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The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and has the honour to refer to Sudan's obligations under Article 5 of the Convention. In this regard, the Permanent Mission has the honour to transmit herewith Sudan's request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline. The request has been duly prepared in accordance with the Convention's procedures and is kindly submitted for consideration.

Sudan is requesting a two-year extension, from **1 April 2027 to 31 March 2029**, due to the significant transformation of the explosive ordnance contamination landscape following the ongoing war. Large areas remain unsurveyed and are believed to contain extensive UXO, anti-personnel, and anti-vehicle mines, while insecurity and limited access prevent reliable assessment. The conflict has also severely affected the national mine action sector, including losses in personnel, equipment, and operational capacity.

In light of the above, Sudan requires additional time to rebuild institutional and operational capacity, re-establish mine action coordination and operational hubs, and undertake systematic and evidence-based survey activities to establish an accurate baseline for contamination and clearance planning. Sudan intends to adopt a phased and adaptive approach during the requested extension period, prioritizing the scaling up of survey activities, supporting humanitarian access, and ensuring flexible, context-responsive planning in a rapidly evolving operational environment.

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the Implementation Support Unit could kindly circulate the attached request to States Parties and facilitate its consideration in accordance with established procedures.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Implementation Support Unit of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention the assurances of its highest consideration.


Geneva, 31 March 2026

To: **The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) - Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC) Geneva**

The Republic of Sudan



REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE FOR COMPLETING THE DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES IN MINED AREAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 5 PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION.

An Extension Request for Two Years (April 2027 to April 2029)

**Submission Date
March 2026**

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1. Executive Summary

1.1. Introduction

Over the past decades, the Republic of Sudan has experienced numerous wars and armed conflicts that have resulted in the widespread contamination of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) across most of the country's states. This contamination has had severe humanitarian, economic, and security impacts, including loss of life, amputations, population displacement, disruption of development projects, and hindered return of displaced persons, in addition to the deterioration of livelihoods in affected areas.

Sudan joined the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Convention) on 4 December 1997, ratified it on 13 October 2003, with the Convention entering into force for Sudan on 1 April 2004. Sudan has undertaken its commitment to humanitarian principles and remains intent on fulfilling all obligations under the Convention, including mine clearance, stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and risk education. Since joining, Sudan has made significant progress, clearing large contaminated areas, and providing support to thousands of beneficiaries through awareness and humanitarian assistance programs.

In 2022, Sudan submitted a request for extension of its 1 April 2023 deadline to complete implementation of its mine clearance commitments under Article 5 until 1 April 2027. This request was subsequently granted by the Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties. Sudan was on track to meet its obligations; however, the outbreak of the recent war in April 2023 reshaped the operational landscape, leading to contamination in new states, restricted access to previously cleared areas, increased civilian casualties, and disruption of some clearance and risk education activities.

Consequently, Sudan will intensify its efforts in the remaining period of its deadline, beginning with;

- Accurately assessing the current threat through technical and information surveys,
- Developing comprehensive, practical plans to clear new mines and remnants of war
- Prioritizing humanitarian needs.

1.2. National Efforts and Partnerships

The National Mine Action Center (NMAC) leads and coordinates all mine action activities in Sudan as the officially mandated governmental authority by decision of the Sovereignty Council. Its responsibilities include planning, surveying, clearance, risk education, victim assistance, and ensuring Sudan's compliance with its international obligations under the Ottawa Convention.

Despite complex security conditions, NMAC continues to operate in collaboration with the National Committee for Mine Action and local and international partners, including:

- Conducting survey and clearance operations in accessible safe areas.
- Continuing risk education programs in accessible areas.
- Providing victim support, referral services, and rehabilitation.
- Enhancing coordination with all relevant stakeholders to facilitate access and information exchange.
- Developing a new national plan that addresses humanitarian and early recovery priorities.



1.2.1. Estimated scale of the problem

At the start of the current war in Sudan the level of contamination was assessed to be approximately 33.9 million square meters, with Sudan making huge progress towards the land release of Explosive Ordnance (EO) in the south and west of the country. Utilising a combination of open source data, local reporting and hazard area reports it is now estimated that the contaminated area totals approx. 55.2 million square meters¹ (as of 30 November 2025), an addition of 21.3 million square meters centred around dense population centres; further exacerbating the complexity of the problem.




Fig 1.1: Map of Hazard Areas from previous conflicts Fig 1.2: Map of estimated new hazardous areas based on conflict incidents

The contamination consists of:

- Anti-Personnel (AP) mines
- Anti-Tank/Anti-Vehicle (AT/AV) mines (including those with minimal metal content)
- A limited quantity of cluster munitions (from previous conflicts)
- Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), which includes Air-Dropped Weapons (ADW) and Guided Weapons (GW)
- Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO)

Due to the ongoing conflict access to these areas is severely impeded while the EO contamination continues to grow. Based on the areas of control it is assessed that the total accessible contaminated area is 20.5 million square meters (as of 30 November 2025) or 36.5%.

Contamination type	Total Contamination (MSqm / SqKM)	Accessible Contamination (MSqm / SqKM)	Percentage accessible
Legacy Contamination	33.9	5.1	14.8%
Est. New Contamination	21.3	15.5	72.4%
Total estimated contamination	55.2	20.5	36.52%

Table 1.1: Estimated contamination and access to it as of 30 November 2025.

¹ This figure has been calculated by combining estimated contamination from SHAs and CHAs with the estimated contamination from the on-going war, based on conflict incidents from open source data. An assumption has been made that where conflict incidents have occurred there will be some residual EO contamination. Areas where relevant conflict data of Airstrikes, Artillery Bombardments, Drone Strikes and other incidents that relate to large calibre munitions (above 25mm) have been included with a clearance radius of 50m in line with SNMAS. Every effort has been made to remove overlapping conflict points and their associated clearance area.



1.2.2. New Minefields and Contamination

The work by the Government of Sudan to remove the hazards has had to adapt dramatically since the start of the most recent war. Widespread UXO contamination including modern systems such as loiter munitions and drone deployed munitions litter high density urban areas. The mine action sector in Sudan which now includes 11 national partners and 1 international partner has had to quickly adapt to meet the new EO environment. The recent confirmation of 7 new minefields in urban areas (AP and/or AT/AV) increases the complexity due to being in close proximity to civilian areas (in some cases within 2 metres of major access routes) and also in areas with high metal contamination from conflict.



Fig. 1.3: No. 4 AP Mine found in Al Mogran Minefield



Fig 1.4: TM 46 AT/AV mine found in Al Mogran Minefield

The Al-Mogran minefield is a prime example of this. A mixed minefield located alongside the primary route into Khartoum city and in a family park / recreational area. It has unfortunately already taken limbs from two victims which led to its discovery and sits in a location which leaves the population exposed to a high risk. Heavy fighting took place in buildings (including high rise structures) and land around the minefield, posing additional hazards from UXO. This highly complex setting is commonplace in Sudan and enforces the need for quality equipment, complemented by excellent training of extraordinary teams across the entire estimated 55 million square metres.

1.3 Progress in Land Release and Operational Achievements

Between April 2023 and November 2025 , Sudan released one anti-personnel (AP) mined area totalling 2,728,772 m² (1,716,268 m² cleared; 1,012,504 m² cancelled). Survey and clearance operations across eight states (Al Jazirah, South Kordofan, White Nile, North Kordofan, Blue Nile, Khartoum, Red Sea, and Sennar) addressed 17 SHAs and 333 CHAs, releasing 8,213,791 m². Since 2002, the national programme has reduced 5,026 of 5,541 recorded hazards (91%).

1.4 Key Constraints Impeding Compliance

- **Ongoing Civil War.** Active conflict has generated an estimated 13 million people at risk from EO and more than 8,176 conflict events that may have produced new contamination.
- **Limited Access.** Only 36.5% of suspected hazardous areas are currently accessible due to insecurity, shifting frontlines, and long-term isolation of some SAF-controlled zones.
- **Political Fragmentation.** Unrecognized governance structures in non-SAF areas prevent mine action activities in large parts of the country, limiting national coverage and partner access.

- **Loss of Equipment and Supply Constraints.** Rapid evacuations in April 2023 resulted in near-total loss of mine action equipment. Reconstitution has been hampered by global export restrictions on dual-use items.
- **Human Resource Challenges.** The conflict disrupted staffing pipelines and reduced availability of qualified technical personnel for survey, clearance, and risk education.
- **Information Management Disruption.** The national server holding almost 20 years of mine action data was lost during evacuation. Partial, fragmented backups require expert consolidation. Widespread GPS spoofing currently limits the use of IMSMA Core field tools. GICHD is being engaged to lead data restoration, while UNMAS provides system licensing support.
- **Funding Instability.** The funding crisis caused operational pauses and inefficiencies. The vastly expanded contamination, estimated at 55 million m² requiring urgent survey, demands immediate reassessment of priorities, methodology, and resource requirements.
- **Climatic Constraints.** Sudan's rainy season restricts operations to roughly nine months per year due to impassable terrain, lack of infrastructure, and extreme temperatures affecting productivity.

1.5 Humanitarian, Economic, Social, and Environmental Implications

- **Mine Action as a Foundation for Recovery.** Mine action is essential for safe returns, enabling humanitarian aid, reconstruction, market function, and restoration of essential services. It supports economic revitalization and creates employment opportunities, particularly for women and youth.
- **Operational Priorities and Focus on Khartoum.** Khartoum remains the most heavily contaminated and is central to return dynamics. Clearance and EORE there generate immediate, large-scale impact. As access improves, neighbouring states will become priorities.
- **Conflict- and Gender-Sensitive Approaches.** Sudan's mine action programme integrates gender, disability inclusion, and accountability to affected populations. Field teams' long-term presence in communities enables critical data collection for broader humanitarian planning.
- **Economic and Livelihood Impacts.** EO kills, injures, and disables civilians, drives long-term poverty, restricts access to agricultural land and natural resources, blocks infrastructure development, and reduces mobility and market access. These effects collectively undermine national economic security.
- **Socio-Economic Impacts on Displaced and Rural Populations.** Landmines prolong displacement, burden urban areas, and severely hinder rural livelihoods reliant on agriculture and livestock. Anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and ERW all contribute to food insecurity and reduced resilience.
- **Environmental Impacts.** Contamination contributes to soil degradation, loss of biodiversity, and reduced agricultural productivity. Clearance operations also carry environmental risks, mitigated through strict adherence to national and international standards, environmental policies, and SOPs.
- **Need for Comprehensive, Multi-Hazard Survey and Clearance.** The interrelated threats posed by AP mines, AT mines, and ERW hinder recovery, peacebuilding, and development. A comprehensive survey and clearance approach is essential for enabling safe movement, restoring productivity, and supporting long-term stability.



1.6 The Remaining Challenge

Sudan's remaining Article 5 challenge has expanded dramatically due to the recent conflict, with both legacy contamination and vast new, unsurveyed hazardous areas across multiple states. Current verified contamination includes 114 AP-mine hazardous areas covering 13.5 million m², primarily in South Kordofan and Blue Nile; 57 AT/AV mine areas totalling 13.53 million m²; and 191 344 ERW-affected areas covering 12.4 million m². However, these figures represent only a fraction of the problem. Newly estimated contamination from conflict incidents is projected at 21.3 million m², of which 15.5 million m² is currently accessible. In total, Sudan is estimated to contain 55.2 million m² of EO contamination, yet only 36.5% of this (20.5 million m²) is presently accessible for assessment or operations. This dramatic increase; combined with shifting frontlines, degraded access, and the collapse of national mine-action infrastructure; has created a highly complex operational environment. Urban centres, multi-storey buildings, agricultural land, grazing areas, and critical infrastructure are all affected, requiring specialised expertise and significant capacity expansion. Survey and clearance activities will prioritise infrastructure, key supply routes, and locations critical for humanitarian access and food security, supporting the restoration of basic services and enabling broader recovery and peacebuilding efforts. These factors collectively justify Sudan's request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline, allowing time to rebaseline the national contamination picture, rebuild operational capacity, and develop a credible, evidence-based plan for future compliance.

Confirmed (CHA) and Suspected (SHA) Hazard areas containing AP mines by number and size						
State	Number of CHAs (No.)	Area of CHAs (Sqm)	Number of SHAs (No.)	Area of SHAs (Sqm)	Total Number of HAs (No.)	Total Area of HAs (Sqm)
Blue Nile	13	1,014,168	9	118,432	22	1,132,600
South Kordofan	57	2,485,298	30	9,822,666	87	12,307,964
West Kordofan	0	0	3	21,991	3	21,991
Khartoum	2	68,151	0	0	2	68,151
Total	72	3,567,617	42	9,963,089	114	13,530,706

Table 1.2: Hazardous Areas by state containing AP mines

1.7 Requested time for the extension

Sudan is requesting a two-year extension to its Article 5 deadline (1 April 2027–31 March 2029) due to the profound transformation of the EO landscape following the recent conflict. Large areas remain unsurveyed and are believed to contain extensive UXO, AP mines, and AT/AV mines, while shifting frontlines and limited access prevent reliable assessment of contamination. Only a fraction of affected land, such as 0.86% of Khartoum State, has been surveyed, and current estimates rely largely on anecdotal or open-source information. The conflict also caused a near-collapse of the mine action sector, with major losses in personnel, equipment, and operational infrastructure. Sudan therefore requires additional time to rebuild capacity, re-establish operational hubs, and conduct systematic surveys to rebaseline its Article 5 obligations. A phased and adaptive approach will be adopted to scale up survey, support humanitarian access, and allow flexible, evidence-based planning in a rapidly changing environment.



1.8 Financial Resources and Funding Challenges

Sudan's mine action programme received USD 27.9 million between 2019–2023 and USD 45.4 million in projected and confirmed funding for the current extension period (2023–2025). However, severe USA funding cuts in 2025 nearly collapsed the programme, which survived only through urgent interventions from Canada, SHF, CERF, the EU, and the UK. Emergency funds have largely supported life-saving operations and humanitarian access rather than long-term clearance. The new scale of contamination, far beyond prior assumptions, requires substantial revisions to financial planning and capacity expansion.

1.9 Summary

Sudan's operational environment for mine action has been fundamentally reshaped by the war that began in April 2023, leading to a dramatic expansion of explosive ordnance (EO) contamination across multiple states. The estimated contaminated area has increased from 33.9 million m² before the conflict to 55.2 million m² as of November 2025, with only 36.5% currently accessible. Verified contamination includes 114 AP-mine hazard areas (13.53 million m²), 57 AT/AV-mine areas (13.53 million m²), and 344 ERW-affected areas (12.4 million m²), alongside newly estimated contamination totalling 21.3 million m². The conflict caused major setbacks: loss of data systems, personnel, equipment, and operational hubs; restricted access due to shifting frontlines; and the emergence of complex urban contamination requiring new capabilities and standards.

Despite these challenges, the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) continues to coordinate survey, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance with national and international partners, releasing over 8.2 million m² during 2023–2025 and reducing 91% of recorded hazards since 2002. However, the scale, nature, and location of new contamination, especially in dense urban areas such as Khartoum, require urgent rebaselining, expanded capacity, specialised equipment, and sustained humanitarian access.

To re-establish a credible understanding of the Article 5 challenge and rebuild operational capacity, Sudan requests a two-year extension (1 April 2027–31 March 2029). This period will allow the country to conduct systematic survey, reconstruct its mine action infrastructure, and develop an evidence-based plan for full compliance. Funding remains a critical constraint: although USD 16.6 million has been secured for 2023–2026, global cuts, especially from USAID, have caused operational pauses and inefficiencies. Substantial new investment is required to address the expanded contamination and support safe return, humanitarian delivery, and early recovery across Sudan.



2. Detailed Narrative

2.1. Origins of the Article 5 implementation challenge

The contamination of anti-personnel mines as well as other explosive ordnance is the inevitable result of the prolonged series of conflicts jolted Sudan since 1955. The nature and extent of Sudan's original challenge has been described in detail in Sudan's previous requests.

After years of protracted crisis, the violence that broke out in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has triggered a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, including over 28,700 fatalities and over 14 million displacements thus far, with fighting continuing. The extensive use of explosive weaponry has left the country with a new and extensive layer of explosive ordnance (EO) contamination. This is in addition to 34 square kilometers of legacy EO contamination that remained to be cleared from previous conflicts over the past decades. EO is impacting critical infrastructure (electricity and water points), major supply lines (roads, airstrips), essential services (schools, medical facilities, markets), within communities (homes, shops) and within humanitarian facilities (offices and warehouses). Each day the conflict continues, it adds another layer of explosive contamination across Sudan, deepening the humanitarian crisis and impeding long-term recovery efforts in Sudan.

2.2. Nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects

The quantitative scale of Sudan's remaining contamination challenge according to the latest verified Information Management data :

- Anti-Personnel Mines:
 - 72 CHAs covering 3,567,617 m²
 - 42 SHAs covering 9,963,089 m²
 - 114 hazardous areas covering 13,530,706 m²
- Anti-Tank / Anti-Vehicle Mines:
 - 28 CHAs covering 1,931,047 m²
 - 29 SHAs covering 11,606,184 m²
 - 57 hazardous areas covering 13,537,231 m²
- Explosive Ordnance (EO):
 - 247 CHAs covering 10,158,769 m²
 - 97 SHAs covering 2,221,854 m²
 - 344 hazardous areas covering 12,380,623 m².

In addition to confirmed contamination, the Sudan Mine Action Programme has estimated 21.6 km² of new potential EO contamination based on open-source conflict data, historical weapon system failure rates, and incident analysis. When combined with legacy contamination, the total estimated contamination currently reaches approximately 54.7 km², of which 20.5 km² (36.5%) is currently accessible for humanitarian mine action operations. This analysis demonstrates that Sudan continues to face a large, complex, and evolving contamination challenge, requiring systematic survey and prioritised clearance over the coming years.



2.3. Nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge: qualitative aspects

The Republic of Sudan has been plagued by a devastating civil war for nearly sixty-two years. Specific details of Sudan's original Article 5 challenge can be found in its previous requests. However, it is worth considering and emphasising specific aspects of this origin as it remains impactful today.

Sudan's progress in addressing its Article 5 obligations during the period, 2014-2018, is well documented in detail in its second extension request. What is given below is part of the key actions undertaken by Sudan during this period. During the period 2002 – 2007, several surveys, including non-technical survey/General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) and Technical Survey (TA) methods, were carried out by the Swiss Demining Federation (FSD) to identify Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHA). In 2002, The Danish Church Aid (DCA) in coordination with UNMAS conducted a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) using mixed survey teams in GoS and SPLM/A areas of the region. These surveys presented sufficient evidence to launch further humanitarian work. In 2004, a joint series of socio-economic impact surveys were carried out by Landmines Action/ Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI) in collaboration with UNMAS in 75 villages throughout the Nuba Mountains.

It should be noted that Sudan's original Article 5 implementation challenge was partly identified through a series of Landmine Impact Surveys conducted between 2002-2009 resulting in 221 locations measuring 1,985,815,911 square metres (identified to be contaminated with mines and or ERW). This included 150 minefields measuring 20,761,022 square metres.

With progress in survey and clearance, Sudan, in its 2013 extension request indicated an Article 5 implementation challenge of 120 mined areas measuring 24,716,510 square metres, including 58 confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) measuring 2,937,264 square metres and 62 suspect hazardous areas (SHA) measuring 21,779,246 square metres.

2.4. Methods used to identify areas containing AP mines and reasons for suspecting the presence of AP mines in other areas

Information on the level of anti-personnel mines and ERW contamination in Sudan has been collected through one or more of the following key methods:

1. Non-Technical Survey.
2. Assessment missions to the rural areas.
3. Accidents caused by the type of EO including APM or ATM or ERW.
4. Reports from IDPs, returnees and local communities, which are then substantiated by survey activities.
5. Military records.
6. Information collected by EORE teams and clearance organizations.

To estimate the scale of new contamination resulting from the ongoing conflict, the National Mine Action Center (NMAC), in collaboration with UNMAS information management specialists, developed a data-driven estimation methodology combining several sources. This methodology includes:

- Open-source conflict data, particularly incident reports from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).
- Historical weapon system failure rates, applied to reported conflict events involving explosive weapons.



- Existing mine action databases, including confirmed and suspected hazardous areas.
- Geospatial analysis, used to remove overlapping conflict points and previously recorded hazardous areas.

This approach allows the programme to generate preliminary estimates of potential contamination zones, particularly in areas where direct survey access remains impossible due to security constraints. Field verification missions conducted in newly accessible areas, such as central Khartoum, have confirmed that contamination levels may exceed initial estimates. For example, a single recorded mortar attack incident corresponded in reality to 10–15 separate impact points, highlighting the potential scale of unexploded ordnance contamination. Therefore, these estimates should be considered dynamic and subject to revision as additional survey data becomes available.

2.5. National demining structures

2.5.1 The National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

The National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) was established in 2005 to work in partnership with the United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in Sudan. Its mandate is to ensure a safe environment for communities, enabling economic, social, and development free from the constraints of landmine and explosive ordnance contamination, while addressing the needs of victims. NMAC is responsible for monitoring Sudan’s compliance with the Ottawa Convention and other relevant mine action treaties. It also develops and implements national mine action strategies through its sub-offices across the country.

In July 2007, three sub-offices were established in Kassala, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile states to strengthen NMAC’s operational presence in partnership with UNMAO. Together, to coordinate, plan and manage the operations and quality until UNMAO’s departure in June 2011. NMAC set up four sub-offices in Darfur states (North - El Fasher, West - El Geneina, Central - Zallengei, South/East - Nyala), working alongside the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In June 2020, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) began supporting mine action as part of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS).

The outbreak of conflict in April 2023 disrupted operations: NMAC staff were dispersed, and its Khartoum offices were looted. By April 2024, the Centre had re-established offices in Port Sudan, Omdurman and Al Gezira with a plan to open an additional office in North Kordofan before the end of the extension period. From these offices, NMAC coordinates and oversees all mine action activities, which include:

1. Ensuring inclusive participation and representation of all stakeholders.
2. Developing comprehensive national mine action plans aligned with social and development priorities.
3. Managing information systems, including data collection, analysis, and dissemination through IMSMA.
4. Integrating all mine action pillars—risk education, victim assistance, clearance, advocacy, and stockpile reduction—into a coherent national program.
5. Supporting and coordinating resource mobilization efforts.
6. Developing and enforcing technical standards, safety protocols, quality assurance, and quality management procedures.



2.5.2 National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established under Presidential Decree No. 299 on 24 December 2005 and officially launched in Khartoum on 7 March 2006, in a ceremony attended by the President of the Republic. Following the Decree, the National Mine Action Policy Framework was developed, endorsed by the High National Mine Action Committee, and approved by the Council of Ministers of the Government of National Unity (GoNU) on 6 August 2006.

Chaired by the Minister of Defence and comprising other line ministries, the NMAA convenes annually to review progress, assess challenges, and provide recommendations to the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC). With support from the United Nations, the NMAA is mandated to ensure mine action is coordinated in line with international standards and integrated into national development priorities. This includes the formulation of policies, establishment of standards, and enactment of legislation governing all mine action aspects.




Figure 2.1 - National Mine Action Structure

To enable national ownership, a Transition Plan for the transfer of mine action management from the UN to NMAC was developed during a joint NMAC–UNMAS workshop held in Nairobi on 18 November 2008. Under this plan, UNMAS focused on capacity development for NMAC staff through peer-to-peer learning and on-the-job training. Core functions—planning, tasking, and quality management—were conducted jointly until June 2011, when the transition was completed and NMAC assumed full responsibility, with limited UN support.

As part of this process, the Government of Sudan enacted the Sudan Mine Action Law in 2010, aligning national legislation with the Ottawa Treaty. The law introduced penalties for violations of the Convention’s provisions and provided NMAC with the legal framework to address transition challenges effectively.

In 2014, following the withdrawal of UNMAO, UNDP temporarily led UN support to mine action in Sudan. However, UNDP re-oriented its mandate later that year. As a result of sustained government engagement, UNMAS resumed operations in April 2015, to provide technical assistance to NMAC, mobilizing resources for land release, risk education (EORE), and victim assistance (VA), and supporting Sudan in fulfilling its Article 5 obligations under the Ottawa Treaty and other international



commitments. UNMAS continues to strengthen capacity, enhance coordination of mine action, and facilitate donor contributions to ensure Sudan’s compliance with its treaty obligations and to address both existing contamination and residual risk. In reaffirming the high consideration Sudan’s officials being given to mine action program, is the on regular-basis field sessions convened in Mine Action Centre by the Ministerial Council – the supreme executive power in the country - to give contemplating pause and cast lights on mine action projects and activities, get acquainted with progress as well as challenges encountered and work to find solution to persistent problems and smoothen the rough edges confronted by the program in the course to realize the announced goal ‘Sudan free from mines’.

Following the outbreak of armed conflict in Sudan on 15 April 2023, the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) experienced significant institutional challenges, including the loss of several administrative and technical personnel due to death, detention, and displacement. Among those affected were the Chief of Operations, who passed away at the onset of the conflict, IMSMA officer who was detained, and the Technical Advisor who left the country. Despite these challenges, NMAC has taken steps to maintain operational continuity by assigning experienced personnel to assume key technical and managerial responsibilities and initiating the recruitment of new staff to strengthen institutional capacity and ensure the continued implementation of mine action activities.

2.6. Nature and extent of progress made: quantitative aspects

2.6.1 Since the previous extension request

During the period of the extension request (1 April 2023 - 30 November 2025) Sudan released a total of 1 AP mined areas measuring a total of 2,728,772 square metres, including 1,012,504 square metres cancelled through non-technical survey, and 1,716,268 cleared. As a result, Sudan identified and destroyed 13 anti-personnel mines. The land was handed over to the local communities in the states Blue Nile, Red Sea, Khartoum and Sennar.

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Year	Number of areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines	Cancelled area (sqm)	Reduced area (sqm)	Cleared area (sqm)	Total area released (sqm)	Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed
2023	0	0	0	0	0	0
2024	0	0	0	21,500	21,500	0
2025	1	1,012,504	0	1,694,768	2,707,272	13
Total	1	1,012,504	0	1,716,268	2,728,772	13

Table 2.1: Area released by Year, 1 April 2023 – 30 November 2025



Through survey and clearance operations including spot EOD tasks, APM and AT/AVM clearance throughout Al Jazeera, North Kordofan, Blue Nile, Khartoum, Red Sea, South Kordofan, White Nile and Sennar states Sudan addressed 17 SHAs and 333 CHAs measuring a total of 8,213,791 square meters. Since the beginning of the programme in 2002 the Sudan mine action programme has succeeded in reducing 5,026 hazard areas out of overall total of 5,541 (91%), with more than 10,416 anti personnel mines have been destroyed, and an area of 146,309,162 square metres has been cleared.

During the operational period from 1 April 2023 to 30 November 2025 the Sudan Mine Action Programme destroyed a total of 13 Anti-Personnel Mines (APM), 23 Anti-Tank Mines (ATM), 30,199 Unexploded Ordnance (ERW) and 62,716 Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) in the States (South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Northern Kordofan, White Nile, Red Sea, Al Jazeera, Khartoum and Sennar), as given in table below.

State	Cancelled area (sqm)	Reduced area (sqm)	Cleared area (sqm)	Total area released (sqm)	Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed	Number of anti-tank mines destroyed	Number of SAA destroyed	Number of UXO items destroyed
Blue Nile	0	0	100	100	0	1	66	67
Khartoum	1,002,504	0	1,690,962	2,693,466	13	5	49,228	24,489
Red Sea	0	0	25,206	25,206	0	1	380	12
Sennar	10,000	0	0	10,000	0	1	2,788	1,597
Al Jazeera	0	0	0	0	0	13	9,449	2,817
Northern Kordofan	0	0	0	0	0	0	64	707
South Kordofan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25
White Nile	0	0	6,210	6,210	0	2	741	485
Total	1,012,504	0	1,716,268	2,728,772	13	23	62,716	30,199

Table 2.2: Land Release Progress by State, 1 April 2023 – 30 November 2025

Year	Cancelled area (sqm)	Reduced area (sqm)	Cleared area (sqm)	Total area released (sqm)	Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed	Number of anti-tank mines destroyed	Number of SAA destroyed	Number of UXO items destroyed
2023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2024	0	0	21,500	21,500	0	0	22,768	7,783
2025	1,012,504	0	1,694,768	2,707,272	13	23	39,948	22,416



Total	1,012,504	0	1,716,268	2,728,772	13	23	62,716	30,199
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Table 2.3: Areas released, APM/ATM devices destroyed, 1 Jan 2023 – 30 Nov 2025

2.6.2 Since Sudan's article 5 commitment

During the operational period from 2002 to 2025 the Sudan Mine Action Programme destroyed a total of 10,416 Anti-Personnel Mines (APM), 3,440 Anti-Tank Mines (ATM), 204,833 items of Unexploded Ordnance (ERW) and 5,876,265 Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) in the States South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Northern Kordofan, White Nile, Red Sea, Al Jazeera, Khartoum, Sennar, Gadaref, Kassala, Western Kordofan and Darfur, as the table below shows the EO identified/destroyed per operational year.

Year	Device			
	AP	AT	SAA	UXO
2002	0	0	345	6
2003	8	1	0	40
2004	263	4	500	1,577
2005	72	4	56,198	8,853
2006	58	2	45,727	6,191
2007	313	97	153,385	4,089
2008	387	22	82,389	11,761
2009	1,524	556	9,795	4,360
2010	3,268	1,127	20,253	3,616
2011	2,412	868	15,776	9,569
2012	451	87	8,334	2,852
2013	1,071	268	10,924	1,944
2014	171	95	14,020	2,976
2015	28	23	61,329	4,501
2016	105	24	258,255	8,851
2017	144	59	86,298	12,587
2018	31	13	696,144	13,053
2019	1	12	74,412	13,775
2020	42	16	837,147	21,893
2021	17	57	3,355,123	39,167
2022	32	14	24,976	2,347
2023	5	68	2,219	626



2024	0	0	22,768	7,783
2025	13	23	39,948	22,416
Total	10,416	3,440	5,876,265	204,833

Table 2.4: APM/ATM and other EO destroyed by year from 2002 - 2025

2.7. Nature and extent of progress made: qualitative aspects

Significant recent progress has been made by the NMAC in close collaboration with UNMAS, partnering with the Danish Refugee Council and National NGO, JASMAR to conduct land release and EORE activities in accessible areas of Sudan. The following case study provided by the partners demonstrates the effect of the mine action activities being undertaken.

2.7.1 Case study - Reviving Arkawet Square, Khartoum Block (50):

Situation. For over 18 months, the central square in Arkawet's Block (50)—a vital recreational and social hub— was rendered unusable and dangerous due to the presence of a suspected Explosive Remnant of War (ERW). This case study details the successful intervention by the DRC/JASMAR clearance team, which safely removed the threat, conducted risk education, and restored not only the land but also the community's sense of safety, social cohesion, and economic vitality. The project underscores the critical impact of humanitarian mine action on community well-being beyond mere physical clearance.

A community living in fear. Arkawet Square was once the epicentre of daily life in Block (50), hosting football matches, social gatherings, community events, and children's play. This changed abruptly with the discovery of a suspicious object in the centre of the square, believed to be an ERW.

- **Social Disruption:** All recreational and social activities ceased. The square, a source of joy, became a symbol of fear.
- **Economic Impact:** Local informal economies tied to events and gatherings in the square collapsed.
- **Psychological Toll:** A constant state of anxiety prevailed, particularly affecting children. Families altered their daily routes to avoid the area.
- **A Personal Story:** Twin brothers Imran and Othman, known for their football skills, embodied this impact. Imran recounted, "Every day on my way to school, I'd stop... and remember the times we used to play. For a year and a half, I took the longer road just to avoid seeing the square and feeling sad."

The intervention. Upon receiving the report, DRC/JASMAR MTT-1, in close coordination with the Sudanese National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), initiated a swift and structured response.

- **Safe Clearance Operations.**
 - The team deployed to the location and conducted a technical survey.
 - The identified object was safely approached, identified, and neutralized in situ in strict compliance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), ensuring no risk to the community or operators.
- **Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE):**
 - Concurrently, Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) engaged with residents.



- They delivered critical risk education messages on how to identify ERWs and the imperative of reporting them to authorities without approaching them, with special sessions tailored for children and youth.
- **Community & Authority Coordination:**
 - DRC/JASMAR worked directly with local community leaders and authorities to safely manage a temporary evacuation perimeter during operations and to plan the organized return and official handover of the land.

The positive outcomes were felt the moment the "all-clear" was given.

- **Restored Safety and Access:** The immediate physical threat was eliminated, and the land was formally released back to the community.
- **Revived Social Fabric:** Within hours, children returned to play football. Imran and Othman were the first to run back onto the field. Social gatherings, events, and the familiar sounds of community life resumed.
- **Alleviated Psychological Burden:** The pervasive fear and anxiety that had gripped the neighbourhood for 18 months were replaced with relief and a renewed sense of security.
- **Economic Reactivation:** The revival of activities in the square indirectly stimulated local commerce and vendor activity linked to community events.

In the words of the community: Imran smiled and said, "Finally, we're back to playing in our square... this brought happiness and life back to us."



Figure 2.2 - The twin boys returned to their playing field

Conclusion. The clearance of Arkawet Square is a powerful example of how humanitarian mine action is fundamentally about protecting people and restoring communities. The operation went beyond the technical removal of an ERW; it reopened a vital public space, mended social ties, and gave a community its future back. It highlights the importance of rapid response, professional execution, and community engagement in building a safer Sudan.

2.7.2. Other areas of effort

The National Mine Action Center implemented a hotline service to address citizens' grievances related to the presence of UXOs. This initiative aims to prioritize received complaints and ensure timely and effective responses. In addition, the Center prepares weekly monitoring reports to assess the performance of the service. Since the commencement of operations, a total of 1,225 hotline reports have been successfully addressed through both government-funded and donor-funded teams.

During the previous extension period, the National Mine Action Center participated in numerous conferences, training courses, and workshops organized by GICHD. The NMAC delegation consistently attended the regular meetings of APMBC, with the sole exception of 2023 due to the outbreak of the war. Furthermore, ten (10) NMAC staff members participated in training courses held in Switzerland, Nairobi, and Lebanon. In addition, two (2) staff members took part in the Regional Universalization and Capacity-Building Workshop of the EWIPA Declaration held in Morocco in 2025, as well as the Victim Assistance Workshop conducted in Cambodia in 2023.

Despite the closure of its four offices in Darfur States, NMAC continued its activities through a temporary HQ office in Port Sudan, in addition to five sub-offices located in Khartoum State, Kassala State, South Kordofan State, Blue Nile State, and Al-Jazira State.

2.8. Methods & standards used to release areas known or suspected to contain AP mines

2.8.1 Overview of land release

In mine action, in order to process vast suspected mined areas, many of which have been identified by initial surveys that established the scope of the mine/ERW contamination challenge, a more efficient methodology, the Land Release Process was introduced and endorsed to tackle the issue of large suspected mined area(s). Land Release is the process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define and remove all presence and suspicion of EO contamination through non-technical survey, technical survey and/or clearance; using evidence based and documented approach.

The methodology used to release land relies on operators and NMAC to classify and categorize the hazardous areas to either Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA); based on direct evidence, Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA) based on indirect evidence or cancel the area with confidence that the area does not include any evidence of explosive hazards. Any new information, requests for clearance about potentially hazardous areas which are not recorded in IMSMA data base, are subject to the same probing process of confirming the presence, suspicion, and or absence of hazards and releasing the areas based on actual threat rather than perceived threat.

The process of releasing land from actual threat involves the use of appropriate demining assets available to achieve the desired level of confidence that the land is free of EO, which the Sudan mine action programme referred to as "all reasonable effort". All reasonable effort may, at one extreme, only be the conduct of a non-technical survey which finds absolutely no evidence of EO.

The commitment of additional resources in this case is unlikely to justify the expected additional information about the area. However, if the non-technical survey confirms some evidence of EO, it would be reasonable to expend more effort to gain more confidence about which areas are free of EO and which are not. In this case, "all reasonable effort" may mean that a technical survey or clearance should be conducted. "All reasonable effort" for the release of previously reported Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA) and Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA), is reached at a point where sufficient



and reliable information has been obtained to conclude, with confidence, that there is no more evidence of EO and applying additional efforts and resources are not reasonable, and the evidence do not support a decision to apply more efforts and resources. Varying levels of information gathering through survey and clearance shall be undertaken to reach this point.

The Sudan mine action programme's guidance on the Land release process is carried out in accordance with IMAS 07.11, the "Land Release Process" and Asset Deployment decision making tools to help visualize the land release process and to give operators in the field a ready reference for deploying technical assets.

2.8.2 Land release methodology

The Land Release methodology adopted by Sudanese National Mine Action Standards (SNMAS) is based on the application of IMAS 07.11. The NMAS for land release has been updated in 2019 and approved by NMAC and disseminated to the mine action organizations for applying its requirements during the land release operations. The application of land release assumes a level of risk based on the verification of a threat and evidence of EO, both direct and indirect evidence. It recognizes that just because a hazard is reported and or reflected on the IMSMA database, the details are not necessarily accurate and that all hazards benefit from thorough application of the Land Release Process at all levels of intervention. Land release in Sudan has been based on three sub processes including Non-Technical Survey, Technical Survey and Clearance. Further information can be found in Sudan's previous extension requests and current standards online at the Sudan Mine Action Centre.

In addition to SNMAS the most conflict has moved the operational environment from the rural area to the high density urban area. To respond to these challenges, Sudan has developed and implemented specialized operational procedures, including building clearance methodologies and the deployment of Non-Technical Survey advance teams. These teams are tasked with rapidly assessing newly reported hazardous areas, collecting reliable information from local communities and authorities, and supporting the prioritization of subsequent technical interventions. Such measures contribute to enhancing operational safety, reducing risks to demining personnel, and ensuring that clearance activities are conducted in a systematic and efficient manner.

In parallel, prioritization mechanisms have been further strengthened to ensure a coordinated and inclusive approach to tasking and resource allocation. This process takes into consideration operational capacity, the evolving humanitarian situation, and the needs of affected populations. Particular attention is given to both previously recorded hazardous areas and newly identified contamination resulting from recent conflict, especially in locations assessed as critical or operationally complex.

Through the continued application of this methodology, Sudan seeks to ensure that land release activities are implemented in a transparent, efficient, and accountable manner, while maintaining close coordination with national authorities, the United Nations, international and national non-governmental organizations, and affected communities. This collaborative approach aims to maximize the humanitarian impact of mine action activities and facilitate the safe return and recovery of communities affected by mines and explosive remnants of war.



It must also be understood that due to the significant increase in risk to life population due to the vast contamination in urban centres the priorities since the last extension request have shifted in-line with humanitarian priorities to an immediate life crisis setting.

2.9. Methods & standards of controlling and assuring quality

The Sudan Quality Management System for mine action became operational in 2006. It has been charted to serve two key objectives. Firstly, to ensure that a proper, and sufficient quality assurance (QA) monitoring process that consists of accreditation and regular monitoring visits at all stages of operations is implemented; secondly, to confirm that mine action organizations are applying their accredited management processes and operational procedures in a manner that will result in the safe, effective and efficient release of land. Additional QC sampling is to provide confidence that quality requirements have been met and that released/cleared land is safe to use. The productivity and quality of mine action operations at organizational level, efficiency and effectiveness of the mine action activities improved.

The programme has revised and updated its Quality Management System (QMS) based on the requirements of IMAS 07.12 and the ISO 9001:2015 standards. Including developing new NMAS for QMS including identification and mapping of the quality management processes, documentation of the processes, documenting Quality Policy and communicating it throughout the sector. Mine action organizations are asked to develop their internal QMS procedures and processes.

In order to realize the overall goal of the Mine Action Quality Management System and these set of objectives, NMAC quality management department shoulder the implementation of the following three basic tasks:

1. Organizational and Operational Accreditation.
2. Quality Assurance Monitoring.
3. Quality Control (sampling) including progressive, targeted and post-clearance inspections before the handing over and formal release of the land to the beneficiaries.





Figure 2.3 - A woman undergoing demining training and accreditation.

2.9.1 Organizational Accreditation

NMAC Organizational Accreditation procedures are designed to ensure that a mine action organization is appropriately established, staffed, equipped, and has the required systems, procedures and support structures in place before it is permitted to plan, manage and undertake mine action activities. A thorough assessment of all mine action organizations management system, structure, operational and support procedures, policies and capabilities is taking place, the organization is then recognized to be accredited to plan and manage mine action activities in Sudan. While for making sure the organization is operational capable to conduct mine action operations, another layer of assessment needs to be undertaken, which is called operational accreditation

2.9.2 Operational Accreditation

NMAC Operational Accreditation procedures are designed to ensure that an organizationally accredited mine action organization is appropriately capable to implement mine action activities in Sudan, their personnel are assessed to be well trained and capable, their equipment and tools are available, tested and accredited (Machines, MDDs), their structures are as per the national mine action standards and organizations SOPs and certainly what is said and written can be applied by the organization and its sub-units or teams. Control of activity in mine action in Sudan is achieved through the Operational Accreditation, license and monitoring of mine action organizations whether they are national or international before and during their work and the outputs of their mine action activities. It also involves the inspection of the organization's documentation (Organizational Accreditation), qualifications of proposed staff, Standard Operations Procedures (SOPs), List of equipment, financial status statement. After Operational Accreditation is granted, monitoring is conducted by Quality Assurance staff. For reference, please see Sudan NMAS 07.01, 07.02, 07.03.

2.9.3 Quality Assurance Monitoring

Quality Assurance monitoring is the observation, inspection or assessment of worksites, facilities, equipment, activities, processes, procedures and documentation to confirm that a mine action organization is working in accordance with its Operational Accreditation. Quality Assurance monitors may visit worksites at any time. In some circumstances, they may be based at the worksite and provide continuous monitoring. The purpose of Quality Assurance monitoring is to confirm that demining organizations are applying their approved management processes and operating procedures in a way that results in the safe, effective and efficient release of land. Quality Assurance monitoring serves the interests of the mine action organizations because it helps them to identify problems and to achieve the required results efficiently. The QA monitors are not policemen, they are there actually to help the mine action organization fulfil its aims.

2.9.4 Quality Control Inspections

QC inspections are taking place while the operations are ongoing; mainly on the completed parts of the hazardous areas, targeted inspection are carried out in some specific cleared parts of the hazardous area that additional confidence on the quality of clearance needs to be built and post-clearance inspection occurs after a demining organization has completed the land release operations and before the land is handed over to the beneficiaries. The processed ground may have been cleared or may have been processed in a manner that gives confidence that full clearance procedures are not necessary. The post clearance inspection is intended to determine whether the land has been processed in the way that was intended, and to confirm whether the selected procedures were appropriate. Inspection of the cleared land will be carried out before it is released and handed over to the national authority or local community.

2.9.5 Post-land release Impact Assessment

After a cleared land handed over to the use of local community, jointly NMAC and the demining organization carry out post-land release impact assessment with the aim to verify whether the clearance met the intended purposes and stand on how the land being usefully utilized by the locals and whether there any suspicious hazard that could be left behind.

2.9.6 NMAC Quality Management Structure

The Sudan Quality Management System has been structured with regionally based QM teams based in Damazin, Kadugli and Darfur states, in addition to the HQ team based in Khartoum. Each regional QM team is made up of (1-2 persons).

Regional QA teams have been delegated the responsibility of monitoring the quality of all humanitarian demining operations in their areas of responsibility.

2.10. Efforts undertaken to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from mined areas

The significant change in the EO contamination in Sudan has presented all stakeholders responsible for the protection of civilians with new challenges. In the previous extension report methods used to prevent civilians entering mined areas were focused on marking, both formal and informal. Typically the populations in the areas of contamination were well sensitized through EORE to the hazards present.



2.10.1 Marking methods used prior to 2023 Civil War

Initially, warning signs (markings) were placed by people in a community affected by mines and ERW at the moment the threat was detected to warn people to avoid the contaminated areas. Sometimes it is done jointly with the EORE team operating in the area. But in most hazardous areas official markings have been undertaken by the non-technical survey and demining team(s) either during the non-technical survey or technical survey activities. In open areas where there are no jungles and dense bushes, stones have been painted red to show the contaminated area and in places where clearance has been done red and white painted stones have been used to show the cleared areas and the sites which are still contaminated. In areas with vegetation and dense trees and bushes, formal hazard warning signs including red metallic triangles with (Danger of Mine and or UXO) have been used to indicate the dangerous sites. EORE teams when visiting areas with suspected hazards also mark areas in order for the people to be aware of the danger and avoid approaching those areas.

2.10.2 New challenges and efforts being undertaken

With contamination now widespread and focussed in urban areas close to high density population the challenge has now changed significantly. This combined with a high numbers of returnees (estimated at 2.7 million²) from populations who have not previously been exposed to EO hazards creates an urgent need for effective marking and risk education. The increase in recorded victims over the last year, from 54 and 76 in 2023 and 2024, respectively up to 150 in 2025 (at 30 November 2025) alone demonstrates a quantifiable urgent need. The increase of incursions into minefields has triggered the need to explore more substantial marking and fencing systems, better integrated EORE and high impact media messaging. Team structures have been redesigned and projects are being launched which include a more robust EORE capability, both direct and indirect which operate more closely with clearance teams in the areas of land release operations.



Figure 2.4 - Operations in new environments.

² International Organization for Migration (IOM), Oct 22 2025. DTM DTM Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 22 (Bi-Weekly). IOM, Sudan.

The national mine action programme is currently facing several operational constraints, including limited access to certain locations due to security conditions and a shortage of qualified Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Level 3 personnel required to lead and supervise operational teams in accordance with national standards.

In response, the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) has introduced operational adaptations to strengthen capacity while maintaining compliance with national regulations and procedures. These measures include revised guidance on team composition and responsibilities, as well as the expansion of manual clearance teams to include eight deminers, two team leaders, and two community liaison officers. This structure allows teams to operate in two sub-groups under the supervision of a designated supervisor while enhancing community liaison and the delivery of Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE).

In addition, enhanced operational modalities have been introduced, including advanced Non-Technical Survey (NTS+) teams capable of conducting survey and responding to urgent clearance needs, and EORE+ teams that combine survey activities with risk education. These adaptations aim to improve the responsiveness and efficiency of mine action operations in addressing the evolving contamination context in accordance with the principles of the International Mine Action Standards.

2.11. Resources made available to support progress made to date

The period between 2019 -2023 witnessed the continuation of funds from the government of Sudan and generous support of donors through UNMAS to the mine action program in Sudan. Total funds received by the mine action program during the said period was 27,991,305 USD (20,737,305 USD at the time of previous extension request).

Since the last request this figure is 45,417,902 USD with projected funding to the end of the current extension and confirmed funds of 17,043,459 USD over the period of 2023-2025. It should be noted that significant cuts from US funding had a severe impact on funding to mine action, in April 2025 the funding crisis which would have collapsed the mine action programme was only saved with 48 hours notice to closure. In spite of what seemed to be an insurmountable financial crisis the programme managed to survive thanks to huge interventions from Canada, the Central Emergency Relief Fund, the European Union, the UK. This funding has been focused on emergency response and the facilitation of emergency humanitarian delivery from other sectors.

In addition to these international contributions, the government support is paying for the staff of the NMAC, and the costs of some of the activities implemented by the department of projects. In some cases there has been Sudanese government led initiatives to enhance areas for classrooms, conference halls, administration office facilities, accommodation facility for personnel and trainees, practical training areas for survey, clearance including practical minefields, battlefields, road verification and clearance, mechanical demining test and accreditation areas and central disposal site.

The previous Sudan ambition to create a Regional Mine Action Training Centre that is capable of providing capacity building support in the region including to the neighboring mine action programmes in Africa and possibly the Arab region remains but has become a lower priority since the onset of war. The prior achievements in the areas of Explosive Ordnance Risk Education and Victims Assistance which were further elaborated in the previous extension report, all are achievements which could not have been materialized without the continual support of the government of Sudan.



Funding Resources	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Total
GoS	500,000	1,425,000	1,027,000	1,500,000*	1,500,000*	5,952,000
UNMAS	1,852,000	5,292,883	6,567,472	10,374,443*	10,000,000*	34,086,798
Grand Total	2,352,000	6,717,883	7,594,472	11,874,443*	11,500,000*	40,038,798*

* Estimated, with no guarantee of funding

Table 2.5: UNMAS and GoS funding during the 3rd extension period (2023-2027)

Funding Resources	2013 - 2018 (1st ext)	2019 - 2023 (2nd ext)	2023-2027 (3rd ext) Confirmed	2023-2027 (3rd ext) Projected
GoS	8,000,000	5,500,000	2,952,000	2,952,000
UNMAS	6,625,609	22,491,305	13,712,355*	34,465,902*
Grand Total	16,625,609	27,991,305	16,664,355	40,038,798*

* Estimated, with no guarantee of funding

Table 2.6: UNMAS and GoS funding for all extension periods. (2013-2027)

2.11.1 Other Resource Mobilization

In addition to the aforementioned financial contributions additional funding has been mobilised from World Food Programme and the Sudan Humanitarian Fund. Additionally personnel provisions to support mine action have been made by Switzerland to enhance the logistic and information management capacity of the Sudan Mine Action programme.

2.12. Circumstances that impede compliance during the period of the previous extension

2.12.1 The Sudanese Civil War

The renewed conflict in Sudan since April 2023 has caused a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by widespread explosive ordnance (EO) contamination in populated areas. An estimated 13 million Sudanese are at risk from explosive ordnance, with 8,176 conflict events potentially leading to contamination reported between April 2023 and May 2025.

2.12.2 Access

As a consequence of the war there have been extreme limitations in the ability for any humanitarian delivery across huge parts of Sudan. At the time of writing only 36.52% of suspected contaminated areas are accessible, preventing all land release and EORE activities. The access is limited by on-going conflict and lack of established control by the Sudanese Armed Forces. Additionally, areas of Sudan under control of the SAF have been cut off for extended periods, preventing MA activities even where the rule of law is established, in some cases they remain cut off since the start of the war in April 2023.





Figure 2.5 - Teams in Khartoum after the city became accessible.

2.12.2 Political situation and Conflict Sensivity

Although attempts have been made to establish parallel governments on areas outside of SAF control they are not recognised by the Government of Sudan of which the NMAC sits organisationally and legally. This political situation and lack of acknowledged legitimacy prevents the implementation of any mine action activities by partners in non SAF controlled areas.

2.12.3 Lack of Technical Equipment

A further consequence of the conflict was the significant loss of mine action equipment. The rapid onset of the civil war, evacuation of personnel and forced abandonment of mine action offices, sites and stores led to an almost complete loss of equipment. This loss has severely hampered the ability to re-establish mine action activity and significant support from UNMAS, Partners and the Sudan Humanitarian Fund has been instrumental in restarting activities. To further exacerbate the equipment issues the on-going war has led to significant export limitations from many suppliers of technical equipment, particularly as many essential items can be considered military equipment.

2.12.4 Lack of suitably qualified personnel

Following the significant expansion of the contamination since 2023, the number of technical field managers has become disproportionate to the scale and extent of contamination. This situation has resulted in a clear gap in the leadership of field teams, particularly with regard to the limited number of personnel holding EOD-Level 3 qualifications.

Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, a total of seventeen personnel held EOD-Level 3 certificates. However, a number of them are currently occupying administrative positions within implementing organizations, which has effectively reduced the number of personnel actively leading field teams to no more than five staff.

As a result of these exceptional circumstances, the National Mine Action Center was compelled to deploy certain personnel based on their extensive years of experience in the sector, temporarily into roles exceeding the higher-level certification requirements. This was done only after subjecting those

personnel to thorough technical and professional assessments conducted by the Quality Assurance section, thereby ensuring continued compliance with approved safety and quality standards.

2.12.5 Challenges in Information Management

The demining programme in Sudan suffered a near-total operational setback following the outbreak of conflict in April 2023. Although all personnel were safely evacuated, the central server, hosting nearly twenty years of demining data, was assumed lost. Thankfully, partial backups were recovered, but they are scattered across two different versions and stored on separate devices, complicating restoration and consolidation efforts. We greatly appreciate UNMAS' proactive work to support the transition to the latest iteration of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA Core). However, given Sudan's long-standing and highly effective collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), their technical support is considered to be the most appropriate and reliable option for managing the migration and consolidation of our legacy data. Preserving continuity and integrity of this historical dataset is critical to ensuring the credibility, accuracy, and operational value of future mine-action activities. Current operational constraints, particularly widespread GPS spoofing, further limit the feasibility of adopting field-based data-entry tools within the IMSMA Core suite at this stage. For these reasons, the priority is to first secure a stable, complete, and reconstructed dataset before fully transitioning to the new system.

2.12.7 Inadequate funding / Funding crisis

Although projected funding indicates an overall increase compared to previous years, it does not reflect the severe funding crisis triggered by recent global US cuts. These cuts not only caused a temporary suspension of mine action operations but also resulted in substantial financial losses due to the operational inefficiencies created by the interruption. Additionally, the funding trajectory outlined in the previous extension request could not have anticipated the scale of new contamination that emerged when the war broke out just days after its approval. The magnitude of explosive ordnance contamination now far exceeds the scope of earlier funding assumptions and has necessitated a major shift in operational priorities and future financial forecasting. Compounding this challenge is the need to train and equip additional teams, an expansion that was not previously required and is only partially reflected in current projections.

Given these realities, the urgency of rapidly surveying all areas of conflict related contamination across Sudan cannot be overstated. This effort is essential to establish an accurate understanding of the scale and nature of the threat and to inform the appropriate methodology, prioritization framework, and operational plan for addressing it in the period following this extension.

2.12.6 Climatic factors

Sudan experiences 3 to 4 months of rainy season annually, this limits the operational year to maximum 9 months per year because of the heavy rain especially in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Lack of paved roads and other infrastructures make it impossible for the teams to safely carry out their field operations and reach hazardous areas during the rainy season. The soaring temperature also contributes to the climatic challenges and affects the productivity rate of land release assets. From the mentioned factors, it is not only about the availability of funds but also and most importantly the timing this fund made available.



2.13. Humanitarian, economic, social and environmental implications

Sudan faces the world's largest displacement crisis, with 11.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 3.8 million refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries. The ongoing war has created a catastrophic humanitarian situation and exacerbated tensions with Chad, South Sudan, and other neighbours due to refugee flows and the risk of violence spilling across borders. As previously inaccessible areas opened in late 2024 and early 2025, displaced populations began returning in significant numbers. Mine action is essential to ensuring their safe movement, enabling humanitarian assistance, and supporting early recovery and reconstruction efforts free from explosive ordnance (EO) threats.

2.13.1 Mine Action as a Foundation for Recovery and Safe Return

Mine action is a prerequisite for the safe return of displaced populations and for broader recovery and development. Land release enables communities to rebuild homes, schools, health facilities, and livelihoods while allowing the restoration of market activity and basic social services. Clearance of key infrastructure and transport routes supports food production and distribution by securing supply chains. Mine action programmes also contribute to economic revitalization through capacity-building and job creation, including opportunities targeted at women and youth in affected and displaced communities.



Figure 2.6 - The wreckage of a car in minefield incident impacting the safety of returnees.

2.13.2 Operational Priorities: Focus on Khartoum and Expanding Accessibility

Since late 2024 and throughout 2025, mine action operations have focused on Khartoum state due to extensive EO contamination and the anticipated large-scale return of displaced residents. Contamination across residential areas, public infrastructure, and transit routes has made Khartoum one of the most severely affected areas. Clearance and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) efforts in the capital are expected to yield immediate, large-scale humanitarian and recovery impacts. As accessibility improves, priorities may shift to neighbouring areas and other affected states.

2.13.3 Integrated, Conflict- and Gender-Sensitive Approaches

The Sudan Mine Action Programme adopts a conflict- and gender-sensitive approach, ensuring that cross-cutting issues, such as gender equality, disability inclusion, and accountability to affected populations, are systematically addressed. Because mine action teams often remain embedded within

communities for extended periods, they are well-positioned to collect information on EO incidents, victim needs, humanitarian gaps, and protection concerns. This approach strengthens coordination with broader humanitarian and development interventions.



Figure 2.7 - A woman to woman risk education intervention in Khartoum.

2.13.4 Economic Impacts of EO

Landmines and ERW cause death, injury, and long-term disabilities, with children particularly affected. Survivors and their families face significant medical and economic burdens. Contamination fuels socio-economic hardship, contributes to chronic poverty, and limits access to agricultural land, forests, water resources, and livelihood opportunities. It also inhibits the development of infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, schools, and markets, undermining national economic recovery. These effects make landmines one of the most persistent obstacles to peace, stability, and sustainable development in Sudan.

2.13.5 Socio-Economic Consequences for Displaced and Rural Populations

Landmines prevent IDPs and refugees from returning home even after hostilities subside, prolonging displacement and placing additional strain on urban areas. Rural populations—who depend on agriculture and livestock—are often forced to farm or graze animals on land that is known or suspected to be contaminated. Anti-personnel mines, anti-tank/vehicle mines, and ERW collectively restrict access to markets, limit mobility, reduce agricultural productivity, and threaten food security. Their removal is therefore critical to restoring livelihoods, improving economic security, and enabling long-term recovery.

2.13.6 Environmental Impacts of Landmine Contamination and Clearance

Landmine contamination contributes to land and soil degradation, loss of biodiversity, and reduced agricultural productivity, deepening rural poverty and underdevelopment. While clearance operations are essential, mechanical assets used for survey and clearance can also pose environmental risks—such as soil erosion, vegetation loss, fuel-related pollution, and accidental damage to archaeological or cultural sites. To mitigate these risks, all survey, clearance, and EORE activities are conducted in line with the Sudan National Mine Action Standards (SNMAS 07.04), Environmental Management Policy, and Environmental Impact Assessment requirements derived from International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Specific Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) guide teams in ensuring compliance and environmental protection.

2.13.7. Interconnected EO Threats and the Need for Comprehensive Clearance

The presence of anti-personnel mines, anti-tank/vehicle mines, and ERW creates a complex, interrelated threat landscape that affects all aspects of civilian life. These hazards disproportionately impact rural and impoverished communities, undermine economic stability, and obstruct the transition from conflict to peace. Comprehensive clearance—addressing all types of EO—is essential for enabling safe movement, restoring productive land, supporting sustainable development, and ensuring long-term recovery and stability in Sudan.



Figure 2.8 - Complex environments with layered risks from UXO and Mines in sensitive sites.

2.14. Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects.

The quantitative scope of Sudan’s remaining contamination challenge is reflected in the consolidated analysis of Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHA), Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHA), and estimated contamination derived from survey results, legacy databases, and conflict incident analysis. Current Information Management records indicate contamination from anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, and explosive ordnance across multiple states. The overall estimated contamination currently reaches approximately 54.7 km², of which only about 36.5% is accessible for humanitarian mine action operations due to ongoing insecurity and access constraints. These figures demonstrate that Sudan continues to face a significant and evolving Article 5 challenge requiring systematic survey and prioritized clearance operations.

Although significant progress was made prior to the previous extension request the response following the outbreak of war has been extremely limited due to the factors discussed in section 2.12 of this extension request. The tables of confirmed and suspected hazard areas in Sudan only paints part of the picture, the two final tables detailing estimated contamination and access are fundamental to understanding the scale of the problem.



2.14.1 Anti-personnel Mines

	Confirmed (CHA) and Suspected (SHA) Hazard areas containing AP mines by number and size					
State	Number of CHAs (No.)	Area of CHAs (Sqm)	Number of SHAs (No.)	Area of SHAs (Sqm)	Total Number of HAs (No.)	Total Area of HAs (Sqm)
Blue Nile	13	1,014,168	9	118,432	22	1,132,600
South Kordofan	57	2,485,298	30	9,822,666	87	12,307,964
West Kordofan	0	0	3	21,991	3	21,991
Khartoum	2	68,151	0	0	2	68,151
Total	72	3,567,617	42	9,963,089	114	13,530,706

Table 2.7: AP contamination by state.

The onset of war severely limited Sudan's ability to continue its progress on the clearance of AP mines. Furthermore, the discovery of new AP mines in Urban areas was unprecedented. Particular challenges have been faced in the clearance of newly discovered minefields due to the contamination from other items of EO including UXO and AT/AV mines. Complex minefields containing both AP and AT/AV sometimes including low metal content mines further increase the speed of progress.

2.14.2 Anti-Tank/Vehicle Mines

	Confirmed (CHA) and Suspected (SHA) Hazard areas containing AT/AV mines by number and size					
State	Number of CHAs (No.)	Area of CHAs (Sqm)	Number of SHAs (No.)	Area of SHAs (Sqm)	Total Number of HAs (No.)	Total Area of HAs (Sqm)
Blue Nile	12	790,388	5	866,794	17	1,657,182
Khartoum	5	936,563	0	0	5	936,563
South Kordofan	11	204,096	24	10,739,390	35	10,943,486
Grand Total	28	1,931,047	29	11,606,184	57	13,537,231

Table 2.8: AT/AV contamination by state.

The ongoing discovery of minefields, frequently precipitated by incidents resulting in casualties or injuries among Sudanese civilians, underscores the critical need for extensive survey activities and concurrent risk education initiatives. These measures are essential for the prevention of further human losses attributable to mines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). It is anticipated that additional states will confirm the presence of active minefields during the duration of this extension period.

2.14.3 EO Contamination

The continued threat posed by explosive ordnance (EO) resulting from three years of sustained conflict regrettably exacerbates the contamination challenge. This situation leads to an increased number of victims, places greater demands on operational teams, and in some instances necessitates multi-layered clearance tasks. A case in point is the Almogran Minefield in Central Khartoum, a complex minefield situated within a conflict zone adjacent to a major access route into the city.

	Confirmed (CHA) and Suspected (SHA) Hazard areas containing EO by number and size



State	Number of CHAs (No.)	Area of CHAs (Sqm)	Number of SHAs (No.)	Area of SHAs (Sqm)	Total Number of HAs (No.)	Total Area of HAs (Sqm)
Southern Kordofan	130	5,486,260	38	155,841	168	5,642,101
Khartoum	48	4,501,222	1	2,500	49	4,503,722
Eastern Darfur	1	0	4	1,906,142	5	1,906,142
Western Darfur	7	68,011	22	94,750	29	162,761
Blue Nile	18	82,995	5	45,617	23	128,612
Central Darfur	0	0	9	17,000	9	17,000
Northern Darfur	18	14,781	15	2	33	14,783
Sennar	7	5,000	0	0	7	5,000
Northern	4	475	0	0	4	475
River Nile	1	25	0	0	1	25
Western Kordofan	0	0	2	2	2	2
Al Jazeera	2	0	0	0	2	0
Kassala	3	0	0	0	3	0
Northern Kordofan	4	0	0	0	4	0
Southern Darfur	0	0	1	0	1	0
White Nile	4	0	0	0	4	0
Grand Total	247	10,158,769	97	2,221,854	344	12,380,623

Table 2.9: Explosive Ordnance contamination by state.

2.14.4 New estimated contamination

The estimation of new contamination is based on a methodology developed jointly by NMAC and UNMAS information management specialists. This methodology combines open-source conflict data, particularly ACLED incident reporting, with known explosive weapon system failure rates and geospatial analysis. The approach also cross-references existing mine action databases in order to remove overlapping hazard areas. Field verification missions in newly accessible areas have confirmed that actual contamination levels may exceed initial estimates, emphasizing the importance of systematic survey and continuous data verification during the implementation of the extension period.

By utilizing legacy and new data from survey and clearance teams, fused with conflict data, the NMAC and UNMAS information management teams have sought to estimate the scale of contamination. This estimate accounts for typical weapon system failure rates and applies them to open-source narrative descriptions of conflict incidents provided by ACLED. The methodology has also aimed to eliminate overlapping conflict points and hazardous areas (HAs). Table 2.10 provides an overview, by state, of the estimated level of contamination. It must be noted that this figure continues to rise, and in certain instances, previously cleared areas may become re-contaminated as the conflict situation evolves. Furthermore, due to limitations inherent in the accuracy of open-source reporting, the situation on the ground can exhibit significant variability. An illustration of this occurred during a joint mission by NMAC, UNMAS, UNDSS, and Government Security Forces in central Khartoum, following the Sudanese



Armed Forces' assumption of control. This mission quickly demonstrated that the level of contamination was substantially higher; for example, a single ACLED entry documenting a mortar bombardment actually corresponded to 10–15 impacts.



Figure 2.9 - Routine bulk demolitions demonstrating the progress being made in clearance operations.

Estimated Hazard areas containing EO by size and accessibility				
State	Number of Conflict Incidents	Area of potential estimated HA	Accessible (Yes/No/Partial)	Current operations (Yes/No)
Al Jazirah	478	1195,000	Yes	Yes
Blue Nile	48	120,000	Yes	No
Central Darfur	95	237,500	No	No
East Darfur	52	130,000	No	No
Gedaref	30	75,000	Yes	Yes
Kassala	16	40,000	Yes	Yes
Khartoum	4,777	11,942,500	Yes	Yes
North Darfur	1,275	3,187,500	No	No
North	474	1,185,000	Partial	No



Kordofan				
Northern	64	160,000	Yes	Yes
Red Sea	26	65,000	Yes	Yes
River Nile	70	175,000	Yes	No
Sennar	160	400,000	Yes	No
South Darfur	338	845,000	No	No
South Kordofan	244	610,000	Partial	No
West Darfur	108	270,000	No	No
West Kordofan	261	652,500	No	No
White Nile	115	287,500	Yes	Yes
Grand Total	8,631	21,577,500	Estimated 15,500,000	7 out 18 states

Table 2.10: Estimated total contamination by state.

2.14.5 Access

Access to contaminated areas remains a major operational constraint for the Sudan Mine Action Programme. Ongoing conflict and shifting frontlines significantly restrict humanitarian access to many hazardous locations. Current estimates indicate that approximately two-thirds of contaminated areas remain inaccessible or unsafe for survey and clearance activities. As security conditions evolve, newly accessible areas will require rapid non-technical and technical survey to confirm contamination and prioritize clearance interventions. Due to the on-going war the majority of contaminated areas remain inaccessible or unsafe for humanitarian deminers. This issue is constantly being exacerbated due to the ongoing fighting and thus the continued use of explosive ordnance.

Contamination	Total Contamination (MSqm / SqKM)	Accessible Contamination (MSqm / SqKM)	Percentage accessible
Legacy	33.1	5.1	14.8%
Est. New	21.6	15.5	72.4%
Total estimated	54.7	20.5	36.52%

Table 2.11: Access to contaminated areas.

2.14.6 Victims of Explosive Ordnance

The increase in explosive ordnance casualties reflects the expansion of contamination caused by the ongoing conflict and the limited capacity currently available to address the threat. Casualty data indicates that civilians, including children and internally displaced persons, are disproportionately affected. This trend highlights the urgent need to expand Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), strengthen emergency EOD response capacity, and accelerate survey and clearance operations in high-risk areas.

Despite considerable efforts dedicated to promoting a thoughtful and safe approach to all humanitarian activities, robust planning for the safe and voluntary return of displaced populations, and the systematic dissemination of widespread risk messaging through mass media campaigns, the number of EO victims in Sudan continues to escalate.

This sustained increase in casualties, tragically impacting civilians, humanitarian workers, and



internally displaced persons alike, serves as stark, unequivocal evidence of a critical deficiency within the current mine action response. Furthermore, it demonstrates the urgent and profound necessity for a fully established, comprehensive, and well-developed EORE prevention plan. The current situation underscores that messaging alone is insufficient without a scalable, professional, and rapid clearance and disposal capacity to effectively address the sources of the danger.

State	Injured Victims of Explosive Ordnance by State					
	Boys	Girls	Men	Women	Not Specified	Total
Al Jazeera	15	1	5	1	0	22
Blue Nile	71	14	206	21	50	362
Central Darfur	48	11	25	10	4	98
Eastern Darfur	32	10	16	1	2	61
Gadaref	1	0	3	0	1	5
Kassala	63	9	268	16	41	397
Khartoum	56	10	37	18	6	127
Northern	1	0	0	0	0	1
Northern Darfur	75	16	29	10	23	153
Northern Kordofan	1	1	3	1	0	6
Red Sea	3	1	28	0	3	35
River Nile	1	0	3	0	0	4
Sennar	8	0	3	0	0	11
Southern Darfur	79	14	34	13	3	143
Southern Kordofan	137	34	269	33	173	646
Western Darfur	34	20	24	1	6	85
Western Kordofan	2	0	17	2	41	62
White Nile	4	0	9	1	0	14
Grand Total	631	141	979	128	353	2,232

Table 2.12: Injured Victims by State.

State	Killed Victims of Explosive Ordnance by State					
	Boys	Girls	Men	Women	Not Specified	Total
Al Jazeera	6	0	0	0	0	6
Blue Nile	38	4	84	5	30	161
Central Darfur	7	3	1	0	2	13
Eastern Darfur	9	3	3	2	2	19
Gadaref	1	0	1	0	1	3
Kassala	20	4	79	8	10	121
Khartoum	9	1	9	5	4	28
Northern	0	0	1	0	0	1



Northern Darfur	29	3	5	3	7	47
Northern Kordofan	0	0	1	0	0	1
Red Sea	6	1	15	3	2	27
River Nile	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sennar	1	0	0	0	0	1
Southern Darfur	9	4	2	2	3	20
Southern Kordofan	35	12	61	10	92	210
Western Darfur	16	2	2	1	0	21
Western Kordofan	2	0	7	3	6	18
White Nile	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grand Total	188	37	271	42	159	697

Table 2.13: Killed Victims by State.

Year	Injured						Killed						Grand Total
	Boys	Girls	Men	Women	Not Specified	Total	Boys	Girls	Men	Women	Not Specified	Total	
Before	131	30	560	41	211	973	55	16	196	20	116	403	1,376
2005	15	1	21	3	30	70	8	1	3	0	2	14	84
2006	14	1	24	0	10	49	4	1	5	1	5	16	65
2007	20	6	6	1	12	45	14	3	0	2	2	21	66
2008	12	2	10	1	4	29	7	0	3	2	1	13	42
2009	25	9	9	2	10	55	10	0	3	0	4	17	72
2010	29	7	36	2	5	79	5	2	6	1	1	15	94
2011	29	10	69	7	15	130	7	0	25	2	0	34	164
2012	28	5	33	5	35	106	15	2	7	2	9	35	141
2013	22	7	17	8	0	54	0	0	1	0	1	2	56



2014	20	3	32	7	0	62	0	0	1	2	0	3	65
2015	23	3	14	4	9	53	5	0	5	0	9	19	72
2016	12	4	10	5	3	34	2	1	0	0	0	3	37
2017	28	3	15	5	0	51	6	3	1	0	2	12	63
2018	27	10	20	3	3	63	12	3	0	1	2	18	81
2019	18	6	12	2	0	38	3	2	1	0	0	6	44
2020	25	5	12	5	0	47	2	1	1	0	0	4	51
2021	28	2	12	1	0	43	1	0	2	0	0	3	46
2022	13	6	5	1	0	25	4	0	1	0	0	5	30
2023	15	2	21	4	4	46	3	0	0	4	1	8	54
2024	27	3	20	10	0	60	9	1	3	2	1	16	76
2025	70	16	21	11	2	120	16	1	7	3	3	30	150
Grand Total	631	141	979	128	353	2,232	188	37	271	42	159	697	2,929

Table 2.14: Victims by Year.

2.15. Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: qualitative aspects

The current scale and complexity of EO contamination in Sudan is unprecedented. Urban centres, including multi-story buildings, are heavily affected, demanding specialized expertise, equipment, and procedures that are new to Sudan's existing national mine action operators. This is in addition to the legacy and new contamination on farmland, grazing land, as well as many other facilities and infrastructure needed for the food chain system, worsening the food insecurity crisis in the country. These challenges are further compounded by multiple complex and competing urgent humanitarian priorities and where funding for support in Sudan and other global crises is shrinking. Consequently, the mine action sector urgently needs to expand its capacity not only in terms of the number of operators but also through the adoption of new operational standards, training, and appropriate equipment.

The overall objective for the mine action sector in Sudan is that “the Sudanese population lives free from the threat of explosive ordnance” by protecting civilians from the threats of explosive ordnance and to paving ways towards early recovery and peacebuilding. In coordination with humanitarian, early recovery and development actors as well as local and national authorities, target areas, such as infrastructure sites and key roads, will be identified, surveyed and prioritized. The teams’ focus will be on systemic area-based survey and clearance of larger contaminated areas, including road segments and locations with significant concentrations of abandoned and unexploded ordnance. These efforts aim to ensure that residential areas and essential transit and supply routes are safe for returnees, local populations and aid actors and is a critical phase of the survey and clearance efforts after the immediate emergency response capabilities currently being deployed and in advance of longer-term development activities.





Figure 2.10 - The challenging operating environment of a besieged city.

The survey and clearance work will directly support the restoration of basic social services and the reopening of key infrastructure, enabling rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Coordination with the Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) sector will also be a priority, focusing on the removal of EO from strategic areas and facilities vital to food supply chains, thereby contributing to improved food security. Which will then allow Sudan to set the conditions for the longer term aim of full compliance with its Article 5 compliance.

2.16. Amount of time requested and a rationale for this amount of time

Sudan is requesting a two-year extension to its Article 5 deadline in order to re-establish operational mine action capacity and develop a credible evidence-based plan for completion. The armed conflict that began in April 2023 disrupted mine action operations, caused the loss of trained personnel and equipment, and generated large areas of new contamination that remain largely unsurveyed. The requested extension period will allow Sudan to rebuild institutional capacity, conduct nationwide survey and resurvey activities, and establish an accurate baseline for remaining contamination.

Sudan is requesting a two-year extension to its Article 5 commitment, covering the period 1 April 2027 to 31 March 2029 grounded in reliable data and expert analysis. The extent and characteristics of this new contamination must first be understood.

The most recent conflict has fundamentally altered the EO landscape across the country, creating an urgent need to reassess the nature and scale of Sudan's remaining Article 5 obligations. Large, unsurveyed conflict-affected areas now contain extensive UXO contamination as well as confirmed AP and AT/AV minefields.

2.16.1 Rationale for the Requested Extension

- **Rapidly Evolving Conflict Lines and Access Constraints.** Frontlines continue to shift, and access fluctuates weekly between accessible and inaccessible areas. Initiating priority-based clearance without a clear, stable picture of needs risks creating an inefficient system where operations are repeatedly interrupted or overtaken by events.
- **Extremely Limited Survey Coverage to Date.** Only a very small proportion of conflict-affected land has been surveyed since the outbreak of the war. For example, in Khartoum State, mine action teams have been able to operate in just 0.86% of its total land area. Further exacerbated by the lack of trained and deployable capacity described below. Current estimates of contamination, including AP minefields, are largely derived from open-source data and anecdotal reports. The true scale, density, and distribution of hazards therefore remain unknown.
- **Sector-wide Loss of Capacity and Infrastructure.** The near-collapse of the national mine action sector in 2023–2024 resulted in the loss of trained personnel, equipment, and operational facilities. Significant rehabilitation is required to rebuild technical teams, re-equip operators, and re-establish subnational operational hubs—all prerequisites for credible survey and land release operations.
- **The Need to carry out survey and resurvey activities and establish a new baseline for remaining Article 5 Challenge.** Sudan urgently needs to generate an accurate baseline of its Article 5 obligations. This task is complicated by limited geographic access, an unstable security environment, and the ongoing recovery of the mine action sector. The requested two-year extension will provide the time necessary to conduct systematic survey, re-establish operational capability, and collect the information required to develop a realistic, evidence-based completion plan.

2.16.2 A Phased and Adaptive Approach

Given the extreme complexity of the current situation and the rapidly changing conflict and EO landscape, proposing a definitive national clearance plan at this stage would be neither credible nor responsible. Instead, Sudan is adopting a pragmatic, phased strategy that will allow for continuous adjustment as conditions evolve. This approach prioritizes:

- scaling up survey capacity to carry out survey and resurvey activities and establish a new baseline for remaining Article 5 Challenge;
- supporting emergency humanitarian access and response;
- rebuilding national operational capacity;
- ensuring flexibility to adapt priorities based on changing security and access conditions.

A flexible, agile methodology is essential to fully understand the threat posed by AP mines and other EO hazards, reduce civilian casualties, and facilitate emergency humanitarian assistance and safe post-conflict recovery for the prosperity of Sudan as a whole.

2.17. Detailed work plan for the period of the requested extension

Sudan's priorities during the period preceding the extension and throughout the extension period are centred on the re-establishment of a functional and resilient mine action sector. The objective is to restore a system capable of effectively managing emergency response requirements while



simultaneously undertaking comprehensive and wide-ranging survey activities to accurately determine the full scope and nature of contamination.

In light of the near-total collapse of the sector and the ongoing recovery efforts, the work plan has been structured into two distinct phases. Phase One represents a continuation of current activities focused on emergency response and sector-wide capacity development. This phase will run until the commencement of the extension period, from April 2026 to March 2027.

Phase Two will sustain the capacities established under Phase One while expanding efforts to conduct systematic survey operations across all accessible areas of Sudan. During this phase, it is essential that progress toward Article 5 compliance does not impede national recovery and redevelopment efforts, nor delay or obstruct life-saving humanitarian interventions. This principle is fundamental to the core philosophy of mine action and must be consistently upheld—from contaminated areas in South Kordofan to international fora in Geneva.

2.17.1. Phase 1 (April 2026 to March 2027)

Phase one focuses on the following key areas. Enhancement of trained personnel, importation of equipment, rewriting and contextualising of Sudanese national mine action standards as well as developing procedures and policies which fit the new context of contamination in Sudan.

Simultaneously Sudan will maintain its ability to rapidly respond to emergency mine action activities, including interventions in-line with the Sudan Humanitarian Needs Response Plan³.

OBJECTIVE	KEY ACTIVITIES	MILESTONES / OUTPUTS	PERIOD Months	2026					2027				
				A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J
Land release activities (NTS, TS, BAC, MMC, EOD)													

³ <https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1514>



Emergency response	Deployment of MTT and NTS	12 x MTTs, uplifting to 14	1-13	
Support humanitarian delivery	Deployment of MTT and NTS	1 x MTT tasked to directly support humanitarians	1-6	
Support recovery	Deployment MTTs	2 x MTT and 1 x EORE	3-12	
Release contaminated land	Survey and Clearance of confirmed minefields	Mark and begin clearance of 7 minefields in Khartoum	1-13	
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education				
Strengthen operational capacity	Deployment of EORE teams	6 x EORE teams operational (FCDO, ECHO, SHF, US)	1-10	
Strengthen operational capacity	Direct EORE Grant	Additional EORE teams available	1-6	
Support IDP return	Indirect delivery EORE Grant	Redeveloped messaging and delivery mechanisms	3-8	
Victim Assistance				
Map VA in Sudan	Victim assistance and referrals	Formalise referral pathway and oversight mechanisms	1-7	
Information Management				
Establish IMSMA Core	Create database, design, test and implement forms	IMSMA implemented	1-13	
Validate legacy contamination	Recover legacy data and integrate onto database	Legacy records validated and updated in IMSMA	5-13	
Capacity Development				
Introduce new technology	Import and train NMAC and Teams on GPR	GPR capability running	1-13	
Technical training and qualification	EOD 2 and EOD 3 courses.	More teams trained	3-8	
Infrastructure enhancement	Refurbish and enhance the NMAC training centre	Training centre suitable for full spectrum of operations	4-9	

Table 2.15: Gantt Chart for planned activities for the duration of the current extension period

2.17.2. Phase 2 (April 2027 - March 2029)

During the proposed extension period, Sudan will prioritize evidence-based survey and land release activities to accurately define the extent of mine and ERW contamination and reduce risks to affected populations within safe and accessible areas.

The programme will focus on non-technical survey (NTS), technical survey (TS), clearance, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), and victim assistance, while supporting humanitarian access and the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Preliminary estimates indicate approximately 5.1 km² of legacy contamination and 15.5 km² of new contamination linked to recent hostilities. To address this challenge, Sudan will implement a phased and prioritized response.

NTS and EORE will be conducted using open-source information and conflict event location analysis, targeting more than 8,632 suspected hazardous locations. representing an estimated 21.6 million m², within areas assessed as safe and accessible. Technical survey, clearance, and EORE will be undertaken in seven confirmed suspected minefields in Khartoum State, including Al Jazeera, Sennar and white Nile state based on previous survey results and recent data.



In addition, Sudan will conduct re-survey, re-marking, EORE, and clearance of legacy contamination in safe and accessible areas of Blue Nile, West Kordofan, and South Kordofan States, to validate historical records and address residual risks. NTS and EORE will also be carried out in safe towns and villages to enable the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of IDPs.

Survey and clearance of suspected hazardous roads will be conducted to restore freedom of movement, humanitarian access, and socio-economic activity. Explosive Ordinance Risk Education EORE activities will target approximately 2.5 million people, prioritizing high-risk groups, including IDPs, returnees, women, children, and humanitarian workers. Victim assistance services will be provided to at least 200 mine/ERW survivors, focusing on medical care, rehabilitation, psychosocial support, and referrals.

To deliver these activities, the programme will deploy twelve (12), eight (8) NTS teams and nineteen (19) EORE teams, subject to security conditions and available resources.

2.18. Planned Activities During the Proposed Extension Period (April 2027 - April 2029)

The structured plan includes a comprehensive set of activities to address contamination from mines and ERW. Key targets include addressing 5.1 km² of legacy and 15.5 km² of newly identified contamination, alongside Non-Technical Surveys (NTS) of 8,632 suspected hazardous locations (21.6 million m²). Technical survey and clearance will target 5.1 million m² across seven confirmed minefields in Khartoum State, with additional clearance in Blue Nile, West Kordofan, and South Kordofan.

Intervention Area	Planned Activities	Geographic Focus / Scope	Estimated Coverage / Targets
Contamination Context	Address legacy and new mine/ERW contamination	Nationwide (safe and accessible areas)	5.1 km ² legacy contamination; 15.5 km ² new contamination



Non-Technical Survey (NTS)	NTS supported by open-source data and conflict event location analysis	Safe and accessible areas nationwide	8,632 suspected hazardous locations; ~21.6 million m ²
Technical Survey & Clearance	TS, clearance, and EORE in confirmed hazardous areas	Seven confirmed minefields in Khartoum State	~5.1 million m ²
Legacy Data Validation	Re-survey, re-marking, clearance, and EORE	Parts of Blue Nile, West Kordofan, and South Kordofan States	Legacy CHAs / SHAs in safe and accessible locations
Support to IDP Return	NTS and EORE in towns and villages	Safe and accessible IDP return areas	Reduced risk for returning populations
Road Survey & Clearance	Survey and clearance of suspected hazardous roads	Priority humanitarian and economic routes	Restored freedom of movement and access
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE)	Community-based and targeted EORE	Nationwide (high-risk groups)	~2.5 million people reached
Victim Assistance	Medical care, rehabilitation, psychosocial support, and referrals	Nationwide	At least 200 mine/ERW survivors assisted
Operational Capacity	Deployment of national survey and EORE teams	As security and access permit	12 NTS , 8 NTS teams; 19 EORE teams

Table 2.16: Planned activities for extension period.

The plan prioritizes supporting the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) through NTS and Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) in safe areas, and clearance on critical routes to restore freedom of movement. EORE aims to reach 2.5 million high-risk individuals, and victim assistance will provide medical and psychosocial support to at least 200 survivors. Operational capacity includes deploying 12 NTS and 19 EORE national teams, subject to security conditions.

2.19. Workplan Milestones and Timeline (April 2027 - April 2029)

The work plan outlines a 24-month strategy for mine action and explosive ordnance risk reduction. Key objectives include defining and reducing contamination through Non-Technical Survey, Technical Survey, and clearance, with a specific target of releasing 5.1 million square meters in Khartoum. The plan also focuses on validating legacy contamination by re-surveying and updating records. Reducing civilian risk is a major component, aiming to reach 2.5 million people with Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE). Furthermore, the strategy supports the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and restores access by conducting NTS and EORE in return areas and clearing priority roads. Victim assistance is integrated by providing support and referrals to at least 200 survivors. Finally, the plan aims to strengthen capacity by deploying Mine/ERW Threat Teams (MTT), NTS, and EORE teams.

Objective	Key Activities	Milestones / Outputs	Timeline (Months)
Define the extent of contamination	Non-Technical Survey (NTS) using open-source and conflict event data	NTS completed for priority SHAs; national database updated	Months 1–18



Reduce confirmed contamination	Technical survey in confirmed hazardous CHAs	TS completed in all priority confirmed CHAs	Months 6–20
Release contaminated land	Clearance of confirmed minefields	Clearance completed in seven confirmed minefields in Khartoum (~5.1 million m ²)	Months 8–24
Validate legacy contamination	Re-survey and re-marking of legacy SHAs	Legacy records validated and updated in IMSMA	Months 4–18
Reduce civilian risk	Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE)	2.5 million people reached through EORE	Months 1–24
Support IDP return	NTS and EORE in return areas	Priority towns and villages assessed and declared safe	Months 3–22
Restore access and mobility	Survey and clearance of suspected roads	Priority humanitarian and economic routes released	Months 6–24
Assist mine/ERW survivors	Victim assistance and referrals	At least 200 survivors assisted and referred	Months 1–24
Strengthen operational capacity	Deployment of MTT ,NTS and EORE teams	12 MTT , 8 NTS teams and 19 EORE teams operational	Months 1–6

Table 2.17: Planned activities for extension period.

A Gantt chart displaying the work plan graphically can be found in Annex E to this document.

2.19.1. Prioritisation of task sites.

The challenge of prioritisation exists for all sectors, both the humanitarian crisis and recovery in Sudan. When mine action is considering its prioritisation of the deployment of assets, whether they are land release, risk education or victim assistance, they should be done so in accordance with humanitarian needs priorities. This prioritisation must be conducted in close collaboration with the analysis done by the humanitarian aid commission of Sudan, UN agencies, and the needs of donors contributing to the recovery efforts facilitated by mine action. Mine action and more broadly EOD has the benefit of its universal principles which allow teams and sub national offices to always, without exception, prioritise direct risk to life interventions.

The re-establishment of a function IM system, in IMSMA Core, combined with a larger clearance capacity will enable a better system of prioritisation to be established, which can be adapted based on need, humanitarian situation, conflict situation and access.





Figure 2.11 - The wreckage of a car in a newly discovered urban minefield.

2.19.2. Expected productivity.

Based on the assumption that mobilised teams during Phase 1 will remain operational throughout phase 2 it is expected that there will be a total of 26 x MTTs, 8 x NTS+ teams (NTS with EOD capacity), 19 x EORE+ teams (EORE with NTS capacity) by the end of the extension period. This will equate to the following number of “team months” with the following outputs.

TEAM TYPE	KEY ACTIVITIES	Team Months	EORE beneficiaries	SQM assessed
Multitask team	NTS, TS, EORE, EOD, BAC	812	1.06 Million	44.6 Million
None Technical Survey +	NTS, EORE, EOD	188	0.8 Million	5.6 Million
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education +	EORE, NTS	549	11.5 Million	16.47 Million
Total		1549	13.36 Million	66.67 Million

Table 2.18: Planned scale and output of operations.

The cost of this implementation is estimated, without considering the risks which affect operations and limitations on equipment, to be approx. 140 Million USD including management and support between Apr 2026 and Apr 2029.

2.20. Risks which may affect the implementation of the workplan

The challenges and obstacles that have significantly impeded Sudan's progress toward full compliance with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, as detailed in Section 2.12 of this extension request, are not only persistent but are projected to remain largely extant moving forward. In addition to the deeply rooted barriers Sudan confronts in its vital efforts to remove the threat posed by Anti-Personnel (AP) mines and Cluster Munitions (CM), the following key systemic and external risks are highly likely to have a substantial, adverse impact on the ambitious workplan:

2.20.1. On-going Internal Conflict and Volatility

The protracted and continuing internal conflict, primarily between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has plunged Sudan into a constant and pervasive state of operational and security instability. This volatility critically undermines the mine action programme's fundamental ability to launch and maintain sustainable, long-term operations in critical areas of known or suspected AP mine and CM contamination. This issue has historically and persistently been a major constraint for operations in the Kordofan regions of Sudan, where frontlines are fluid and access is severely limited. Alarming, this limitation is now expanding and is likely to severely restrict access in other volatile regions, notably Blue Nile State, where recent flare-ups of conflict have reignited hostilities and displaced populations.

Furthermore, the constantly shifting and unpredictable frontlines between the SAF and RSF present a significant and dangerous risk of previously cleared and verified safe areas becoming recontaminated with newly laid mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO). This tragic scenario would not only nullify the immense effort and resources already expended but would effectively double the required clearance efforts, creating a cyclical problem of mine clearance and recontamination that dramatically slows the path to compliance. The necessary focus on emergency response and risk education in conflict-affected areas also diverts critical resources away from proactive, systematic clearance tasks.

2.20.2. Regional Instability and Geopolitical Ripple Effects

The escalating geopolitical and military environment in the wider Middle East is already beginning to cast a tangible and detrimental shadow over the progress of the Sudanese mine action effort. A case in point involves a critically important, planned course intended to train twenty Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Level 3 personnel, a component vital for rehabilitating and independently sustaining the sector's advanced technical capacity. This course has been regrettably cancelled due to the heightened and direct threat of war and regional spillover, specifically in Lebanon, the intended host country.

The broader regional conflict dynamics could also exert a negative influence on the flow of lethal aid and weapons into Sudan. This proliferation, often involving less traceable or modern ordnance, poses the very real danger of introducing new and complex explosive threats (such as new types of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or unrecorded stockpiles of ordnance) that the existing mine action sector is not yet fully equipped or trained to manage. The effort required to adapt to, identify, and safely dispose of these new threats will inevitably slow the overall momentum and progress of the mine action sector.

In addition to these concerns, the confluence of rising global commodity prices, the falling value of the Sudanese pound and other adverse macroeconomic factors, compounded by the direct and indirect economic impacts of regional wars, will almost certainly inflate the cost of implementation and severely impact the financial viability of mine action progress.

2.20.3. Donor Fatigue and Shifting Global Priorities

Despite the stark reality that Sudan remains among the world's most severe and complex humanitarian crises, the level of international funding committed to the mine action sector remains disproportionate to the overwhelming scale of the need. As new conflicts and humanitarian emergencies continue to erupt and escalate across the globe, it is highly probable that available



international funding will have to be distributed more widely, leading to a de-prioritisation and a subsequent reduction in the financial resources allocated to Sudan.

A significant, sustained reduction in funding, when combined with the severe operational, security, and economic factors detailed above, would be devastating to the already struggling progress of mine action in Sudan. The lack of necessary operational capital would lead to the scaling back or complete cessation of clearance and risk education efforts, which will, without doubt, result in a significant and preventable loss of life, severe injury, and the continued denial of livelihood opportunities for hundreds of thousands of vulnerable Sudanese citizens.

2.20.4. Persistent Lack of and Difficulties Acquiring Technical Equipment

The modernisation and enhancement of Sudan's mine action capacity through the leveraging of new and advanced technologies remains an extraordinarily difficult task. This difficulty stems primarily from stringent and complex national importation limitations. Furthermore, the requirement for *dual-use* items (technologies with both civilian and potential military applications, common in mine action) to be accompanied by a certified End User Certificate (EUC) often creates a bureaucratic hurdle that, while justifiably in place for security reasons, proves to be extremely limiting and restrictive for operational procurement.

While the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) continues its vital role in supporting the sector with the introduction of select new technologies and best practices, the scale of this support is insufficient to meet the colossal and escalating challenge of clearing widespread contamination. More substantial, dedicated, and streamlined international technical assistance is critically needed to overcome these import and regulatory barriers, thereby ensuring that the sector is equipped with the state-of-the-art tools necessary to accelerate clearance and save lives.

2.21. Institutional, human resource and material capacity

Sudan's ability to implement its Article 5 obligations is grounded in an established national mine action framework, led by the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), operating under the policy guidance of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA). Despite the severe disruption caused by the armed conflict of April 2023, Sudan has taken significant steps to reconstitute and strengthen its institutional, human, and material capacity to ensure the continuation of mine action activities.

2.21.1. Institutional Capacity

NMAC remains the central coordinating body responsible for planning, tasking, quality management, and oversight of all mine action activities in Sudan. Following the relocation of its headquarters to Port Sudan, NMAC successfully re-established operational coordination functions and resumed activities in accessible areas through a network of sub-offices, including Kassala, Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Omdurman, and Al Jazirah.

The programme continues to operate in accordance with the Sudan National Mine Action Standards (SNMAS), aligned with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). NMAC maintains responsibility for accreditation of operators, tasking of survey and clearance operations, quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC), and national information management through the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA Core), which is being progressively deployed nationwide.



Coordination mechanisms with national and international stakeholders have been maintained and strengthened, ensuring effective prioritization, resource allocation, and integration of mine action within broader humanitarian and recovery frameworks.

2.21.2. Human Resource Capacity

The conflict in 2023 significantly affected human resources, resulting in the loss, displacement, and attrition of experienced personnel. In response, NMAC implemented mitigation measures, including the reassignment of experienced staff to critical roles, accelerated recruitment of new personnel, and targeted capacity development initiatives.

Sudan's mine action programme currently relies on a combination of national staff within NMAC and implementing partners, including national and international non-governmental organizations. The expansion of national NGOs since 2023 has significantly contributed to maintaining operational capacity, particularly in non-technical survey (NTS), explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), and emergency response activities.

Capacity development remains a priority. Training programmes aligned with IMAS and SNMAS have been conducted in key areas, including non-technical survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), basic demining, and operations management. The National Mine Action Training Centre serves as a central platform for building and sustaining technical competencies, with continued support from international partners.

Efforts have also been made to ensure inclusive participation, with increased representation of women in survey and EORE teams, contributing to improved access to communities and enhanced quality of data collection.

2.21.3. Material and Operational Capacity

The outbreak of conflict in April 2023 resulted in the widespread loss and destruction of mine action assets, including vehicles, equipment, and office infrastructure. This significantly reduced Sudan's operational capacity, particularly in mechanical clearance and specialised EOD capabilities.

Since then, Sudan has initiated a gradual recovery of material capacity through government support, partner contributions, and limited donor assistance. Current operational capacity is primarily focused on non-technical survey, risk education, and manual clearance in accessible areas. However, significant gaps remain in critical assets, including:

- Mechanical clearance equipment
- Personal protective equipment (PPE)
- Detection tools and technologies
- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment
- Operational vehicles and logistics support

Addressing these gaps is essential to scale up operations and meet Article 5 obligations within the requested extension period. Sudan will continue to prioritize resource mobilization and partnerships to restore and expand its operational capabilities.



2.21.4. Outlook

Despite the challenges posed by ongoing insecurity, Sudan has demonstrated resilience in maintaining core mine action functions and progressively rebuilding capacity. The requested extension period will enable Sudan to further strengthen institutional systems, expand trained human resources, and restore essential equipment and infrastructure.

Sustained international cooperation and assistance, in line with Article 6 of the Convention, will remain critical to ensuring that Sudan can effectively implement its obligations and address the evolving contamination landscape

Annexes

List of Annexes

Annex A - Maps

Annex B - Abbreviations and Acronyms

Annex C - Glossary of Terms


Annex D - Full list of remaining AP mined areas

Annex E - Workplan Gantt chart




Annex A - Maps


A.1. Pre 2023 War Contamination Map




A.2. Estimated contamination map



A.3. Access Map



A.4. Central Khartoum MF and SHA map



Annex B - Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data	GoS	Government of Sudan
AP	Anti-Personnel	GoNU	Government of National Unity
AT	Anti-Tank	LTA	Low Threat Area
AV	Anti-Vehicle	LRP	Land Release Process
BAC	Battle Area Clearance	LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	MAG	Mine Advisory Group
CHA	Confirmed Hazardous Area	MECHEM	Commercial Demining Company
DA	Dangerous Area	MDD	Mine Detection Dog
DCA	Danish Church Aid	MCT	Manual Clearance Team
DHA	Defined Hazardous Area	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations	MF	Minefield
DRC	Danish Refugee Council	NTS	Not Technical Survey
EO	Explosive Ordnance	NTSG	National Mine Action Standards and Guidelines
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	NMAS	National Mine Action Standards
ERW	Explosive Remnant of War	NMAC	National Mine Action Centre
FPDO	Friends of Peace and Development Organization	NDU	National Demining Units
FSD	Swiss Demining Federation	NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
GMAA	General Mine Action Assessment	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
HTA	High Threat Area	QA	Quality Assurance
HNRP	Humanitarian Needs Response Plan	QC	Quality Control
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons	SAC	Survey Action Centre
JASMAR	Sudanese NGO	SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action	SHA	Suspected Hazardous Areas
RSF	Rapid Support Forces	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
SDG	Sudanese Pound	UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures	UNMAO	United Nations Mine Action Office
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army	USD	United States Dollar
TS	Technical Survey	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

Annex C - Glossary of terms

C.1. Applicable Mine Action Acronyms and Terminologies:

Since its establishment in 2002, the Sudan mine action program has adapted some mine action-related terminologies such as Explosive Ordnance (EO), Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA), Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA), and Mine field (MF), for defining and confirming the state of hazard in a specific area. After reviewing the Sudan National Mine Action Standards (SNMAS), the terms Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA), and Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA) were defined as follows:

The term “Explosive Ordnance” is interpreted as encompassing mine action’s response to the following munitions:

- Mines
- Cluster Munitions
- Unexploded Ordnance
- Abandoned Ordnance
- Booby traps
- Other devices (as defined by CCW APII)
- Improvised Explosive Devices⁴

The term “Suspected Hazardous Area” refers to an area where there is reasonable suspicion of EO contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of EO.

The term “Confirmed Hazardous Area” refers to an area where the presence of EO contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of EO.

C.2. The following Land Release related terms are also applied:

The term “Land Release” refers to the process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of EO through non-technical survey, technical survey and/or clearance.

The term “Non-technical Survey” refers to the collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution and surrounding environment of EO contamination, in order to define better where EO contamination is present, where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence.

The term “Technical Survey” refers to the collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution and surrounding environment of EO contamination, in order to define better where EO contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence.

⁴ Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) meeting the definition of mines, booby-traps or other devices fall under the scope of mine action, when their clearance is undertaken for humanitarian purposes and in areas where active hostilities have ceased.

The term "Clearance" in the context of mine action, refers to tasks or actions made to ensure the removal and destruction of all EO from a specified area to a specified depth or agreed parameters as stipulated by NMAC.

The term "All Reasonable Effort" describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of EO. "All reasonable effort" has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

Annex D - Remaining AP mined areas

Hazard ID	Mac	State	Locality	Village	Longitude	Latitude	Type	Area
2402	SU	Blue Nile	Bau	Ullu	33.433447	10.859353	SHA	24,079
513	NR	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Bwayeth	34.021444	9.93025	SHA	0
2670	SU	Blue Nile	Bau	Malakan	33.664556	10.764333	CHA	832,434
2403	SU	Blue Nile	Bau	Ullu	33.418447	10.859353	SHA	38,392
383	NR	Blue Nile	Bau	Ullu	33.6087	10.6743	SHA	2
149	NR	Blue Nile	Bau	Madah	33.772694	11.048333	CHA	1,374
90	NR	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Chali	34.033694	10.226639	CHA	22,376
28-2	NR	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Guffa	33.79349	10.314469	SHA	50,000
2956	SU	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Jorot Gerb	34.29481	10.4631	CHA	5,595
2942	SU	Blue Nile	Bau	Malakan	33.662917	10.837861	CHA	6,720
2689	SU	Blue Nile	Bau	Olu Malkan	33.657806	10.831389	CHA	39,447
2938	SU	Blue Nile	Bau	Ullu	33.46993	10.74169	SHA	470
2966	SU	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Jorot Gerb	34.29481	10.4631	CHA	0
2967	SU	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Dadu	34.28125	10.54089	CHA	2,356
2764	SU	Blue Nile	Bau	Malakan	33.661167	10.830972	CHA	0
1268	NR	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Chali	34.34295	10.23365	SHA	4,712
2925	SU	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Abego	34.30767	11.24241	CHA	2,500
2684	SU	Blue Nile	Bau	Madah	33.47496	11.034019	CHA	89,557

2748	SU	Blue Nile	Bau	Malakan	33.667944	10.944583	CHA	6,789
1267	NR	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Chali	34.181117	10.23135	SHA	141
2926	SU	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Abego	34.32309	11.15765	CHA	5,020
1269	NR	Blue Nile	El Kurmuk	Chali	34.034917	10.2277	SHA	636
3339	SU	Khartoum	Khartoum	Almugran	32.502900	15.607945	CHA	24,122
3362	SU	Khartoum	Khartoum	Almugran	32.499021	15.609631	CHA	44,029
1828	SU	Southern Kordofan	Um Durein	Alhamrah	29.895944	10.895417	CHA	33,368
1239	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Addar	29.897861	10.533086	SHA	1
2960	SU	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Damba	29.6665	10.980833	CHA	122,351
957	SU	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Damba	29.682283	10.9965	SHA	78,540
1205	NR	Southern Kordofan	Heiban	Locholo	30.47175	11.186194	SHA	19
152	NR	Southern Kordofan	Heiban	Tura	30.5595	11.143571	SHA	4,755,043
1172	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Al Tiess	29.864639	10.662306	SHA	236
196	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katla	29.337889	11.761778	CHA	95
129	NR	Southern Kordofan	Habila - SK	Fayo	30.177283	11.640033	CHA	18,641
53	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Abu Snoon	29.485528	10.936028	CHA	270,137
58	NR	Southern Kordofan	Heiban	Al Azraq	30.616611	11.289139	CHA	131,986
117	NR	Southern Kordofan	Um Durein	Um Serdiba	30.017417	10.993056	CHA	207,105
171	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Koyea	30.372217	10.940567	CHA	389,500
279	NR	Southern Kordofan	Um Durein	Um Durain	30.04815	10.855061	CHA	8,948
164	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Krongo	29.610222	10.874056	CHA	12,513
224	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Toro	30.059806	10.589861	CHA	10,501
169	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Krongo	29.60495	10.8861	CHA	3,539
62	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Wali Souq	29.36291	11.84238	CHA	15,540
61	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Wali Souq	29.35845	11.84554	CHA	103,472
192	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katla	29.331556	11.756333	CHA	50
134	NR	Southern Kordofan	Habila - SK	Fayo	30.179967	11.637483	CHA	20,277

165	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Krongo	29.611944	10.875306	CHA	2,993
277	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Wali	29.357667	11.838222	CHA	236,513
86	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Tabania	30.00395	10.595917	CHA	11,933
194	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katla	29.333361	11.754194	CHA	1,418
54	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Julud	29.469056	11.673083	CHA	32,821
60	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Shat Damam	29.758667	10.826417	CHA	45,702
223	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Toro	30.063	10.594611	CHA	3,988
284	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Katsha	29.6826	10.799636	CHA	4,653
65	NR	Southern Kordofan	Um Durein	Al Ahmier	29.843806	10.805528	CHA	769
162	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Krongo	29.609139	10.884889	CHA	16,301
166	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Krongo	29.605611	10.888778	CHA	8,291
128	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Krongo	29.605556	10.892167	CHA	14,735
46	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Wali	29.333944	11.834428	CHA	204,868
276	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Katsha	29.685133	10.789867	CHA	2,245
291	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Wali	29.37475	11.856611	CHA	4,059
201	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katla	29.338222	11.763611	CHA	28
200	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katla	29.335333	11.765556	CHA	65
161	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Krongo	29.607472	10.883167	CHA	7,553
278	NR	Southern Kordofan	Um Durein	Um Durain	30.04815	10.855061	CHA	14,338
280	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Wali	29.363556	11.842444	CHA	10,895
202	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katla	29.337833	11.763778	CHA	51
283	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Katsha	29.681375	10.799449	CHA	3,552
198	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katla	29.333361	11.764556	CHA	61
163	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Krongo	29.61025	10.886556	CHA	1,852
193	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katla	29.333028	11.755917	CHA	1,561
199	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katla	29.333833	11.764944	CHA	43
191	NR	Southern Kordofan	Habila - SK	Brakandi	29.561306	11.851472	CHA	5,326
197	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katla	29.337611	11.760889	CHA	40
75	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Ganaya	29.89405	10.5278	CHA	672

130	NR	Southern Kordofan	Habila - SK	Fayo	30.177017	11.639117	CHA	2,769
181	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Katsha	29.684483	10.798717	CHA	27,494
47	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Wali	29.3261	11.84611	CHA	310,151
74	NR	Southern Kordofan	Um Durein	Ragafi	30.166667	10.994333	CHA	6,706
168	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Krongo	29.603217	10.888083	CHA	5,847
87-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Kololo	29.808831	10.847147	SHA	26,000
100-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Julud	29.49045	11.707881	SHA	100,000
68-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	Heiban	Tira Mande	30.488937	10.88145	SHA	600,000
113-4	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katala	29.329199	11.75685	SHA	60,800
113-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katala	29.312628	11.76455	SHA	432,000
100-2	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Julud	29.493343	11.70038	SHA	270,000
108-2	NR	Southern Kordofan	Abu Karshola	Um Bartaboo	30.696482	11.55665	SHA	400
113-2	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katala	29.312493	11.76631	SHA	594,000
100-4	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Julud	29.690344	11.606595	SHA	375,000
112-7	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Wali	29.37449	11.86331	SHA	122,850
113-5	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katala	29.329303	11.75559	SHA	100,000
92-3	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Tabaina	30.02022	10.586861	SHA	705,000
113-3	NR	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Katala	29.332612	11.762577	SHA	750,000
66-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	Heiban	Um Dar Dur	30.69414	11.031693	SHA	140,000
73-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	Ghadeer	Tambiera	30.768976	11.052796	SHA	75,000
91-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Shat El Sufaya	29.755605	10.683931	SHA	68,256
95-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	Um Durein	Delibia	30.229237	10.76123	SHA	50,000
110-3	NR	Southern Kordofan	Delami	Al Gnei	30.177623	11.6381	SHA	150,000
90-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Angulo	29.87396	10.50759	SHA	0
108-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	Abu Karshola	Um Bartaboo	30.699869	11.58674	SHA	400
85-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Al Dar	29.984052	10.487778	SHA	19,750
92-1	NR	Southern Kordofan	Al Buram	Tabaina	29.99474	10.594272	SHA	236,550
77-5	NR	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Krongo	29.606998	10.86988	SHA	68,000

1703	SU	Southern Kordofan	El Dalang	Rogol Al Marfain	29.62575	10.118889	CHA	3,658
1647	SU	Southern Kordofan	Kadougli	Damba	29.664083	10.983139	SHA	5,551
2552	SU	Southern Kordofan	Delami	Um Hitan	30.05993	11.50656	CHA	47,851
2578	SU	Southern Kordofan	Um Durein	Alhamrah	29.893694	10.895417	CHA	47,641
2257	SU	Southern Kordofan	Habila - SK	Angarko	29.706111	11.894417	CHA	0
1114	SU	Southern Kordofan	Habila - SK	Fayo	30.058194	11.777833	SHA	39,270
2550	SU	Southern Kordofan	Delami	Um Hitan	30.05966	11.5028	CHA	47,785
2177	SU	Southern Kordofan	Habila - SK	Habeila	29.755472	11.800167	CHA	0
2183	SU	Southern Kordofan	Habila - SK	Habeila	30.462583	11.860833	CHA	47
321	NR	Western Kordofan	Abyei PCA area	Lopong	28.328533	9.510183	SHA	12,566
364	NR	Western Kordofan	Abyei PCA area	Mulual	28.4175	9.706667	SHA	6,283
365	NR	Western Kordofan	Abyei PCA area	Mulual	28.415556	9.705833	SHA	3,142

