fifth Review Conference:

- 35 of the now 60 States Parties retaining anti-personnel mines under Article 3 (58%) submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7.
- The following 25 States Parties have not yet submitted a transparency report: Belarus, Burundi, Cameroon<sup>5</sup>, Cape Verde, Congo (Republic of), Cyprus, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Namibia, Romania, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zambia.
- The following State Party – Gambia – provided updated information at the Fifth Review Conference.
- The following 18 States Parties which have reported that they retain anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 3 have not submitted annual transparency information on their retained mines for two years or more since: Burundi (2021), Cape Verde (2009), Congo, Republic of (2009), Djibouti (2005), Eritrea (2014), Gambia (2020), Guyana (2021), Honduras (2007), Indonesia (2020), Italy (2023), Kenya (2021), Namibia (2010), Rwanda (2008), South Africa (2022), Tanzania (2009), Togo (2004), Venezuela (2012) and Zambia (2023).

### Information provided on retained anti-personnel mines (SRAAP Action 16)

As of 1 June 2025, it is understood that 60 States Parties retain a total of 115,078 stockpiled anti-personnel mines under Article 3 based on information provided in Article 7 reports submitted in 2025 or previously. This represents a decrease of 3,774 mines compared to the total reported retained in 2024.

In 2025:

- **12 States Parties** – Bangladesh, Bhutan, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Peru, Senegal, Spain, Türkiye, Zimbabwe – reported **no change in the number of anti-personnel mines retained** under Article 3.
- **20 States Parties** – Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Mauritania,

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<sup>5</sup> The report submitted by Cameroon in 2025 covered calendar year 2023.

Netherlands, Oman, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Tunisia – reported a **decrease in the number of anti-personnel mines retained** under Article 3.

- **2 States Parties** – Mozambique and Serbia – submitted an annual report but the reports did not contain information on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3.
- **One State Party** – Yemen – reported that it is not in a position to provide information on anti-personnel mines previously reported as retained under Article 3.
- **20 States Parties** – Bangladesh,<sup>6</sup> Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Greece, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Mauritania, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Türkiye and Zimbabwe - **provided voluntary information** on the use (and or planned use) of retained anti-personnel mines.
- **4 States Parties** - Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Japan and Zimbabwe - indicated that the number of anti-personnel mines they retain for permitted purposes under Article 3 **does not exceed the minimum number** absolutely necessary.
- **2 States Parties** – Senegal and Zimbabwe – indicated that they were currently **exploring available alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines** for training and research purposes or will be in the future.
- **2 States Parties** – Iraq and Japan – reported that they are **currently using or making efforts to use alternatives to live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes**. Japan reported that it was making efforts to replace the use of live mines by using simulated mines in some of training and Iraq reported that it had agreed to replace live explosive devices with inert (non-live) models in training programmes for demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.

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<sup>6</sup> Information provided at the Fifth Review Conference.

**Table 1: Anti-personnel mines reported retained by 60 States Parties<sup>7</sup> for purposes permitted by Article 3 of the Convention**

State Party	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Bangladesh			12050	12050	12050	12050	12050
Belarus	4505	4505		4492	4489	4489	
Belgium	2066	2044	2021	967	958	934	911
Bhutan				146			66
Bosnia and Herzegovina	834	834	834	unclear	817	817	803
Bulgaria	3318		3485		3445	3437	3416
Burundi			4				
Cambodia	1235	3730 <sup>8</sup>	927	1213	1298	1464	1056
Cameroon <sup>9</sup>						1885	
Canada <sup>10</sup>	1878	1649	1540	1491	1475	1475	1475
Cape Verde <sup>11</sup>							
Congo Brazzaville <sup>12</sup>							
Cote d'Ivoire							290
Croatia	4973	4851	3858	3766	3747	3636	3564
Cyprus	435	435	435	410	380	357	
Czech Republic	2180	2155	2155	2138	2102	1740	761
Denmark	1748	1736	1730	1702		1602	1547
Djibouti <sup>13</sup>							
Ecuador	90	90	90	90			30
Eritrea <sup>14</sup>							
Finland		15982	15851	15771	15665	15591	15509
France	3941	1842	1841	1771	1770	1777	1774
Gambia <sup>15</sup>		No info					
Germany	583	583	543	279	271	113	81
Greece	5599	5585	5570	5547	5527	5507	5497
Guyana			80				
Honduras <sup>16</sup>							
Indonesia	2148	2050					
Iraq	20	Unclear	Unclear	20	20	20	20
Ireland <sup>17</sup>	55	54	53	51	49	No info	41
Italy	617	617	563	563	563		
Japan	898	803	719	663	617	573	547
Jordan	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Kenya			3000				
Mali						600	600
Mauritania	728	728	728	658	658	658	628
Mozambique <sup>18</sup>	900		No info	No info	No info	No info	No info
Namibia <sup>19</sup>							

<sup>7</sup> Several States Parties report that they retain inert anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes. These States Parties are not included in the table as inert anti-personnel mines do not fit the Convention's definition of an anti-personnel mine.

<sup>8</sup> This number includes anti-personnel mines as well as other devices.

<sup>9</sup> In its report submitted in 2009, Cameroon indicated in Form B that 1,885 mines were held and in Form D that some thousands of mines were held for training purposes. In its report submitted for calendar year 2023, Cameroon indicated that the number of anti-personnel mines retained was unchanged.

<sup>10</sup> In 2022, Canada reported that 18 of the 1491 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 are without fuses.

<sup>11</sup> In its report submitted in 2009, Cape Verde indicated that it retains 120 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>12</sup> In its report submitted in 2009, Congo Brazzaville indicated that it retains 322 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>13</sup> In its report submitted in 2005, Djibouti indicated that it retains 2996 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>14</sup> In its reports submitted in 2013 and 2014, Eritrea indicated that 71 of the 101 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 were inert.

<sup>15</sup> In its report submitted in 2013, the Gambia indicated that it retains 100 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. While a report was submitted in 2020, it did not contain information on antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3. At the Fifth Review Conference, Gambia indicated that it retains 100 mines under Article 3.

<sup>16</sup> In its report submitted in 2007, Honduras indicated that it retains 815 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>17</sup> Ireland did submit a report in 2024 but no information was provided on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3.

<sup>18</sup> In its report submitted in 2018, Mozambique indicated that 90 of the 1355 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 are inert without explosive and detonator. In its report submitted in 2022, Mozambique indicated that the Defence and Interior Ministries have a certain number of guarded mines that are intended, solely and exclusively, for the instruction of the Defence and Security Forces.

<sup>19</sup> In its report submitted in 2010, Namibia indicated that it retains 1634 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

State Party	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Netherlands	889	868	270	270	204	204	170
Oman	No info	No info	2000				1970
Peru	2015	2015	1705	1330	956	482	482
Romania	2395	2249	2020		1836	1836	
Rwanda <sup>20</sup>							
Senegal <sup>21</sup>	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Serbia <sup>22</sup>	3134	No info	No info	3134	3134	No info	No info
Slovenia	272	256	249	229	229	219	
South Africa <sup>23</sup>			483				
Spain	1349	1357	1121	976	976	923	923
Sri Lanka	21153	20831	16718	14489	9825	7339	6121
Sweden	6009	6009	5964	5948	5173	5161	5041
Tanzania, United Rep. of <sup>24</sup>							
Togo <sup>25</sup>							
Tunisia	4405	4375		4341	4320		4282
Türkiye	9259	6552	6439	6357	5728	5719	5719
Uganda <sup>26</sup>					1660	1660	
Ukraine <sup>27</sup>	No info	No info	No info		No info	N/A	
Venezuela <sup>28</sup>							
Yemen <sup>29</sup>	No info	No info	No info	No info	No info	N/A	No info
Zambia	907			907	907		
Zimbabwe	450	450	450	450	450	450	450

	Report not received
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<sup>20</sup> In its report submitted in 2008, Rwanda indicated that 65 anti-personnel mines had been uprooted from minefields and retained for training purposes under Article 3.

<sup>21</sup> In its reports submitted since 2019, Senegal indicated that 14 of the 50 mines retained have been defused.

<sup>22</sup> In its report submitted in 2018, Serbia indicated that all fuses for 494 PMA-1 type and 540 PMA-3 type had been removed and destroyed. While Serbia submitted reports in 2020 and 2021, no updated information on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 was provided.

<sup>23</sup> In its report submitted in 2022, South Africa indicated that as of 31 December 2020 it retained 483 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>24</sup> In its report submitted in 2009, the United Republic of Tanzania indicated that it retains 1780 anti-personnel mines under Article 3, including 830 deactivated anti-personnel mines.

<sup>25</sup> In its report submitted in 2004, Togo indicated that it retains 436 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>26</sup> In its report submitted in 2012, Uganda indicated that it retains 1764 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>27</sup> In its report submitted in 2013, Ukraine indicated that it retains 605 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. In its report submitted in 2023, Ukraine indicated “did not save” when reporting on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3.

<sup>28</sup> In its report submitted in 2012, Venezuela indicated that it retains 4874 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

<sup>29</sup> In its Article 7 report submitted in 2017, Yemen indicated that it retains 3760 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. In its Article 7 reports submitted in the period 2020-2022, Yemen indicated that before 2014 Yemen submitted information about quantity and types of anti-personnel mines for permitted purpose in accordance with Article 3 after that Yemen did not use any anti-personnel mines for training and research activities. Under the current operating procedures forced upon YEMAC by the current conflicts, at any given time there are several AP mines (and AP mines of an improvised nature) held at YEMC storage locations whilst awaiting destruction. This is caused by the lack of access to explosives or other means to destroy items in place and the need to conduct large scale demolitions once coordination with relative contacts and approval of access to explosives besides burning items such as thermite is allowed. The numbers and types vary and are kept only for so long as it takes to organise their destruction. The conflict created a complex environment and currently Yemen is not performing any plan of development of mine detection, detection techniques for further training of the use of mines retained under Article 3. In its report submitted in 2023, Yemen indicated that since the fourth review conference and because the conflict the fate of the Anti-personnel mines retained is unknown because of the control of militias in Sanaa and there are no changes or updates on this matter. In its report submitted in 2025, Yemen indicated that before 2014, Yemen submitted its Article 7 report about the quantity and types of anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes in accordance with Article 3, which there is no info on these mines due to the Houthis control in Sana'a, and there are no changes or updates on this matter.

**Table 2: States Parties which have reported that they no longer retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes**

<b>State Party</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2025</b>
Angola	1304	1304	1304	1304	536	511	0



**Table 3: Siem Reap Angkor Action Plan Reporting**

Siem Reap Angkor Action Plan Reporting Stockpile destruction and retention of anti-personnel mines							
Actions	Indicators		2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
#13	1	% the percentage of States Parties implementing Article 4 that report having a realistic, costed, and time-bound plan in place that includes clear milestones for the fulfilment of Article 4 as soon as possible	0				
	2	% the percentage of States Parties implementing Article 4 that report on aligning their destruction methods with international standards for the protection of public health and the environment	0				
	3	% the percentage of States Parties with stockpile destruction obligations that report on the status of such mines in accordance with Article 7	0				
#14	1	% the percentage of States Parties that have failed to meet their stockpile destruction deadline that report having in place a realistic, costed, and time-bound plan with clear milestones for fulfilling Article 4 as soon as possible	0				
	2	% the percentage of States Parties that have failed to meet their stockpile destruction deadline that report on progress and remaining challenges in implementation	50 <sup>30</sup>				
	3	% the percentage of States Parties that have failed to meet their stockpile destruction deadline that report on securing and accounting of stockpiled anti-personnel mines	50 <sup>31</sup>				
#15	1	Number of States Parties that report the discovery of previously unknown stockpiles	0 <sup>32</sup>				
	2	% the percentage of these States Parties that destroy these anti-personnel mines within six months of their discovery	0				
#16	1	% the percentage of States Parties that retain antipersonnel mines retained for permitted purposes which report on annual reviews of these mines	6 <sup>33</sup>				
	2	% the percentage of States Parties that retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes which report on the current, planned use, and destruction of these mines	33 <sup>34</sup>				
	3	% the percentage of States Parties that report exploring alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines <sup>35</sup>	6 <sup>36</sup>				

<sup>30</sup> Greece.

<sup>31</sup> Greece.

<sup>32</sup> The Gambia reported the identification of previously unknown stockpiled mines in 2020 but has not reported on their destruction.

<sup>33</sup> Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Japan and Zimbabwe

<sup>34</sup> Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Greece, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Mauritania, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Türkiye and Zimbabwe.

<sup>35</sup> In 2020, 2021 and 2022, Iraq, Slovenia, Sudan and Zimbabwe reported efforts to explore alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes. In 2023 and 2024, Iraq and Zimbabwe reported on efforts to explore alternatives.

<sup>36</sup> Iraq, Japan, Senegal and Zimbabwe.

## Annex I: Stockpile Destruction (Article 4) Background Information

The destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines is an obligation covered by Article 4 of the Convention which requires each State Party to “destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after entry into force of the Convention for that State Party”.

In the *Siem Reap Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029*, States Parties committed to a number of actions related to the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. In addition, the Fifth Review Conference appealed to States Parties which are in non-compliance with their Article 4 obligations to intensify efforts for the completion of their stockpile destruction obligations.

- **Action 13** Following the entry into force of the Convention, develop a **realistic, costed and time-bound plan with clear milestones for the fulfilment of Article 4 as soon as possible** and within deadline, regularly **inform States Parties on progress made and remaining challenges** in implementation, report on the status of such mines in accordance with Article 7, and ensure that destruction methods align with international standards for the protection of public health and the environment.
- **Action 14 States Parties that have failed to meet their stockpile destruction deadline** and are therefore in non-compliance with Article 4 **will present, by the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties, a realistic, costed, and time-bound plan with clear milestones for fulfilling Article 4 as soon as possible**, report on the status of such mines in accordance with Article 7, urgently proceed with implementation in a transparent and environmentally responsible manner and regularly inform States Parties on progress and remaining challenges.
- **Action 15 States Parties that discover previously unknown stockpiles**, including stockpiles of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, **will inform the President of their discovery and plans for the destruction of these stockpiled anti-personnel mines as soon as possible**, and ensure their destruction as a matter of urgent priority, in an environmentally responsible manner in accordance with the Convention and in line with IMAS, no later than six months after their discovery.

**As part of the transparency measures** which exist under Article 7 of the Convention, each year, no later than 30 April, States Parties shall provide updated information on a number of matters including on:

- the **total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed** by them, or under their jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
- the **status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines** in accordance with Articles 4, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
- the **types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed** after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4.

## **Annex II: Retention of Anti-Personnel Mines (Article 3) Background Information**

Article 3 of the Convention permits States Parties “the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine detection techniques. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

In the *Siem Reap Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029*, States Parties committed to the following action related to the retention of anti-personnel mines:

- **Action 16** Annually review the number of anti-personnel mines retained for permitted purposes under Article 3 to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary, destroy as soon as possible all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number, report annually on their use and planned use and on their destruction. Explore alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines, and report annually on all of these efforts.

**As part of the transparency measures** which exist under Article 7 of the Convention, each year, no later than 30 April, States Parties shall provide updated information on:

- The **types, quantities** and, if possible, **lot numbers** of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the **institutions authorized** by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3 (Article 7.1.d).